Institute for the Study of War:

Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026. Ukrainian drone units have been increasingly prioritizing and executing successful strikes against Russian artillery, drone operators and logistics targets in the near rear to achieve tactical effects.[1] The planning head of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces have shifted the focus of their drone strikes to prioritize targeting Russian artillery, drone operators, ground lines of communication (GLOCs), and staging areas rather than Russian infantry, reducing the number of Russian assaults and enabling Ukrainian forces to make local gains.[2] The planning head added that frequent Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian communications antennas are demoralizing Russian forces, as well as inhibiting Russian frontline communications.[3] A Ukrainian drone unit reported on March 19 that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed an entire battery of six Russian Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the Pokrovsk direction, and geolocated footage published on March 19 confirms the destruction of two Grad systems in Zhuravka (roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline southeast of Pokrovsk).[4] Ukraine’s short-range strike campaign against the Russian tactical near rear is therefore increasingly degrading both Russian offensive and defensive capabilities by enabling Ukrainian forces to make tactical gains and hindering Russia’s ability to conduct artillery preparation for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[5]

Ukrainian forces are also conducting a systematic effort to degrade Russian air defenses and expose other valuable assets in the Russian rear within their mid- and long-range battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported on March 18 that the reported monthly Ukrainian mid-range strikes between 50 and 250 kilometers behind the frontline have quadrupled from an average of roughly 11 between March and October 2025 to an average of 45 since November 2025.[6] The analyst noted that Ukrainian forces conducted a total of 365 mid-range strikes between March 19, 2025 and March 9, 2026, of which one third occurred in the previous three months alone (roughly since January 9, 2026). The figures include some Ukrainian long-range strikes that have similar impacts, as mid-range strikes are typically at an operational depth (about 20 to 120 kilometers from the frontline).[7] The OSINT analyst noted that Ukrainian forces targeted radar stations, missile launchers, and other elements of the Russian air defense system in almost half of the strikes since March 19, 2025. The OSINT analyst added that Ukrainian forces have used Ukrainian-manufactured mid-range strike drones with ranges of up to 250 kilometers to partially replace the role that High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) systems used to fill, and notably increased their usage of FP-2 long-range strike drones over the past five months (roughly since October 9, 2025). BBC’s Ukraine Service reported on March 19 that Ukrainian General Staff data indicates that Ukrainian forces struck 55 Russian air defense systems during Winter 2025-2026.[8] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces struck 23 more air defense systems between March 1 and 16, for a total of 80 systems during Winter 2025-2026 and early Spring 2026.[9] Dutch open-source project Oryx visually confirmed on January 1, 2026 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 77 Russian surface-to-air-missile (SAM) systems and 23 radar stations in 2025.[10] Ukraine’s degradation of the Russian air defense network through concentrated strikes against radars and air defense systems allows subsequent Ukrainian strikes to target other valuable assets in the Russian rear, enhancing the reach of Ukraine’s mid-range BAI campaign.[11]

Recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction and the continued success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances have forced the Russian military command into competing tactical and operational dilemmas on the battlefield. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on March 19 that Russian forces possess insufficient strength to simultaneously seize Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advance to Zaporizhzhia City from the south in a single offensive.[12] Mashovets noted that the Ukrainian defensive line along the Kinska River that runs through Orikhiv to the northwest south of Zaporizhzhia City, and the recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction that are diverting Russian forces from efforts against Orikhiv from the east both hinder a Russian seizure of Orikhiv. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces would likely have to draw reinforcements from the Kherson direction to conduct such an effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast, considering Russian forces’ attempts to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts against the Fortress Belt, Dobropillya, Kupyansk, and to create a ”buffer zone” in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[13] Mashovets previously observed on March 12 that a Russian push toward Dobropillya would force Russian forces to divert resources away from their efforts against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt to significantly reinforce the exhausted 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 2nd CAAs (Central Military District [CMD]) in the area.[14] Mashovets noted on March 19 that Russian forces are unable to leverage a hypothetical mobilization to rapidly generate manpower for such an effort, as Russian forces lack the time to train recruits for a summer offensive.[15]

The competing dilemmas that Ukraine has imposed on the Russian military command have likely disrupted Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Mashovets stated that he has not observed credible reports of Russian forces’ redeployment of significant formations to the 58th CAA’s (SMD) area of operations (AoR) west to south of Orikhiv that Russian forces would require to conduct a major operation against Zaporizhzhia City during Spring or Summer 2026, however.[16] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are accumulating infantry southwest of Orikhiv for offensive efforts against the town and against Novopavlivka (just northwest of Orikhiv), but that this accumulation is insufficient given the lack of Russian gains to the west and northwest.[17] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Kostyantynivka) direction reported on March 19 that the intensity of Russian attacks in this direction is relatively low and that Russian forces have failed to achieve even tactical advances northeast of Kostyantynivka before a presumably fabricated Russian March 10 deadline to wedge between Mayske and Markove (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) and a similarly fabricated March 15 deadline to seize the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal in the area.[18] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces have not observed a large accumulation of Russian heavy equipment in the Kramatorsk direction, which would be an indicator of Russian offensive preparation. The Russian failure to make even tactical advances to seize favorable starting positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt directly undermines Russia’s ability to achieve significant gains in the anticipated offensive.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely formalized some Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements. The Russian MoD stated on March 18 that the BARS-22 detachment is subordinated to the 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet, newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade) and is operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[19] ISW has observed recent reports of elements of the 55th Naval Infantry Division operating in both the Dobropillya and Hulyaipole directions, and the division may be split between these two sectors.[20] The Russian MoD reorganized the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Naval Infantry Division on December 1, 2025 as part of ongoing reforms and efforts to form new maneuver divisions that then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu first announced in December 2022.[21] BARS elements have operated largely as informal units since 2022, and the Russian MoD may be taking advantage of these ongoing expansion efforts to formalize the BARS units.[22]

