Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 25, 2024, time 7:20pm ET
Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces back from Ukrainian defenses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces established “combat control” over an unspecified section of the border where Russian forces had initially crossed into northern Kharkiv Oblast following the start of Russian offensive operations on May 10.[2] A Ukrainian commander operating in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) stated that Ukrainian forces have completely stopped Russian offensive operations in the Strilecha-Hlyboke direction (north of Lyptsi) and that Ukrainian forces are now focused on regaining territory in the area.[3] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are successfully pushing Russian forces out of captured positions but that Russian forces are saturating the area with manpower and equipment to prevent Ukrainian forces from seizing the tactical initiative.[4] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have partially transitioned to the defensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast after consolidating captured positions and are currently focused on destroying reserves that Ukrainian forces have concentrated near Kharkiv City.[5] The milblogger assessed that Ukrainian forces would have to launch counterattacks in the area at the end of May 2024 to push Russian forces out of northern Kharkiv Oblast and that future Russian plans on this axis likely depend on the outcome of Ukrainian counterattacks.[6] Russian forces launched their offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast with limited manpower and have yet to commit significant reserves to the area, leading to a decreasing tempo of Russian advances and offensive operations.[7] This decreasing tempo is likely presenting Ukrainian forces with tactical opportunities to counterattack, although Ukrainian forces are not yet conducting a limited counteroffensive operation that aims to push Russian forces completely out of northern Kharkiv Oblast.
The disparate Russian elements currently operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian military’s apparent hesitance to commit available reserves to fight suggests that Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up to its reported planned end strength before intensifying offensive operations and pursuing subsequent phases of the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources had been indicating that the Russian military intends to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area.[8] Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast earlier than intended with an understrength force hoping to establish a foothold before the arrival of resumed US military aid to the front made that task more difficult.[9] Ukrainian sources have identified elements of the 11th Army Corps [AC], 44th AC, and 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA] as the main elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and limited elements of these formations have participated in the offensive operation and have reportedly suffered significant casualties.[10] Zelensky stated in an interview published on May 25 that Russian forces have suffered an eight-to-one casualty ratio in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the past two weeks, although these losses do not appear to have forced the Russian military to commit significant reserves from the 11th AC, 44th AC, or 6th CAA to sustain Russian offensive operations in the area.[11]
Instead, Russian forces appear to be relying on limited elements of units that are part of various different force groupings in eastern Ukraine. Limited elements of the 47th Tank Division’s 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and limited elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[12] Elements of the 47th Tank Division and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are currently heavily committed to intensified Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously reported that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is “leasing” limited elements to the Northern Grouping of Forces.[13] Elements of a battalion of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division’s 217th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast, even though elements of the 217th VDV Regiment and other elements of the 98th VDV Division are participating in intensified assaults on Chasiv Yar’s eastern outskirts.[14] Russian forces have either been attacking with an understrength 217th VDV Regiment in the Chasiv Yar area for some time or have recently transferred a battalion of the regiment to the Northern Grouping of Forces.
Russian forces are likely holding back reserves of the 11th AC, 44th AC, and 6th CAA in order to establish the Northern Grouping at closer to its intended end strength. The Russian military command may be waiting to intensify offensive operations and pursue a second phase of the operation because its plans require a grouping of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel strong. Russian forces likely intend to launch the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast following their intended seizure of Vovchansk, although positional fighting and possible Ukrainian counterattacks could require Russian forces to conduct another wave of intensified assaults in the area to complete the seizure of the settlement.[15] Russian forces currently aim to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City, and it is unclear which goal a second phase of the operation will support or if Russian forces have a more ambitious operational objective in mind.[16] The Northern Grouping of Forces, even at the upper limit of its reported end strength, will lack the necessary manpower needed to conduct a successful operation to envelop, encircle, or seize Kharkiv City.
