September 13, 2024

Institute for the Study of War: Russian makes marginal advances in Kursk counter-attack

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances west of Vishnevka (southwest of Korenevo) and in northern Krasnooktyabrskoye (southwest of Korenevo). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have recaptured 10 settlements south and southwest of Korenevo since starting counterattacks on the night of September 10 to 11, including Apanasovka, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Vnezapnoye, Gordeevka, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Obukhovka, Snagost, and 10-y Oktyabr. All of these settlements are within the existing claimed limit of Russian advances, and ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation that Russian forces have recaptured any of these settlements except parts of Snagost and Krasnooktyabrskoye. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued advancing southeast of Korenevo and northeast of Snagost (southwest of Korenevo), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking in areas where Russian forces have launched counterattacks and launched additional attacks outside of the salient, making gains in Glushkovsky Raion (west of Korenevsky Raion). Geolocated footage published September 12 indicates that Ukrainian infantry have advanced across the border and into southwestern Tetkino (about 40km southwest of the current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast). Additional geolocated footage published on September 12 shows Ukrainian armored vehicles and infantry bypassing Russian dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles on the Russian-Ukrainian border southwest of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo) unopposed, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced in the area and that Russian forces were not prepared to leverage the obstacles to repel cross-border Ukrainian assaults. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Novy Put, Medvezhye (southeast of Glushkovo), Snagost, Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha).

Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control. ISW uses the doctrinal definition of “control” when referring to control of terrain in which “control is a tactical mission task that requires a commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.” Russian forces have advanced roughly 58 square kilometers in areas where ISW has observed either maximalist claims or visual evidence of Ukrainian forces operating since starting counterattacks on the night of September 10 to 11. ISW previously was not mapping control of terrain within the Ukrainian salient in Russia, and Russian forces have not advanced in recent days through areas which ISW formally assessed were under Ukrainian control. ISW has been mapping the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances, however, and ISW’s mapping never excluded the possibility that Russian forces were operating in areas within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces have not attempted to consolidate positions everywhere in their salient in Kursk Oblast, and it is likely that Ukrainian forces had fewer consolidated positions in forward areas at the edges of the salient where Russian forces have recently advanced. Ukrainian forces most certainly control territory within some areas of the salient in Kursk Oblast, although ISW will continue to refrain from mapping Ukrainian control of terrain in Russia. Russian counterattacks against better prepared and consolidated positions in territory where Ukrainian forces exert control will likely be far less successful than the counterattacks Russian forces launched on September 10 to 11.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area.
  • Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control. 
  • A Ukrainian HIMARS strike reportedly damaged a temporary pontoon bridge across the Seym River and wounded a group of nearby Russian troops on September 12. 
  • Russian authorities have reportedly deployed additional elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast and may begin redeploying more combat experienced forces to support ongoing Russian counterattacks and future counteroffensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia. 
  • The United Kingdom (UK) will reportedly allow Ukraine to use UK-provided long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike military objects in Russia in the coming days. 
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues rhetorical efforts aimed at influencing the ongoing Western policy debate about granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia, although Russia has not previously escalated militarily against perceived Western violations of Russia’s “red lines.” 
  • Russian forces struck a civilian cargo ship transiting through the Ukrainian grain corridor in the western Black Sea on September 11, likely as part of a renewed Russian effort to undermine international confidence in the safety of the corridor. 
  • Russia continued its efforts to enhance relations with non-Western countries at the meeting of BRICS high-ranking security officials and advisors in St. Petersburg. 
  • Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project in the Caucasus. 
  • Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states. 
  • Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published an investigation on September 12 into the Kremlin’s efforts to consolidate its influence over the Russian information space via Telegram ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 
  • Russian forces recently north of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and west of Donetsk City. 
  • Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed on September 12 that the first group of the newly-formed “BARS-Sarmat” volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD and are training for deployment to the frontline in Ukraine.
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Forced displacement represents one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of our time. Individuals and families, torn from the fabric of their communities, find themselves navigating a world of uncertainty, often without basic necessities or a clear path to safety. There are currently some 110 million forced displaced, and this number is growing by 10 million each year!

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