The Russian military command likely has laterally redeployed elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units from the Pokrovsk direction and the Dobropillya tactical area in eastern Ukraine to the southern frontline, likely in part in order to respond to recent Ukrainian gains in the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk direction. An OSINT analyst observed on March 6 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]), including of its 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, from near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya in Donetsk Oblast to the Hulyaipole direction, which comprises territory in southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Geolocated footage published on March 4 shows a Russian tank from the 68th AC, possibly of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade, shelling Ukrainian positions south of Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[2] A Russian milblogger published footage on March 7 reportedly showing drone operators of the 1st Battalion of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction, possibly referring to the Hulyaipole direction.[3] The Russian military command previously redeployed elements of the 68th AC from the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions to the Toretsk direction in March 2025 before then redeploying elements of the corps to the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions by June 2025.[4] ISW previously observed reports that drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade were striking Ukrainian forces in Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) as of January 17 and that elements of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment were in the Dobropillya direction as of December 15, 2025, and in northern Kharkiv Oblast as of January 4.[5] The elements of the 68th AC, as EMD elements, will now be operating among the main operational grouping of EMD elements in the Eastern Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility (AoR) as they had been prior to their lateral redeployments to the eastern front in March 2025. The redeployment of 68th AC elements to southern Ukraine is likely a reaction to Ukraine’s ongoing counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts that began in late January and early February 2026.
The OSINT analyst also observed that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Hulyaipole direction as of February 25, and elements of the 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) (newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade) to the Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) area as of February 21.[6] The Russian military command has previously committed relatively elite naval infantry units to priority directions in response to Ukrainian counterattacks, such as the Kursk direction in August 2024 and Dobropillya tactical area in September 2025.[7] The redeployment of Pacific Fleet naval infantry elements to southern Ukraine is likely a reaction to Ukraine’s ongoing counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts that began in late January and early February 2026.
The Russian military command likely redeployed elements of the relatively elite 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Pokrovsk direction to the Zaporizhia direction in January and February 2026. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 7 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division to the Orikhiv direction around January 2026.[8] Available open-source evidence suggests that the Russian military command redeployed various elements of the 76th VDV Division, including reports that elements of its 104th VDV Regiment likely redeployed to the Zaporizhia direction as of January 21, elements of its 237th VDV Regiment as of January 23, and elements of its 234th VDV Regiment as of February 5.[9] ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division, including its 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments, to the Pokrovsk direction in November 2025, likely in response to the slowed rate of Russian advances near Pokrovsk – a priority sector at that time.[10] Russia has used the redeployment of elements of the 76th VDV Division to respond to critical situations on the front in the past, including deployments to Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and to Kursk Oblast during the Ukrainian incursion in 2024.[11] The redeployment of the 76th VDV Division elements to southern Ukraine likely was not a reaction to Ukraine’s counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, as the counterattacks occurred later, though these VDV elements are now all the same involved in responding to the Ukrainian counterattacks that began in late January and early February 2026.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 that resulted in significant civilian casualties in Kharkiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh oblasts; and 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 480 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones – of which about 290 were Shahed drones – from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 453 drones, eight Iskander-M/S-400 missiles, and 11 Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 26 drones struck 22 locations; that drone debris fell at five locations; and that Ukrainian authorities were clarifying information about one missile as of 0900 local time.
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, port, and rail infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[22] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the strikes caused power outages in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Khmelnytskyi, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts and heating outages in Kyiv City.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against an apartment building in Kharkiv City killed at least 11 civilians and that preliminary information indicates that Russian forces used an Izdeliye-30 missile in the strike.[24] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that the overnight strikes left 1,905 homes in Kyiv City without heat, and that almost 2,700 homes in the city are without heat.[25]
Key Takeaways
- The Russian military command likely has laterally redeployed elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units from the Pokrovsk direction and the Dobropillya tactical area in eastern Ukraine to the southern frontline, likely in part in order to respond to recent Ukrainian gains in the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk direction.
- The Russian military command’s redeployment of some VDV elements to southern Ukraine in January before Ukrainian forces began counterattacking suggests that Russia may have been planning to continue exploiting tactical successes in the Hulyaipole direction in Spring and Summer 2026. Ukraine’s counterattacks in February 2026 thus may have disrupted Russia’s plans to continue exploiting tactical successes in Zaporizhia Oblast and also may have generated spoiling effects for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.
- The Russian military command’s redeployment of troops from efforts in Donetsk Oblast to Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts illustrates the competing dilemmas that the Russian military command faces in attempting to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts, further complicated by recent Ukrainian counterattacks.
- Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 that resulted in significant civilian casualties in Kharkiv City.
- The March 6 to 7 Russian strike series notably contained a higher quantity of ballistic missiles than Russia usually includes in its regular strike packages. Russia is likely trying to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptors and take advantage of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
- Ukrainian forces conducted an Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS)/SCALP-EG missile strike against a Russian Shahed drone launch site near occupied Donetsk City on March 7.
- Swedish authorities seized on March 6 a tanker that may be part of the Russian shadow fleet and has previously shipped stolen grain from occupied Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova.