A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia’s full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[1] Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik’s claim, however, stating that Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova).[2] One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested “gray zones.”[3] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022, that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.[4] Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the “fortress belt” in Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years.[6] ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.[7]
The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities.[8] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia’s ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and training throughout the Russian military in recent months.[9]
Russian sources continue to speculate on the Russian MoD’s ability to formalize and further improve Russian motorcycle usage, however.A Russian Telegram channel claimed on June 13 that Mordvichev pioneered the use of motorcycles and ATVs in late 2024 in order to facilitate further Russian advances toward Pokrovsk.[10] The Telegram channel stated that the Russian force grouping in the Pokrovsk direction developed formal norms for using motorcycles by June 2025 and that the Russian military command is attempting to replicate these norms in other frontline areas. The Telegram channel reiterated that Russian servicemembers receive most of their motorcycles from volunteer organizations or purchase motorcycles independently, but noted that Mordvichev intends for the Russian MoD to centrally provide motorcycles for troops and establish a motorcycle stockpile. The Telegram channel, citing unspecified sources in the Russian military, stated that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and that Russian forces have received 20,000 of these motorcycles. One Russian military source told the channel that the Russian MoD intends to purchase 120,000 motorcycles, 30,000 ATVs, and 12,000 buggies by the end of 2025. Another source in the Russian MoD stated that the MoD intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other types of light vehicles — likely in 2025. The Telegram channel stated that Mordvichev also intends to hire a group of instructors to teach troops how to best operate motorcycles and that some of these instructors may be former Wagner Group members.
A Russian milblogger and former Storm Z instructor complained on June 30 that Russian motorcycles and ATVs are vulnerable to Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes and that Russian motorcycle assaults result in higher killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios, however.[11] The milblogger noted that motorcycle assaults could be more successful should Russian forces use motorcycles in tandem with significant air, drone, and electronic warfare (EW) support. Motorcycle usage has allowed Russian forces to marginally improve their ability to dodge Ukrainian drones in contested “gray zones” along the frontline, but Russia’s rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace despite efforts to integrate faster-moving vehicles into assault tactics.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia’s rear. Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 1 that SBU drones struck the “Kupol” Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, Republic of Udmurtia.[12]The SBU sources reported that the drones traveled 1,300 kilometers to the target and that at least two drones struck two factory buildings, causing a fire. The SBU sources reported that the plant produces Tor and Osa air defense systems and Garpiya long-range strike drones. Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows a drone striking the plant, causing an explosion.[13] Republic of Udmurtia Head Alexander Brechalov acknowledged on July 1 that Ukrainian drones struck an enterprise in Izhevsk, starting a fire.[14] Russian milbloggers largely responded to the strike by continuing to call for Russian authorities to strengthen air defenses to protect the defense industrial base in the Russian rear.[15]
Key Takeaways:
- A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia’s full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.
- The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.
- Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia’s rear.
- The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.
- Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.
- An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.