Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the US-Ukrainian peace proposal during his meeting with a US delegation in Moscow on December 2 and remains highly unlikely to accept any compromises short of his original war goals. Putin, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev met on December 2 with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner.[1] Ushakov stated after the meeting that the US and Russian delegations discussed “several options” for a peace settlement but that they did not agree on a “compromise plan.”[2] Ushakov stated that some of the US proposals were acceptable to Russia but that Putin “made no secret” of Russia’s critical or negative attitude about others. Ushakov stated that the parties did not discuss “specific wording or specific proposals” but discussed the “essence” of the documents that the United States “submitted to Moscow some time ago.” Ushakov stated that the delegations discussed territorial issues and the “enormous prospects” for US-Russian economic cooperation. Ushakov stated that the US and Russian delegations agreed not to disclose the substance of the talks – in line with ISW’s December 1 forecast that the Kremlin was planning to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the meeting to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.[3] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Putin, have been consistently rejecting the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plans did not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist war demands.[4]
NBC reported on December 2, before the US-Russian meeting, that a Russian official stated that Russia will not compromise on territory in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, limits on Ukraine’s military, and US and European recognition of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory.[5] The source reportedly stated that Russia is prepared to be flexible on “secondary issues,” such as frozen Russian assets in Europe. Kremlin insider sources may have leaked information into the US information space about Russia’s stance to frame Russia as willing to compromise on some “secondary issues” in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions on other issues. Russia’s original war aims include the annexation of all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, while issues related to frozen Russian assets are notably not part of Russia’s original war aims. Kremlin insider reports likely also aim to obfuscate Putin’s actual, more extreme objective of taking control of not only all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but of all of Ukraine.
Putin and the Russian military commanders amplified Russian successes in the Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Hulyaipole, and Orikhiv directions, and Putin noted that Russian forces “entirely” maintain the initiative across the front.[10] Putin stated that the Russian military command must provide Russian troops with “everything they need” for winter operations – implying that Russia is prepared to continue hostilities to achieve its goals militarily. Putin’s long held theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces will be able to indefinitely continue gradual advances, prevent Ukraine from regaining any territory, outlast Western support for Ukraine and Ukrainian ability to resist Russian aggression, and ultimately win a war of attrition.[11] Putin’s aggrandized battlefield claims are part of his wider efforts to convince the West that Russia can outlast Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should acquiesce to Russian demands now during negotiations.
Putin exaggerated Russia’s claimed seizure of Pokrovsk as strategically important for large scale breakthroughs. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the complete Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, but Russia’s seizure of the town in the near future is unlikely to produce rapid Russian advances. Putin claimed on December 2 that Pokrovsk is a “good base” for achieving all the objectives that Putin set at the beginning of the war.[12] Putin claimed that Pokrovsk offers Russian forces the ability to advance in “any direction” that the Russian General Staff “deems most promising.” Putin’s statements overestimate the ease with which Russian forces will be able to conduct large-scale breakthroughs from Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely face several challenges when advancing from Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces have a series of effective field fortifications to the west, north, and northeast of Pokrovsk that will complicate Russian advances from Pokrovsk.[13] Russian forces have also recently exploited periods of foggy and rainy weather that hinder the operability of Ukrainian drones to advance in various areas of the front line, but these weather conditions will not persist indefinitely.[14] Russian forces will additionally face terrain and water features that complicate Russia’s ability to rapidly maneuver. Russian forces notably previously failed to make operationally significant advances in the Dobropillya direction as they struggled to widen the deep but narrow penetration and maintain supplies to Russian forces in the area.[15] Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, former 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) also notably struggled to close the northern shoulder of the Russian encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction, and Russia will likely face similar problems advancing from Pokrovsk.[16] Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction are also likely severely degraded, having suffered significant losses in recent months.[17] ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub, but that Russia had already achieved this objective by July 2025.[18] The further operational significance of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk will depend on the nature of Ukrainian withdrawal, Ukrainian defenses beyond Pokrovsk, and the availability of necessary combat power to exploit the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. A Russian seizure of Pokrovsk will not significantly alter Russia’s ability to achieve Putin’s objective of imminently seizing all of Donetsk Oblast, as Russian forces have yet to seize the Fortress Belt, Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of large population centers the size of which Russia has not seized since 2022.
Putin threatened Europe to prevent Europe from engaging in the peace process. Putin claimed that Russia has no intention of going to war with Europe but would be “ready right now” should Europe suddenly want to fight Russia.[29] Putin issued a thinly veiled nuclear threat, stating that a situation would “quickly arise” should Europe start a war with Russia, in which Russia will “have no one to negotiate with.” Putin also threatened that a future Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war would not be like Russia’s war in Ukraine, which Putin claimed Russia is conducting “surgically” and “carefully.” Putin claimed that the war in Ukraine is not a war “in the literal, modern sense of the word,” threateningly implying that Russia could fully mobilize its military, economy, and society in a war against NATO. Russian State Duma deputies echoed Putin’s threats on December 2. Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that there is a “dangerous trend” in Europe toward militarization and threatened that “the more you play with fire, the higher the risk of a conflagration in Europe and around the world.”[30] State Duma Defense Committee member Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed that Europe is trying to protract the war in Ukraine until a war between Russia and Europe erupts.[31] Kremlin threats against Europe likely aim to deter Europe’s involvement in the peace process as well as undermine the strengthening of Europe’s defenses out of fear of allegedly provoking Russian aggression.
Russian forces are modifying their Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian air defenders. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on December 2 that Russian forces have begun striking Ukrainian mobile fire teams operating in moving vehicles with Shahed-type drones.[44] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on December 2 that recent Russian technological adaptations – such as cameras – allow Russian drone operators to directly control Shahed drones (as opposed to Shahed drones with preplanned routes and targets that Russian forces have historically used in strikes against Ukraine’s rear areas), making it easier for Russian forces to hunt Ukrainian air defense systems, especially in rear areas.[45] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Innovation Lieutenant Colonel Yurii Myronenko recently stated that Russian forces started using operator-controlled Shahed drones to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, which Ukrainian forces have been using to shoot down Russian drones.[46] Beskrestnov also reported on December 1 that Russian forces have equipped Shahed drones with R-60 air-to-air missiles to try to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and aircraft that hunt Shaheds.[47] Recent Russian adaptations to the Shahed drone will likely degrade Ukraine’s air defenses and ability to down Shaheds in the rear, and Russia has been exploiting drone adaptations to strike moving targets like trains to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects.[48]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the US-Ukrainian peace proposal during his meeting with a US delegation in Moscow on December 2 and remains highly unlikely to accept any compromises short of his original war goals.
- The Kremlin intensified its cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent in the lead up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting, likely to coerce the West into accepting Russia’s absolutist demands.
- Putin exaggerated Russia’s claimed seizure of Pokrovsk as strategically important for large scale breakthroughs. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the complete Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, but Russia’s seizure of the town in the near future is unlikely to produce rapid Russian advances.
- Putin also intensified efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead up to the December 2 meeting.
- The Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin’s portrayal, however.
- Putin attempted to preemptively deflect blame onto Europe for Russia’s rejection of any peace plan iterations ahead of the December 2 US-Russian meeting.
- Putin threatened Europe to prevent Europe from engaging in the peace process.
- Russia may be trying to set information conditions to justify Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports to impose a de facto blockade of Ukraine.
- Putin may also be setting information conditions to justify Russian attempts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia’s seizure of these regions remains unlikely at this time.
- Russian forces are modifying their Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian air defenders.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.