Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements. Five anonymous European intelligence agency heads told Reuters in an article published on February 19 that Putin does not want to end the war in Ukraine quickly.[1] The head of one European intelligence agency stated that the Kremlin’s strategic goals remain unchanged and include the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the imposition of Ukrainian neutrality. Reuters’ intelligence sources added that Ukraine’s cession of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would not satisfy Putin’s desire to overthrow Ukraine’s democratically-elected government and would not in and of itself lead to a final peace agreement, as Putin would then make further demands. The European intelligence heads’ statements are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Putin is committed to achieving his original war aims.[2] Putin has repeatedly indicated that his war aims extend beyond territory in eastern Ukraine and include changes to the NATO alliance that amount to a total restructuring of the European security architecture, Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations, severe limitations on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, and the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government.[3]
Western sources tied Putin’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s theory of victory. Reuters reported that one intelligence chief assessed that the “main issue” is that Putin neither wants nor needs a quick peace as the Russian economy is not on the verge of collapse.[9] Another Reuters source stated that Russia will face “very high” financial risks in the second half of 2026, however, as Western sanctions and Russia’s high borrowing costs have limited Russia’s access to capital markets. Putin has grossly mismanaged Russia’s economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[10] Russian oil and gas industries continue to suffer, with Bloomberg reporting on February 18 that Russian oil producers drilled 3.4 percent fewer production wells in 2025 compared to 2024 as Western sanctions and a strong ruble have reduced revenue.[11] Russian oil and gas revenues dropped in 2025 to a five-year low, and Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in September 2025 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[12] The Kremlin appears to currently believe that it can absorb and deal with these economic friction points in the immediate term. ISW assessed in February 2025, however, that Putin’s ability to manage these friction points is not indefinite. Putin will have to balance his theory of victory, which posits that the Russian economy can continue to support Russian battlefield advances longer than Ukraine is able to defend itself and the West is willing to support Ukraine, with the need to reckon with the increasingly difficult economic situation in Russia in 2026.[13] Putin is likely pushing for Ukraine and the West to capitulate now to Russia’s demands in negotiations before Putin must face these difficult economic decisions.[14]
The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor. Advisor to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Gvozdiar reported on February 19 that the Ukrainian DIB has increased production fiftyfold since the start of the full-scale invasion, reaching an estimated $50 billion worth of production.[20] Gvozdiar stated that the Ukrainian DIB provides over 50 percent of the Ukrainian military’s needs and is expanding its joint production facilities with European states. Sweden announced on February 19 a new military aid package worth almost 12.9 billion Swedish kronor (about $1.4 billion), which includes short-range air defense systems and ammunition.[21] The package will also support projects expanding cooperation projects with Ukraine to procure and develop long-range drones and provide Ukraine with unmanned surface vehicles. Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB, and Western security and financial aid has helped Ukraine in past work towards this goal.[22] Ukraine’s partners stands to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian DIB in this endeavor, as Western states can use Ukraine’s experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle to bolster their defenses and domestic DIBs. The provision of air defenses to Ukraine is particularly necessary to not only defend Ukrainian cities in the rear and on the front but to defend Ukraine’s own defense industrial enterprises. The establishment of joint Ukrainian-European production facilities outside of Ukraine throughout Europe will also ensure Ukraine‘s continued production in the face of intensified Rusisan long-range strikes across the country.
Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 17 allegedly showing a Russian Geran-2 mothership drone releasing an FPV drone while flying over Sumy Oblast.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using Geran drones as signal repeaters for FPV drones, which separate from the mothership drone as they near the intended target. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces’ use of Geran-2 drones as aerial relays is particularly important after they lost access to Starlink terminals.[24] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov previously reported on February 3 that Russian forces began using Gerbera drones (which are the much cheaper decoy version of Russia’s Shahed/Geran drone) as mothership drones to carry strike or reconnaissance FPV drones, and Russian forces have used Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones in a similar capacity.[25] Geran motherships drones are likely able to continue toward their own targets after releasing their FPV drones to conduct significant strikes. Gerbera drones, in contrast, carry either very small or no explosive payloads so would either crash or result in a small explosion. Geran mothership drones carrying reconnaissance FPV drones would also be able to use the FPV drones to confirm or adjust the Geran’s own strike.
Key Takeaways
- Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements.
- Western sources tied Putin’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s theory of victory.
- The Kremlin is attempting to distract the United States with bilateral economic deals in order to secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine.
- The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor.
- Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.