Tankers carrying Russian oil are reportedly sailing to Cuba in violation of the US embargo. Co-founder of maritime intelligence company TankerTrackers.com Samir Madani told the Financial Times (FT) that the Hong Kong-flagged Sea Horse tanker is carrying 27,000 tons of gas and will arrive in Cuba on Monday, March 23.[23] Maritime intelligence company Kpler identified the gas as Russian in origin. Madani added that the Russian-flagged Anatoly Kolodkin, which carries roughly 100,000 metric tons of crude, will likely arrive in Cuba on April 4. The FT reported that the vessels would be the first to arrive in Cuba in three months.

Kremlin officials are reportedly considering military means to escort Russian ships. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev told Russian business outlet Kommersant on March 18 that Russia is considering installing “special protective equipment” on ships, including mobile fire groups to defend ships (likely from drone strikes), and Russian naval vessels to escort merchant ship convoys.[24] Patrushev’s statements are set against the backdrop of increased US and European seizures of shadow fleet tankers off the European coast and in the North Atlantic and Indian oceans and the Caribbean Sea.[25]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is reportedly struggling to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities are attempting to slowly throttle access to Telegram. A source at a Russian fixed-line telecommunications operator told Forbes’ Russia service on March 18 that Roskomnadzor has “completely lost control” of its blocking efforts, allowing users to periodically access some previously blocked websites and apps.[26] A source at a Russian “backbone” internet service provider confirmed to Forbes’ Russia service that Roskomnadzor “does not have the bandwidth” to handle all ”RuNet” traffic to completely block all banned resources. ”RuNet” is Russia’s sovereign internet system that uses state-controlled domain name servers (DNS) to match IP addresses with domain addresses and connect users with websites.[27] Roskomnadzor denied the claim that it possesses insufficient bandwidth to conduct the required blocks.[28] Russian authorities have failed to prepare adequate technical means to block Telegram along with other banned applications and websites. Russian authorities have also failed to adequately prime the information space to absorb increasingly restrictive measures, and the Kremlin has faced backlash over its information control attempts from pro-war information space figures that it cannot fully co-opt or subordinate to state control.[29] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on March 18 that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) expelled Russian State Duma Deputy Andrei Svintsov for actions that “discredited” the LDPR, likely referring to controversial statements that he recently made regarding the blocking of Telegram, virtual private networks (VPNs), and the internet in Russia.[30] The Russian rhetorical response to the backlash toward impending internet crackdowns appears uncoordinated, and the Kremlin is likely unprepared to deal with such backlash.

The US decision to lift sanctions against Belarus will likely directly benefit Russia’s economy and therefore Russia’s war effort. US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale met with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko on March 19, after which Lukashenko announced that he freed 250 political prisoners.[31] Coale told reporters that the United States will lift sanctions from two Belarusian state banks, the Belarusian Finance Ministry, the top Belarusian potash (a key ingredient for fertilizer and major Belarusian export) producers.[32] Coale told Reuters that the United States will remove all sanctions placed on Belarus over the suppression of protests in 2020 if Belarus releases all remaining political prisoners by the end of 2026.[33] ISW has long assessed that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that the states have a combined defense industrial base (DIB).[34] Lifting US sanctions on Belarus therefore directly benefits Russia’s war effort.

A Russian Su-30 fighter jet briefly violated Estonian airspace on March 18. The Estonian Defense Forces reported on March 19 that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet violated Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland near Vaindloo Island (about 81 kilometers southeast of Helsinki) for roughly one minute on March 18.[35] The Estonian Defense Forces reported that the Russian aircraft had no published flight plans and no two-way radio contact with Estonian air traffic control.

Key Takeaways

1. Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.
2. Recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction and the continued success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances have forced the Russian military command into competing tactical and operational dilemmas on the battlefield.
3. The competing dilemmas that Ukraine has imposed on the Russian military command have likely disrupted Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely formalized some Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements.
5. Tankers carrying Russian oil are reportedly sailing to Cuba in violation of the US embargo.
6. Kremlin officials are reportedly considering military means to escort Russian ships.
7. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is reportedly struggling to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities are attempting to slowly throttle access to Telegram.
8. The US decision to lift sanctions against Belarus will likely directly benefit Russia’s economy and therefore Russia’s war effort.
9. A Russian Su-30 fighter jet briefly violated Estonian airspace on March 18.
10. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Pokrovsk and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Hulyaipole direction.
11. · Russian forces launched 133 drones against Ukraine, including in Chernihiv, Volyn, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Lviv oblasts.