Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to “surrender parts” of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing. Two senior officials told The Washington Post in an article published on October 18 that Putin told US President Trump on October 16 that Ukraine must cede the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia “as a condition for ending the war” and that he “would be willing to surrender parts” of occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange.[1] The exact terms of Putin’s reported offer are unclear. It is possible that Putin may have been referring to Ukrainian-controlled parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts that Russia illegally annexed and does not occupy. Putin previously demanded the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire in August 2025, and ISW has continuously assessed that ceding the remainder of Donetsk Oblast disproportionately favors Russia.[2] Donetsk Oblast contains territory that is strategically vital for Ukraine’s defense and defense industrial base (DIB), including the fortress belt — Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, which Ukraine has developed into a significant logistical and defense industrial hub.[3] Russian forces currently have no available means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating the fortress belt, which would likely take several years to seize at their current rate of advance. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would allow Russian forces to avoid a long and bloody struggle and continue fighting into deep rear areas of Ukraine from new positions along the Donetsk Oblast border.[4] Russian forces would have advantageous positions from which to launch attacks into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts or southern Kharkiv Oblast – areas that are significantly less fortified than the fortress belt. Such a withdrawal would also set more advantageous conditions for the ongoing Russian offensive to advance across the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast and approach Izyum. Russia would have its choice of multiple, mutually supportive offensive operations to undertake should Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia, especially if there is no guarantee that Russia will not resume offensive operations in Ukraine.
Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City — efforts that are incompatible with Putin’s claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on October 19 that Russian forces control an industrial part of Kherson City in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and several dacha areas on the Dnipro River Delta islands, so “therefore the [seizure] of Kherson [City] itself has already begun.”[5] The administrative boundaries of Kherson City are limited to west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, so it is unclear which areas of east bank Kherson Oblast Saldo is referring to. Russian forces withdrew from all of west bank Kherson Oblast as of November 2022 following a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and interdiction campaign.[6] Kremlin newswire TASS framed Saldo’s statement to imply that Russian forces have begun a new concerted offensive effort to seize Kherson City itself — a significant undertaking that would require Russian forces to ford the Dnipro River and dedicate more manpower and materiel than is currently operating in the Kherson direction.[7] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russian forces will seize Kherson City as it is a “constituent entity” that “must be returned to Russia,” but noted that Russian forces will not do so “anytime soon.”[8] ISW has yet to observe any indicators to assess that Russian forces are likely preparing for or have launched a renewed significant offensive operation against west bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian officials also downplayed the seriousness of Putin’s reported proposal, likely in an effort to condition Russian society to accept the Kremlin’s intent to continue its war effort in Ukraine. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed to Russian state media outlet Lenta on October 19 that occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts “are recognized regions of Russia,” following Russia’s September 2022 sham referenda, and that any territorial concessions that Russia may have proposed “were expressed in a more relaxed manner.”[9] These Russian officials are messaging to domestic Russian audiences that the Kremlin maintains its territorial claims over Kherson City and likely all of west bank Kherson Oblast, and that Putin did not seriously make territorial concessions in Ukraine as Western reporting suggests.
The Kremlin has also failed to prime the Russian information space, particularly Putin’s main constituency of ultranationalists, to accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger characterized Putin’s reported proposal as “utter nonsense” and noted that there is no reason for Putin to willingly trade a “convenient defensive line” on the Dnipro River and a land corridor to occupied Crimea through southern Ukraine in exchange for the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian officials — including Saldo — similarly opposed making possible territorial concessions to Ukraine around the August 2025 Trump-Putin summit in Alaska.[11] Putin has held firm to his original war aims and territorial claims for over three and a half years of war, and ISW has not observed any indications that he is willing to make meaningful concessions on any of these aims for a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine made proposals to the United States for gas infrastructure, nuclear power generation, and several other unspecified projects to contribute to Europe’s energy independence from Russia.[13]
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows large fires and smoke plumes near the refinery’s oil storage tanks.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the primary oil processing unit and are still clarifying the damage. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery produces over 20 types of commercial products and processes about 4.9 million tons of oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Orenburg natural gas processing plant in Orenburg Oblast as part of the October 18-19 strikes, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Orenburg natural gas processing plant is one of Russia’s largest natural gas processing complexes, processing up to 45 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 6.2 million tons of gas condensate and oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit one of the gas processing and purification units. Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on October 19 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at and “partially damaged” an unnamed gas plant’s infrastructure in the oblast.[16] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that the Orenburg gas processing plant is the largest gas and chemical complex in the world.[17] The Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy, citing information from Russian state energy operator Gazprom, reported on October 19 that a drone strike caused the Orenburg gas processing plant to temporarily stop receiving gas from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak oil and gas project, which uses the Orenburg facility to process Kazakh-produced raw natural gas.[18] Bloomberg reported on October 19 that Karachaganak is one of Kazakhstan’s top three oil and gas projects and that the Karachaganak oil and gas project cannot cut gas output without reducing crude oil, as the plant co-produces gas and oil.[19]
German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18. The Associated Press (AP) reported on October 19 that German authorities temporarily closed Munich Airport twice on the evening of October 18 due to several reports of unidentified drones operating nearby.[20] The AP reported that German authorities were unable to verify either instance and reopened the airport. The drone incidents, if confirmed, would mark the latest incident in an increasing trend of unidentified drone incursions near critical civilian infrastructure and military facilities throughout Europe.[21] ISW assesses that these unattributed drone sightings are likely associated with Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[22]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to “surrender” parts of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing.
- Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City — efforts that are incompatible with Putin’s claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19.
- German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.