Institute for the Study of War: Russia seizes Hulyaipole

The Kremlin continues to reject any meaningful security guarantees that would protect Ukraine from complete diplomatic or military capitulation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on February 6 the Kremlin’s rejection of Western-provided security guarantees in Ukraine and reiterated the Kremlin’s support of the “security guarantees” that Russia agreed to in the April 2022 Istanbul talks.[1]  The 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document did not provide the groundwork for meaningful security guarantees and would have left Ukraine defenseless against renewed aggression. The Istanbul Protocol draft stipulated that Russia – the aggressor in the war in Ukraine – would be treated as a neutral ”guarantor state” of Ukraine; that Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would have veto power over a mechanism to respond to future aggression in Ukraine; and that Ukraine commit to neutrality, severe restrictions on military size and composition, and never accepting military assistance from its allies.[2]  Lavrov’s February 6 statement is the latest in a series from senior Kremlin officials indicating that the Kremlin continues to view the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty as the basis for any future peace settlement and is unwilling to compromise on its demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the US-proposed 28-point peace plan or any plan requiring Russia to compromise on any of its original war aims.[4]

Russian forces likely seized Hulyaipole — a town with a pre-war population of roughly 13,000 – after three months of fighting and are unlikely to make rapid advances beyond Hulyaipole without deprioritizing other areas of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces advanced beyond Hulyaipole at a prior date.[16] ISW has not observed evidence in the past few weeks that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain defensive positions in Hulyaipole, and the pattern of recent Russian infiltrations and advances in area suggests that Russian forces hold the town.[17] Russian forces began making relatively rapid advances in the Hulyaipole direction in early November 2025 after a months-long battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that degraded Ukrainian logistics and ability to sustain frontline forces and defense against subsequent Russian ground operations.[18] Russian forces first infiltrated into Hulyaipole in mid-to-late November 2025, began consolidating positions in the town by mid-December 2025, and claimed to have seized Hulyaipole as of December 27.[19] These advances were contingent upon both the weather conditions in the area and the Russian prioritization of the effort. The relatively rapid Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction exploited seasonal foggy and rainy weather conditions that hindered Ukrainian strike and reconnaissance drone operations, which allowed Russian forces to accumulate forces and advance under less threat.[20] These weather conditions did not last, however, as Russian forces entered the Hulyaipole built up area and winter conditions began degrading infantry operations since late December 2025.[21] The Russian military command had also committed elements of at least three combined arms armies (CAAs) to the areas east and northeast of Hulyaipole, while deprioritizing other sectors of the frontline.[22] Russian forces initially attempted to maintain simultaneous advances in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, but lacked the combat power to sustain both efforts, causing the Russian military command to deprioritize the Oleksandrivka direction.[23] Russian forces have consistently proven themselves unable to build large enough reserves to be able to flood a sector of the front without redeploying personnel from other areas.[24] Russian forces may seek to accelerate their advance in the Hulyaipole direction to support a potential Summer 2026 offensive toward Zaporizhzhia City from the south, but are likely unable or unwilling to redeploy forces and means from other frontline sectors to accomplish such an objective.

SpaceX’s block on unregistered Starlink terminal operations in Ukraine is reportedly hindering Russian ground operations and tactical strikes. Ukrainian General Staff sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on February 5 that SpaceX’s efforts to block unregistered Starlink satellite communication terminals have forced Russian forces to reduce the number of assaults on the frontlines and have temporarily stopped all assaults on unspecified areas of the frontline.[25] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces reduced their assault operations and first-person view (FPV) drone operations after SpaceX blocked unregistered Starlink terminals.[26] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces no longer have to expend additional resources striking Russian Starlink terminals in order to disable them. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force, whose area of responsibility comprises northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, reported that the Starlink terminal blocking is affecting both Russian and Ukrainian forces but that is affecting Russian forces more.[27] Russian milbloggers broadly expressed concern about the unregistered terminal block, claiming that the lack of access to Starlink is hindering Russian military operations and that Russian forces are ”scrambling to establish an equivalent.”[28] One milblogger indicated that the Starlink terminal block will likely impact Russian operations in the Kostyantynivka direction.[29] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that some Russian soldiers have managed to operate Starlink terminals, but ISW is unable to confirm this report, and it is unclear how, where, or in what capacity Russian forces would be operating these Starlink terminals.[30]

Unknown actors conducted an assassination attempt on Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev in Moscow City on February 6. Russia’s Investigative Committee claimed on February 6 that unknown actors fired three shots at Alekseyev near his home in northwestern Moscow City, leaving Alekseyev hospitalized.[31] A Russian insider channel claimed that the assailants shot Alekseyev’s torso and that he is in critical condition.[32] Alekseyev was reportedly heavily involved in Russian volunteer formations and private military companies (PMCs), including the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Redut PMC.[33] Alekseyev reportedly played a significant role in organizing Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, participated in negotiations for a humanitarian corridor from Mariupol in Spring 2022, and was affiliated with the Wagner Group PMC.[34] Alekseyev reportedly supported Wagner Group Head Yevgeny Prigozhin in Prigozhin’s June 2023 rebellion against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[35] Former Russian officer and imprisoned prominent ultranationalist, Igor Girkin, claimed in 2023 that Alekseyev was responsible for the creation of the Wagner Group.[36]

Key Takeaways

1. The Kremlin continues to reject any meaningful security guarantees that would protect Ukraine from complete diplomatic or military capitulation.
2. The Russian military command is reportedly planning to deploy its likely limited strategic reserves to a planned Summer 2026 offensive in southern and/or eastern Ukraine. The Russian military likely lacks sufficient reserves to both adequately prepare for such an offensive and achieve the offensive’s objectives, however.
3. Russian forces have been setting conditions for future offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City directions yet have been struggling to make significant advances in the area.
4. Russian forces likely seized Hulyaipole – a town with a pre-war population of roughly 13,000 – after three months of fighting and are unlikely to make rapid advances beyond Hulyaipole without deprioritizing other areas of the frontline.
5. SpaceX’s block on unregistered Starlink terminal operations in Ukraine is reportedly hindering Russian ground operations and tactical strikes.
6. Unknown actors conducted an assassination attempt on Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev in Moscow City on February 6.
7. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.