Russian forces increased their average rate of advance in 2025 due to a new operational template supported by technological adaptations and a shift in assault tactics. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers in Ukraine and regained roughly 473 square kilometers that Ukrainian forces had taken in Kursk Oblast in 2025. Russian gains in Ukraine amounted to 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Russian forces had seized 3,604 square kilometers in Ukraine in 2024. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces suffered 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for an average of 78 casualties per square kilometer seized in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast. The average daily Russian rate of advance in 2025 was 13.24 square kilometers per day — higher than the daily average of 9.87 square kilometers per day in 2024. The Russian rate of advance has not been consistent throughout 2025, however. The Russian rate of advance was highest in November at 20.99 square kilometers per day, but this high came after one of the slowest months in 2025 — 8.8 square kilometers per day in October — and subsequently slowed to 15 square kilometers per day in December.
Russian forces began employing a new operational template that relies on a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults that enabled the Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions that occurred in Fall 2025.[1] Russian forces began achieving some BAI effects by using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in early Spring 2025.[2] The Russian military began to proliferate its elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies — the elements that have been largely responsible for successes in Russia’s operational BAI efforts — across the frontline in April and May 2025.[3]
Russian technological adaptations have also supported Russia’s BAI campaign. Russian forces have scaled the production of fiber optic UAVs that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and have increased the range of their fiber optic UAVs from roughly seven kilometers in early Spring 2025 to around 20 kilometers in Summer 2025.[4] Russian forces also introduced “mothership” drones that can carry and extend the range of first-person view (FPVs) drones and significantly increase the reach of Russian drone strikes in the near rear.[5] Recent Russian technological adaptations have further extended the range of Russian fiber-optic drones to between 50 and 60 kilometers.[6] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted on December 30 that Russia’s concentration of fiber optic drones with ranges of more than 20 kilometers in the Siversk direction enabled Russia’s seizure of Siversk.[7] Russian forces’ use of fiber optic drones has also improved their ability to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in forested areas, such as the Serebryanske forest area, where radio-controlled drones struggle to operate.[8]
Russian forces changed their tactical-level assault methods as well, moving away from highly attritional infantry-led assaults in June 2025 to infiltration tactics (and flag raisings) to make (and falsely claim) gains across the front.[9] This shift in tactics has enabled a more rapid rate of Russian advance in 2025, but Russian forces continue to suffer high casualty rates for gains that remain small.[10]
The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intended to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 — both of which tasks Russian forces failed to complete.[11] Russian forces prioritized efforts to seize Pokrovsk, advance in western Donetsk Oblast, and push into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in 2025. Russian forces advanced into Pokrovsk in September 2025 and have seized 67.63 percent of the town as of December 2025.[12] Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka in late January 2025, intensified efforts toward Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole, and began making notable advances towards the towns in November 2025.[13] Russian forces began operating within Hulyaipole in early December 2025.[14] Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups infiltrated toward Dobropillya in August 2025, but the Russian military command was unable to reinforce the penetration and turn tactical-level advances into an operational-level breakthrough, and Ukrainian forces subsequently retook roughly 70 square kilometers of the penetration.[15] Russian forces also continued attempts to envelop Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the northeast and southwest. Intensified Russian offensive operations northeast of Slovyansk resulted in Russian advances into Lyman (roughly 15 kilometers from Slovyansk) and the likely seizure of Siversk (roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk) in December 2025.[16] Russian forces continued efforts to envelop the Fortress Belt from the southwest and completed the seizure of Toretsk by August 1, 2025, having taken 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk, and began efforts to seize Kostyantynivka in October 2025.[17]
The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. Russian forces made their most rapid advances in 2025 in the Velyka Novosilka and Hulyaipole directions near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, an area characterized by small settlements and open fields. Russian forces initially intensified offensive operations toward Hulyaipole from the south and southeast in May 2025 but failed to make tactically significant advances by mid-July 2025 due to Ukraine’s extensive defensive line oriented against attacks from the south.[21] Recent Russian advances toward Hulyaipole have come from the northeast and east, bypassing these south-facing defenses. Ukraine’s south-facing defensive lines continue to constrain Russian forces elsewhere in Zaporizhia Oblast, however. Ukrainian defenses in the Orikhiv direction, also oriented to defend against attacks from the south, have largely constrained Russian advances toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City. The Russian military command indicated on December 29 that it intends to join the Russian efforts in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions in order to advance on Zaporizhzhia City, likely intending to bypass Ukrainian defenses south of Orikhiv by moving westward from the Hulyaipole direction.[22] Russian forces have also spent 18 months fighting to seize the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area — a heavily fortified Ukrainian area. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations — conditions that will not last indefinitely. Russian forces have been leveraging rain, fog, and snow, which all constrain Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drone operations, to conduct attacks according to their new offensive template. Russian forces fought more effectively in 2025 than in 2024, but have still not restored maneuver to the battlefield and are advancing slowly. Russian casualties remain disproportionately high relative to the territory gained, and it is unclear whether Russia will be able to sustain this tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term.
Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own BAI campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia. Ukrainian forces have noticeably increased their mid-range strikes against Russian energy military assets throughout December 2025 and appear to have significantly escalated such strikes on December 30 to 31.[23] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on December 31 that USF elements struck several Russian energy and military objects at or near operational depths (25 to 100 kilometers) in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and Crimea.[24] Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in occupied Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 124 kilometers from the frontline), and geolocated footage shows the strike and fire at the depot.[25] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck positions of the Russian Rubikon-D Spetsnaz unit (Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies), 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline); substations in occupied Melitopol and Molochansk, Zaporizhia Oblast (50 kilometers and 35 kilometers from the frontline, respectively); and the base of the Russian 92nd River Boat Brigade and an ST-68 radar station near Olenivka, Crimea.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Olenivka strike occurred overnight on December 30 to 31 and reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian ammunition depots near Blizhnye and Siatel, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 74 kilometers and 90 kilometers behind the frontline, respectively).[27] Russian sources and occupation officials indicated that Ukrainian forces likely conducted the Rovenky oil depot and Melitopol and Molochansk substation strikes on the night of December 30 to 31.[28] Ukrainian forces likely seek to use these mid-range strikes to counter recent Russian advances. This Ukrainian BAI campaign is still in its early stages, so the immediate effects on Russian offensive operations are still unclear.
Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine in 2025. The sizes of Russia’s overnight strike packages have grown significantly throughout 2025. Prior to 2025, Russian forces launched their largest strike package against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024, with 210 drones and missiles.[29] Russian forces in 2025 have launched 52 strike packages containing 210 or more projectiles.[30] Russian forces launched their largest-ever strike package on September 6 to 7, 2025, containing 810 drones and 13 missiles.[31] Russian forces have launched a total of 18 strike packages that each contain over 500 projectiles in 2025.[32] The Russian defense industrial base’s (DIB) ramped-up production in 2025 has allowed Russia to produce and launch missiles and drones at such high numbers and frequencies.[33] Russian strikes during Fall and Winter 2025 have largely targeted Ukraine’s energy grid with devastating effects.[34] Russian forces have also significantly increased their strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure to impede Ukrainian logistics.[35] Russian forces have used a series of technological adaptations to their missiles and drones to achieve these effects in 2025, including integrated cameras and radio control capabilities on Russian Shahed-type drones that have allowed Russian forces to strike moving targets such as locomotives.[36] Russia has also leaned on its partners and allies to increase production, importing critical components from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and relying on North Korea for KN-23 missiles and labor to work at Russia’s Shahed-producing factory in the Republic of Tatarstan.[37]
The Kremlin is presenting alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but the alleged evidence continues to be unpersuasive. Major General Alexander Romanenko, chief of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), gave a briefing on December 31 about the alleged Ukrainian drone strike against Putin’s residence.[38] Romanenko repeated many of the claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) December 29 report, including the claim that Russian forces downed 91 total Ukrainian drones targeting Putin’s residence over Novgorod, Bryansk, and Smolensk oblasts.[39] The Russian MoD first issued a report about downed Ukrainian drones on the morning of December 29 and subsequently updated that report later in the day, likely to correct some of the discrepancies that did not conform to Kremlin claims about the alleged Ukrainian strike.[40] The Russian MoD is likely leveraging Romanenko as a high-ranking commander to try to bring credibility to the Kremlin’s claims.
The Russian MoD posted a map on December 31 of the alleged flight paths of the Ukrainian drones.[41] The map appears to show dozens of drones flying over or near Smolensk City, east of the Russian-Belarusian border. ISW had not observed reports of Russian forces downing drones over Smolensk Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, and it is unlikely that Russian air defenses would have engaged these drones over a major city with nearby military infrastructure. It is also unclear how the Russian MoD would have been able to confirm that drones flying over Bryansk Oblast were targeting Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast, as drones could have been targeting many other areas in various directions from Bryansk. ISW did not observe reports or evidence of Russian forces downing drones over Bryansk Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29 in any event. The absence of such evidence is not in itself proof that there were no Ukrainian drone overflights in these areas, but it is part of a pattern of silence that is unusual when Ukraine conducts strikes deep into Russia.
The Russian MoD posted footage on December 31 showing a Russian servicemember next to a drone that Russian forces allegedly downed while it was flying toward Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29.[42] The servicemember in the footage claimed that the drone was targeting a “protected facility” in Valdai Raion, Novgorod Oblast.[43] The servicemember highlighted the technical characteristics of the drone and claimed that the drone’s high-explosive warhead is designed to destroy “personnel or civilian targets.” The footage offers no distinguishing features to confirm the location or timing of filming. The Russian MoD’s footage of the alleged drone wreckage comes after Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists on December 30 that he does not think there “should be any evidence” of the strike, but that questions about any downed drone debris as possible evidence are a matter for the Russian military.[44] ISW continues to note that strikes such as the one Russia is claiming Ukrainian forces conducted on December 28-29 typically generate the rapid publication of various sorts of evidence of the strike, such as footage, statements from Russian authorities about Russian air defense activity, and reports from local sources and media about the strike and damages.[45] The circumstances of the alleged December 28-29 strike continue do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes. Kremlin statements and presentations of alleged evidence do not account for these discrepancies. ISW is aware of reports that US intelligence officials have confirmed that Putin’s residence was not the target of Ukrainian strikes, but has no ability to confirm those reports.[46]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces increased their average rate of advance in 2025 due to a new operational template supported by technological adaptations and a shift in assault tactics.
- The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals.
- The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas helped to hinder Russian advances in select areas in 2025.
- Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own BAI campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia.
- Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine in 2025.
- The Kremlin is presenting alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but the alleged evidence continues to be unpersuasive.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin officially named 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in his annual New Year’s Eve address.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.