The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly managed to surprise Ukrainian forces on May 10 and made tactically significant gains in areas that Ukrainian officials reported were less defended.[17] The Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) announced on MAY 25 that it has launched an investigation into improperly prepared Ukrainian defenses in the area and the abandonment of Ukrainian positions in the Lyptsi and Vovchansk directions.[18] The SBI noted that this allowed Russian forces to advance to a second line of Ukrainian defenses in the area, although it appears that limited manpower prevented Russian forces from achieving a deeper penetration. While it is possible that the Russian military command thought the accumulation of a larger force would have alerted Ukrainian forces and prevented the opportunity for operational surprise, the Russian decision to not immediately introduce significant reserves likely prevented Russian forces from achieving rapid gains and a deeper penetration. Ukrainian forces have now established themselves at defensive positions in the area, and Russian forces have likely expended their tactical opportunity to make relatively rapid gains against lightly-held positions in this area.
Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians. Russian forces conducted four distinct missile and glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City on May 25: a missile strike with an Iskander-M missile and S-300/S-400 air defense missiles against an educational facility just after midnight; a strike with two KAB precision-guided glide bombs against the Epicenter construction hypermarket in the city at around 1300; a strike with unspecified munitions against Central Park in Kharkiv City just after 1700; and a strike in a residential area in central Kharkiv City just after 1900.[19] The hypermarket strike sparked a fire that spread to more than 15,000 square meters and engulfed the entire hypermarket.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that up to 200 people could have been in the hypermarket at the time of the strike, and Ukrainian officials have since confirmed that the Epicenter hypermarket strike has killed at least five people, injured at least 40 and that 16 are currently missing.[21] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that the evening strike against a central Kharkiv residential area has injured at least 18 people.[22]
The Russian use of precision-guided bombs against civilian areas in Kharkiv City indicates that Russia likely intends for these strikes to scare Ukrainians into leaving the city. Russian forces have been heavily targeting Kharkiv City with missile strikes and glide bombs – often FAB and KAB bombs modified with glide modules frequently equipped with guidance systems – in recent weeks in part to force residents to flee.[23] Russian aircraft have conducted these strikes from their sanctuary in Russian territory without fear of Ukrainian air defenses due to Western constraints on Ukraine using Western-provided systems against military targets in Russian territory and airspace.[24] Russian forces will very likely continue these strikes as part of the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast as long as Western prohibitions prevent Ukrainian forces from adequately challenging the Russian military’s sanctuary in Russian territory.
Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race. The Washington Post and the New York Times (NYT) reported on May 24 and 25, respectively, that senior Ukrainian military official sources and confidential Ukrainian military assessments described how Russian EW has previously decreased the effectiveness of Western weapons in Ukraine.[25] The NYT reported that the success rate of M982 Excalibur guided artillery shells fell from 55 percent to seven percent between January and August 2023 and that Ukrainian forces stopped using the shells.[26] Ukrainian forces also reportedly experienced issues with Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided munitions in early 2023.[27] US JDAM-ER manufacturers reportedly delivered more EW-resistant systems to Ukraine in May 2023, but Russian forces adapted their countermeasures, causing the JDAM-ER’s success rate to drop to its lowest point in July 2023. The Washington Post noted, however, that the JDAM-ER’s success rate was more than 60 percent for much of 2023. The Washington Post reported that the effectiveness of Ukraine’s M30/M31 rockets for multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) also decreased but that the Ukrainian military assessment that the Washington Post reviewed did not discuss these issues. The NYT stated that Russian forces often deploy EW systems near headquarters and command centers, and Thomas Withington of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told NYT that Ukrainian forces have focused on striking fixed Russian radars and other EW equipment, especially in occupied Crimea, in order to then strike Russian command posts and supply depots.[28] The Washington Post noted that the United States has the means to combat Russian EW jamming, stating that the US military would likely not experience the same issues with Russian EW since the United States has a more advanced air force and “robust” EW countermeasures.[29] Ukrainian forces have notably recently conducted successful ATACMS missile strikes on Russian targets in occupied Ukraine, including Crimea, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have been able to at least partially overcome Russian jamming and/or that Russian EW capabilities are not pervasive throughout all of occupied Ukraine.[30] Both the NYT and the Washington Post noted that Russia and Ukraine are engaged in an offense-defense race as both sides aim to adapt to the other’s innovations – as ISW has frequently assessed.[31]
Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s legitimacy and outlined Russia’s maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.[32] Antonov denied Western statements that Russia is unwilling to negotiate with Ukraine and criticized these statements as a “deliberate attempt” to misrepresent reality. Antonov stated that any Russian-Ukrainian peace agreement must account for the battlefield situation and be signed by a “legitimate” Ukrainian leader, but that it is unclear who could sign such a document since Zelensky has “lost [his] legitimacy.” ISW has previously noted that the Ukrainian constitution allows a sitting president to postpone elections and remain in office past the end of his term during times of martial law, which is currently in effect in Ukraine due to Russia’s full-scale invasion.[33] Russian officials’ focus on Zelensky’s presidential term is only the latest talking point in the Kremlin’s ongoing information operation to discredit Zelensky and frame any pro-Western Ukrainian government as illegitimate.[34] Antonov also dismissed the upcoming Ukrainian Peace Conference in Switzerland as meaningless and as part of a perceived Western effort to legitimize Zelensky’s presidency.[35] Antonov threatened that Ukraine would lose much more territory if the United States continued to ignore Russia’s peace proposals, highlighting the Kremlin’s persistent belief that Russia could subvert Ukraine’s interests and sovereignty by negotiating with the West.[36]
Antonov insinuated that Russia would reject any peace agreement predicated on the retreat or withdrawal of Russian forces from any part of occupied Ukraine, likely including recently occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[37] Antonov claimed that Russia’s constitution prohibits the external division of Russian territory and that Russia’s “new federal subjects” — referring to the illegally annexed and occupied areas of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — are now part of Russia’s clearly marked border and thus cannot and should not return to Ukrainian control. Antonov’s claim insinuates that Russian authorities have clearly determined the borders of the Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed, but occupation authorities have previously presented conflicting assessments of the extent of Russia’s illegally annexed territory. Occupation authorities published conflicting maps in honor of the anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory in September 2023, with some maps showing the entirety of occupied Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to their administrative borders as claimed Russian territory and others showing claimed Russian territory extending roughly to the frontlines.[38] It is unlikely that the Kremlin has taken further steps to determine the boundaries of the Ukrainian territory it illegally annexed in September 2022, and it is unclear how the Kremlin envisions the previously and recently occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast fitting into this framework. Official Russian statements continue to support ISW’s assessment that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any peace agreement that would prevent him from pursuing the complete destruction of an independent Ukrainian state and the subjugation of the Ukrainian people.[39]
Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology. NBC reported on May 24 citing six senior US officials that the Biden administration is concerned that the Russian-North Korean relationship could help North Korea expand its nuclear capabilities.[40] US officials reportedly stated that Russia may push North Korea to conduct its “most provocative military actions in a decade” close to the US presidential election in November 2024. NBC reported that a senior US official stated that US intelligence officials assess that Russia is providing North Korea with nuclear submarine and ballistic missile technology in return for North Korea’s provision of munitions to Russia. US officials reportedly assess that Russia may be helping North Korea develop a long-range ballistic missile that can re-enter the atmosphere with its payload intact — likely referring to the capability required to field an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). NBC noted, however, that US officials stated that they do not have an “entirely clear understanding” of what technology Russia is giving to North Korea as it is difficult to detect and track military technology exchanges. NBC reported that US officials also stated that North Korea may want Russian ballistic missile parts, aircraft, missiles, and armored vehicles and that Russia may help North Korea develop its own DIB. Known facts suggest that Russia is likely at least helping North Korea develop its DIB. Western officials previously stated that North Korea supplied Russia with more than one million artillery shells in 2023.[41] Although these shells are reportedly mostly old, North Korean authorities likely would have agreed to relinquish such a high quantity of munitions only if they thought they would be able to replenish their stockpiles in the near future.[42] North Korea’s ability to produce such a high quantity of shells rapidly would likely require some level of Russian funding and assistance.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area.
- The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians.
- Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race.
- Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s legitimacy and outlined Russia’s maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.
- Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has cancelled its annual “Army Games” international competition for the second year in a row, prompting celebration among critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.