Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with RBK-Ukraine published on March 3 that there are 620,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, about 200,000 of whom are actively fighting on the frontline.[1] Skibitskyi stated that there are roughly 35,000 additional Rosgvardia troops protecting rear areas and that these personnel can become a second line of defense if necessary. Skibitskyi stated in November 2024 there were about 580,000 Russian soldiers operating against Ukraine (presumably both within Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast), and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in January 2025 that the total Russian force grouping in Ukraine was about 600,000 troops.[2]
Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term. Skibitskyi reported on March 3 that Russian authorities recruited 440,000 military personnel in 2024 — 10,000 more than their quota for the year — and fulfilled their January 2025 recruitment quota by 107 percent.[3] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in July 2024 awarding 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,400) to anyone who signed a contract with the Russian MoD between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024 – more than double the previous federal award of 195,000 rubles (roughly $2,100).[5] This increased federal reward likely contributed to Russia’s successful recruitment drive in 2024. Russian federal subjects offered additional high regional bonuses to those who signed military service contracts in late 2024 and early 2025, but select federal subjects have started to reduce these regional payments following the expiration of these limited time offers, indicating that such measures are not sustainable indefinitely.[6] Skibitskyi stated that 15 percent of Russian recruits in 2024 were people under criminal investigation, in prison, or serving suspended sentences and that this figure will increase to roughly 30 percent in 2025. Russian officials reported in 2024 that Russia was shutting down some prisons after Russia’s prison population significantly dropped due to the Russian prison recruitment drives.[7] Russia has recently been increasingly recruiting defendants in pretrial detention centers, likely as the pool of prison recruits has dwindled.[8] ISW continues to assess that increased military spending, including large payments and benefits to Russian servicemembers, is hurting the Russian economy at the macro level and that the Kremlin is reducing this spending on military personnel as part of efforts to mitigate the impacts of such initiatives.[9] Russian authorities are unlikely to sustain such high financial incentives as part of their recruitment drives in the medium- and long-term as the Russian economy continues to decline.
Russian missile production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses. Skibitskyi stated that Russia has marginally increased its missile production by a factor of 1.2 to 1.5 throughout 2024 and is “redistributing” its production capabilities.[17] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are producing more Kh-101 cruise missiles and fewer of the less effective Kalibr cruise missiles and intend to produce more Kinzhal and Iskander-M ballistic missiles in the near future. Russian forces rarely used Kalibr cruise missiles in strike packages against Ukraine in January or February 2025 and continue to mainly use Kalibr missiles to pad larger strike packages and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[18]
The GUR reported on February 18 that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant.[19] The GUR reported that Russia has equipped some new Shahed-136 (“Geran-2”) drones with a new type of warhead weighing 90 kilograms, moved the drones’ navigation and power systems from the nose to the tail, and installed an additional ballast to help with the drones’ stability. The GUR reported that Russia is increasingly relying on components manufactured in Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Iran to produce and assemble Shahed drones. The GUR reported that the Geran-3 drone is an analogue to the Shahed-238 and can fly at a speed of up to 550 to 600 kilometers per hour and has a range of 2,500 kilometers. ISW previously assessed that Russia likely intended to further increase its production and use of Shahed drones and other Shahed-variants following the signing of the Russian-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025.[20]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024.
- Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.
- Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine’s air defense umbrella.
- Russian missile production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin continues to promote its “Time of Heroes” veterans’ program as part of efforts to militarize the Russian government and society.