US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes. US President Donald Trump stated on November 22 that the 28-point peace plan is not his final offer to Ukraine.[1] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated to Fox on November 23 that the peace plan is a “work in progress” and that there are issues that the parties must codify and explain further.[2] Kellogg stated that there likely needs to be an annex document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine. Kellogg stated that the United States does not want a repeat of the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk Agreements, Russian-preferable agreements that gave Ukraine vague security assurances in exchange for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament in 1994 and a 2015 failed ceasefire protocol that greatly advantaged Russia and led to the full-scale invasion in 2022, respectively.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that, after the US-Ukrainian-European meetings on November 23 in Geneva, the peace plan is a “living, breathing document” that changes with new input every day.[3] Rubio added that the parties in Geneva “really moved forward” and that there is no concrete deadline for Ukraine to sign the peace plan, stating that the United States wants to finalize the deal “as soon as possible,” even if that is after the initial November 27 deadline.[4] Rubio stated that the United States recognizes that Ukraine needs security guarantees as part of a peace settlement and that achieving peace will “require for Ukraine to feel as if it is safe” from renewed invasions or attacks.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated, after the Geneva meetings, that “a lot is changing” and that talks will continue later on November 23.[6] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, who is leading the newly formed Ukrainian negotiating delegation, stated that delegations will continue working on November 23 and in the coming days to create a joint proposal between the United States, Ukraine, and European allies.[7]
Western reporting also suggests that the United States is open to amending the peace plan, including points about the Ukrainian military and post-war security guarantees. The Washington Post reported on November 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration recognizes that the security guarantees in the initial 28-point plan are “not strong enough yet.”[8] US officials reportedly stated that US President Donald Trump may raise or remove the 600,000 cap on Ukraine’s military or may consider supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk long-range missiles in the event of a peace agreement to bolster postwar deterrence. The Washington Post reported that a US official stated that the United States and US allies would help Ukraine build a security “wall” along the ceasefire line using unspecified advanced technology. A US official stated that Zelensky responded to the US peace proposal by proposing a ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure, but that Russia then responded by labeling such a ceasefire as a “nonstarter.”
European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan. Western outlets reported that France, the United Kingdom, and Germany drafted a counterproposal ahead of their talks with Ukrainian and American delegations in Geneva on November 23.[9] The 24-point counterproposal reportedly includes calls for an immediate ceasefire to precede discussions about territorial issues; for the cap on Ukraine’s military to be 800,000 “in peacetime;” for Ukraine to receive a security guarantee from the United States similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5; for the use of frozen Russian assets to fully reconstruct and financially compensate Ukraine; for Ukrainian membership in NATO to depend on consensus from alliance members; and for Ukraine to decide on the presence of foreign troops from guarantor states on Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin has already previously explicitly rejected a number of these proposals, including the deployment of foreign troops to post-war Ukraine.[10]
Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia’s longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 22 that Russia cannot deviate from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stated demands at the Alaska summit in August 2025 and reiterated Russia’s commitment to addressing the “root causes” of the war.[11] Ryabkov defined the “root causes” as NATO expansion, weapon deployments to Eastern Europe, and alleged discrimination against Russian people, Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Rybakov’s November 22 definition of the alleged root causes aligns with numerous other high ranking Kremlin officials’ statements on the matter.[12] Ryabkov also noted that Russia will continue to act in its national interests regardless of sanctions, signaling that the Kremlin will remain committed to its war effort in Ukraine even in the face of potential future economic pressures against Russia. Putin notably demonstrated at the Alaska summit that he had not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine.[13] Ryabkov’s reiteration of the importance of eliminating the “root causes” of the war and of Putin’s position at the Alaska summit further indicates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its original war aims and justifications, including demanding that NATO remove its Open Door Policy.
Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the US peace plan aims to preserve a “threat on the Russian border,” likely referring to Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state and Russia’s shared border with longstanding NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic states.[14] Zhuravlev claimed that the Kremlin must treat the plan with “extreme caution” and as a “starting point for negotiations” rather than an ultimate peace settlement. Zhuravlev added that the reported European counterproposal conditions are “completely unacceptable for Russia.” Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly remarked that possible Western transfers of long-range missiles, such as Tomahawks, to Ukraine under the peace plan would contradict Russia’s “demilitarization” objective, which effectively aims to destroy the Ukrainian military such that it cannot protect itself from renewed Russian aggression.[15] Chepa implied that Russia perceives any security assistance or guarantees for Ukraine as a threat to Russia, and Russian state media framed Chepa’s statements as a “warning” explaining why the peace deal is “unacceptable” to Russia.[16] Member of the Belarusian National Assembly’s House of Representatives Vadim Gigin, who is also a prominent propagandist in the Russian and Belarusian information spaces, stated on Russian state television that Russia cannot agree to the peace plan due to “mutual mistrust” between Russia and the United States and that there is no mechanism for implementing such an agreement.[17] These various statements continue to indicate that the Kremlin is disinterested in making any compromises in a peace deal and is setting domestic information conditions to reject the peace plan.
