Russian advances have slowed as Ukrainian forces continue to contest the initiative in different frontline sectors for a protracted period. Russia’s position on the battlefield has changed over the past six months (October 2025 through March 2026) as Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes, the block on Russia’s use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and Kremlin efforts to throttle Telegram have exacerbated existing issues within the Russian military. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 1,929.69 square kilometers between October 1, 2025, and March 31, 2026, advancing at an average of 10.66 square kilometers per day. Russian forces comparatively seized 2,716.57 square kilometers of territory between October 1, 2024, and March 31, 2025, advancing at an average rate of 14.9 square kilometers per day. Russian forces advanced at an average of 5.5 square kilometers per day in the first three months of 2026, compared to an average rate of 11.06 square kilometers per day in the first three months of 2025.
Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes are likely impeding Russian efforts to advance. Ukrainian forces in Winter and Spring 2026 have made their most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and have liberated the most territory in Ukraine itself since the 2023 counteroffensive.[1] Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated over 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions from late January 2026 to mid-March 2026 in two separate drives.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 30 that Ukrainian forces are prioritizing conducting counterattacks in areas where Russian forces are the weakest in order to retake and maintain the operational and strategic initiative.[3] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine have had cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline.[4] Ukrainian forces also retook at least 183 square kilometers in and around Kupyansk in December 2025, which Ukraine has largely held onto despite Russian efforts to reverse them.[5]
The Kremlin continues to set conditions to reject the legitimacy of any Ukrainian elections without direct Russian involvement in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and stall the peace negotiations process. Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed on March 31 that the CEC will work to “ensure” that Ukrainian citizens living in Russia have the right to vote should Ukraine hold elections.[15] Pamfilova’s claim follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and other Russian officials’ claims that Ukraine will try to prevent “Ukrainian citizens” living in Russia from voting in a future Ukrainian election.[16] The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to use the topic of elections in Ukraine to claim that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and to set conditions to reject any potential peace agreements Russia signs with the current Ukrainian government.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to claim that any future Ukrainian election that does not “sufficiently” allow “Ukrainians” under Russian control to vote is not free and fair in an attempt to manipulate potential Ukrainian elections and to enable massive Russian election interference.[18]
Ukrainian long-range strike campaign against Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast is degrading Russian oil export capacity. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko reported damage at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on March 31 following a presumable Ukrainian drone strike.[23] Sources within the Leningrad Oblast emergency services told Russian opposition source Astra that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a 50,000-ton oil tank to catch fire on the night of March 30 to 31.[24] Ukraine has been targeting Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure for the past week (since March 23) in Leningrad Oblast, causing significant damage at the Kinef oil refinery in Kirishi, the Novatek Ust-Luga in Ust-Luga, the Transneft oil terminal at the port of Primorsk, and a project 23550 Purga-class patrol icebreaker at the Vyborg Shipyard.[25] Bloomberg reported on March 31 that Ukrainian strikes against the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in the past week reduced Russia’s oil income by more than $1 billion as Russian weekly crude oil flows decreased by 1.75 million barrels a day.[26] Bloomberg noted that the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga decreased the number of tankers loading crude oil from 18 tankers between the two ports from March 16 to 22 to six tankers between March 23 to 29 as a result of the Ukrainian strikes. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued Ukrainian drone strikes will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil, which may partially offset the United States’ partial lifting of oil sanctions against Russia.[27]
Key Takeaways
- Russian advances have slowed as Ukrainian forces continue to contest the initiative in different frontline sectors for a protracted period of time.
- Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes are likely impeding Russian efforts to advance.
- Battlefield realities as of late March 2026 continue to show that significant Russian battlefield gains, let alone total victory, are not imminent nor inevitable.
- The Kremlin is trying to create a false sense of urgency by reportedly trying to force Ukraine to cede the unoccupied part of Donetsk Oblast, which Russian forces have proven unable to take on the battlefield.
- The Kremlin continues to set conditions to reject the legitimacy of any Ukrainian elections without direct Russian involvement in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and stall the peace negotiations process.
- Russian authorities are increasingly turning to forced covert mobilization efforts as Russian forces suffer unsustainably high losses on the battlefield and Russian recruitment rates decline.
- Ukrainian long-range strike campaign against Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast is degrading Russian oil export capacity.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russian forces launched 289 drones against Ukraine.