Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things. A German source with insider knowledge told Reuters that Ukrainian officials warned German officials on August 13 that Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin planned to use the Alaska Summit to “play for time” ahead of a potential Russian offensive in October or November 2025.[1] This report is consistent with recent Ukrainian warnings of Russian efforts to prepare for renewed offensives in the future, though it is not yet clear where Russian forces may focus their main effort in Fall 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that Russia may transfer 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia direction, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka direction to intensify offensive operations in these areas in the near future.[2] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview published on August 12 that Russian forces planned to achieve all their objectives near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk — presumably seizing the entirety of these towns — by the end of August or start of September 2025.[3] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces postponed their initial plan to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by August 1 to December 31, 2025, and that Russian forces increased strikes against Kherson City in accordance with plans to do so. Russian forces notably took advantage of the August 15 Alaska Summit to intensify ongoing offensive operations in certain areas of the theater, such as conducting an infiltration operation near Dobropillya, and to stockpile drones and missiles that Russian forces used to strike Kyiv and inflict heavy civilian casualties overnight on August 27 to 28.[4] Reports that Russian forces are still planning for a Fall 2025 offensive support ISW’s long-term assessment and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent statements that the Kremlin’s war aims in Ukraine have not changed.[5]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29. Belousov gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks. Belousov claimed on August 29 that Russian forces seized roughly 300 to 400 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory per month at the beginning of 2025 but that Russian forces are currently seizing roughly 600 to 700 square kilometers per month.[6] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized roughly 426.85 square kilometers of territory in January 2025, 310.67 square kilometers in February 2025, 193.19 square kilometers in March 2024, 173.79 square kilometers in April 2025, 499.28 kilometers in May 2025, 465.80 square kilometers in June 2025, 445.88 square kilometers in July 2025, and about 500 square kilometers thus far in August 2025. Russian advances in August 2025 are far below Belousov’s claims. Belousov’s statement also ignores that Russian forces are making these gains in open fields and areas with minimal fortifications, through failed infiltration operations such as those east and northeast of Dobropillya, and at heavy personnel losses.[7] Ukrainian General Staff reporting about Russian personnel casualties thus indicates that Russian forces suffered an average of 938 personnel casualties per day thus far in August 2025.[8] Belousov stated that 97 percent of wounded in action (WIA) servicemembers return to the frontlines “after being wounded,” which is consistent with reports that the Russian military command continues to send injured Russian personnel on attritional, infantry-led assaults.[9]
Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian battlefield tactics since winter 2024–2025. Belousov claimed that the Russian MoD procured and delivered 22,725 motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies to the frontlines and plans to deliver an additional 12,186 light vehicles to Russian forces along the frontlines by the end of August 2025.[10] ISW previously observed reports from unspecified Russian military sources that claimed that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other light vehicles in 2025.[11] Russian forces are increasingly fielding light vehicles including motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies in lieu of heavy armored vehicles such as tanks due to their maneuverability and cheap cost relative to armored vehicles, which Ukrainian drone operations threaten.[12] Russian forces have not implemented adequate protection for armored vehicles and tanks against Ukrainian drone strikes and Russia faces declining tank and armored vehicle stockpiles.[13]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 29 that GUR forces struck a Russian Buyan-M radar system belonging to an S-400 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Crimea overnight on August 28 to 29.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), struck a Russian diesel fuel pumping station near Naytopovychi, Bryansk Oblast.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the station pumps diesel fuel through Russia’s main oil product pipelines, including for Russian forces, and has a pumping capacity of roughly 10.5 million tons per year. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on August 28 that unspecified actors, implied to be pro-Ukrainian, planted and remotely detonated explosives under railway fuel tanks at the Tver City railway station located between Moscow and St. Petersburg and that the explosion caused a massive fire.[21] The sources stated that the Tver railway junction is a hub that Russia uses to supply its army with fuel and lubricants, ammunition, and personnel. Geolocated footage published on August 28 and Russian opposition outlet Astra clarified that Ukrainian drones struck a crude distillation unit, a liquefied gas rack, a liquified gas pipeline, a gasoline pipeline, a diesel fuel storage tank, and other equipment at the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast during a strike on August 28.[22] Astra reported that 28 Ukrainian drones struck the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery and forced the refinery to cease operations.
The US State Department approved three Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of aviation ammunition, Starlink services, and Patriot air defense system support to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 28 that the US State Department approved an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $825 million that includes up to 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) air-launched missiles and 3,350 navigation systems equipped with modules equipped with anti-spoofing modules, weapons components and spare parts, support equipment, weapons software and support equipment, technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and logistics and transportation support.[28] The DCSA reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and US Foreign Military Funding are funding this FMS to Ukraine. The DSCA announcement confirmed an August 24 report from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that the United States had approved the sale of the 3,350 ERAMs for Ukraine.[29] The DCSA announced on August 29 that the US State Department approved another FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $150 million that includes an extension of Starlink terminal support services and a third FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $179 million that includes Patriot air defense system spare parts, maintenance, and related equipment and technical support.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29 and gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks.
- Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian battlefield tactics since Winter 2024–2025.
- Belousov stated that Russia continues to focus on developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and drone production capacity.
- Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is expanding its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment, likely as part of wider efforts to augment Russia’s administrative capacity to handle conscription and mobilization processes.
- Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
- Ukraine’s ongoing strikes campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia.
- US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York City on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, including at the level of heads of state.
- The US State Department approved a $825 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of aviation ammunition and related equipment to Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.