Russian ultranationalists, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, similarly argued that Russia should not accept any peace plan and should instead continue its war against Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that a peace plan could deprive Russia of the opportunity to seize more territory in Ukraine and interpreted Putin’s November 21 remarks about the US-proposed peace plan as a reiteration of Russia’s commitment to fighting while it can still advance.[18] The milblogger concluded that Russia’s ability to sustain the war effort will determine the war’s outcome, not a diplomatic settlement. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russia’s war aims are not limited to the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but encompass all territories “enshrined in the [Russian] constitution,” referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in 2022.[19] The milblogger implied that Russia is willing to continue the war so that it can demand a demilitarized zone that extends all the way to Poland, implying that Russia maintains its maximalist territorial goals in Ukraine. Other Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reiterated that Russia would only agree to a peace plan that encompasses all of Russia’s demands.[20] Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been rejecting the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and reiterating Russia’s commitment to its original, maximalist war aims since Western media began reporting on the proposal on November 20.[21] These statements continue to indicate that Russia is unlikely to accept any proposed peace plan that falls short of Ukrainian capitulation. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[22]
The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning. The Kremlin has been doubling down on the false narrative that Russian battlefield successes are so widespread that a Russian victory is inevitable.[23] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable and that the “realities on the ground” show that Russia faces many obstacles in its path to seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian rate of advance intensified since the Alaska summit, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day between August 15 and November 20. Russian gains notably have still been confined to a foot pace even during this period of faster advances. Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027 at this rate of advance, assuming Russian forces can maintain the current faster rate of advance, Ukrainian defenses remain strong, and Western weapons provisions to Ukraine remain consistent. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to push Ukraine to hand over this territory to save Russia significant amounts of time, effort, manpower, and resources that it could use elsewhere in Ukraine during renewed aggression.
The actual timeline on which Russian forces could potentially seize all of Donetsk Oblast is likely even longer. Foggy and rainy weather has contributed to Russia’s faster tempo in fall 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian drone operations have not been as effective.[24] These seasonal weather conditions are not permanent, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Russian advances since August 15 have also not faced heavily fortified, large population centers the size of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt.[25] Russia’s recent rate of advance of 9.3 square kilometers per day was also notably across the entire theater, and the calculation that Russian forces could seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by August 2027 is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces would commit the same forces, resources, and energy that they have deployed across the frontline since August 15 to fighting in Donetsk Oblast only. The Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire front. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine could also strengthen Ukraine’s defenses, possibly reversing some Russian gains and slowing this protracted timeline even further.
The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks.Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by advancing on the northern shoulder of the encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[26] Additional geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[27] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are completing clearing operations in Pokrovsk.[28] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have created a “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) between Pokrovsk and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad). The milblogger claimed that Russian assault activity is increasing in Myrnohrad and that drone operators are entering the town. The milblogger claimed that it is highly probable that the rest of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is a contested “gray zone.”
Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and maintain a limited presence within and around Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 23 that fighting is ongoing in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from accumulating enough forces to push into the northern part of the town.[29] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses during their attempts to advance into northern Pokrovsk via the Donetska Railway. A Russian milblogger also acknowledged on November 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain a scattered presence between Kozatske (east of Myrnohrad) and Promin (just south of Kozatske).[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in northern Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[31]
Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 23 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian forces participating in offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[32] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position on a dominant height at an industrial facility in Pokrovsk that Russian snipers used to exert fire control over the surrounding area. The SSO reported that Russian forces were also accumulating personnel in the area. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration in Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk and east of Dobropillya) of elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) that were trying to close the encirclement around Pokrovsk from the north. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration point and drone ammunition depot of elements of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and in occupied Sontsivka (in the Russian tactical rear 27 kilometers south of Pokrovsk). The SSO reported a strike against another ammunition depot in occupied Dokuchayevsk (in the Russian operational rear 71 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk) from where Russian forces stored, distributed, and shipped equipment to forces attacking in the Pokrovsk direction.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[33] Russia will likely try to exploit the eventual seizure of Pokrovsk for informational effect to forward the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Russian victory on the battlefield is not inevitable, however, and it notably took Russian forces 21 months to advance roughly 40 kilometers and begin to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.[34] A campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine’s much larger and more populous Fortress Belt, would take several years of arduous battles, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt since 2022.
Key Takeaways
- US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes.
- European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan.
- Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia’s longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance.
- The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning.
- The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks.
- Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.