Dr. Robert O. Freedman
Johns Hopkins University
October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a brutal surprise attack on Israel, killing 1200 Israelis, raping Israeli women and taking more than 200 Israelis hostage was a major turning point in Israeli domestic politics and foreign policy—or was it? After more than a year of war which spread from Gaza to Lebanon, to Yemen and finally to Iran which was a supporter of Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, all of which were attacking Israel, the war came to Iran itself as Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran traded attacks. Yet through it all, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite his mistakes on October 7th, remained in power. The Gulf Arab States that had made peace with Israel under the Abraham Accords did not break diplomatic relations (nor did Egypt or Jordan) and the United Arab Emirates actually increased its trade with Israel; and, despite being part of the so-called Global South which was in general critical of Israel, India maintained its close ties with Israel, decrying Hamas terrorism. Similarly, Russia and China, whose relations with Israel had been problematic before October 7th, saw their relations with the Jewish State continue to decline. Europe, whose countries had been divided on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before October 7th, saw its divisions deepen because of the war. The only outlier to this pattern of continuity has been Turkey, whose relations with Israel had fluctuated under its mercurial leader Recep Erdogan. Under heavy domestic pressure Erdogan moved to break Turkey’s lucrative trade relations with Israel although it did not sever diplomatic relations.
Another area of continuity appeared to be in US-Israeli relations. US President Joe Biden strongly backed Israel following the Hamas attack not only with words, but also actions as he deployed US military assets near Israel to deter a possible Hezbollah follow-up attack and he supplied Israel with extensive amounts of military assistance to combat both Hamas and Hezbollah. In addition, American leaders were happy with Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah leaders, several of whom were involved in the attack on the US Embassy in Beirut and the blowing up of the US Marine barracks there in 1983. Yet as Palestinian casualties in Gaza mounted, both Biden and his successor as the Democratic candidate in the 2024 US Presidential election, Kamala Harris, became more critical of Israeli actions. Complicating matters further was the fact that two elements of the traditional Democratic Party’s coalition, American Jews and American Arabs for the most part took opposing positions on US support for Israel during the war with some Arab groups threatening not to vote for Biden (and later Harris) if they didn’t change their position on the war.
Despite these areas of continuity, however, Israel faced serious strains. The unwillingness of Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox population to serve in Israel’s armed forces, problematic before the war erupted, became a major internal problem for Israel as Israel’s non-Ultra-Orthodox population suffered increasing casualties during the war. Indeed, Netanyahu fired his Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, following a dispute about requiring Ultra-Orthodox men to serve in the Israeli Armed forces. Gallant demanded their military service at a time when Netanyahu needed to placate the Ultra-Orthodox parties in his coalition to remain in power.
Another internal problem that was exacerbated by the war was related to Israel’s Arab citizens, who formed about 21% of the Israeli population. While initially loyal to the state after October 7th, tensions grew as ministers in Israel’s right-wing government made caustic comments about their loyalty and Israel’s right-wing minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, paid little attention to the rising crime rate in Arab communities. On the Israeli-occupied West Bank tensions escalated as Israeli settlers, who had regularly clashed with West Bank Palestinians before October 7th, escalated their attacks as the Israeli army, and the Israeli Government did little or nothing to stop them.
One of the central questions more than a year after October 7th was whether Israeli actions in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran had restored the deterrence capability which Israel appeared to lose following the Hamas attack, Hezbollah’s daily rocketing of Northern Israel, and Yemeni Houthi missile attacks on Israel. Clearly, Israel gravely weakened Hamas by assassinating its top leadership and destroying much of the Hamas arsenal, greatly reducing the likelihood that Hamas would have the capacity to launch another October 7th type attack. Still, guerrilla war continues to be waged in Gaza and Israel has not yet destroyed the organization, which was one of Netanyahu’s goals. Similarly, in Lebanon, Israel has assassinated Hezbollah’s top leadership and seized a strip of land on Lebanon’s southern border which Hezbollah had used to fire anti-tank weapons into Israel, and also heavily bombed Hezbollah sites in Southern Beirut and Hezbollah positions in the Bekaa valley adjacent to Syria from which Iran had sent weapons to its Lebanese ally. Nonetheless, Hezbollah rockets continue to strike Israel and, so far at least, Israel has not sent its army north to push Hezbollah beyond the Litany River.
Finally, in the case of Iran, there have been two rounds of direct conflict, one in April 2024 and the second in October 2024. Following a major Iranian missile attack on Israel at the beginning of October 2024, Israel responded with a massive attack on Iranian military targets including missile factories and SAM-3 air defense systems. With Iran threatening to retaliate again—although that might just be bravado given the weakened state of Iran’s air defenses—it is not clear whether Israel has reached a state of deterrence with Iran. In sum, the Israel-Hamas war has caused more changes in Israeli domestic politics and society than in its foreign policy. However, it remains to be seen whether Netanyahu will be able to remain in power, whether Israel has indeed restored deterrence, and to what degree US-Israeli relations will change with Donald Trump as the next US President.