Dr. Robert O. Freedman
Johns Hopkins University
On October 7, 2023, the Islamist terrorist group Hamas embarked on a cross-border attack from Gaza into Israel, killing 1200 Israelis and taking 250 captives, some Israeli and some non-Israeli, back into Gaza to trade for Arab prisoners in Israeli jails. Hamas was soon joined in its attack by the Lebanese pro-Iranian terrorist organization Hezbollah which fired rockets into northern Israel, displacing some 60,000 Israelis; pro-Iranian militias in Iran which also fired missiles into Israel; and the pro-Iranian Houthi rebels in Yemen who not only fired missiles into Israel but also interdicted shipping in the Red Sea around the Bab al-Mandab Strait claiming that the ships were going to Israel. Thus, Israel faced a multi-front war against Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance”, although, initially, not against Iran itself.
Israel was ill-prepared for the attack, as initial reports from the Israel Defense Forces have demonstrated, because the top military and civilian leadership, first and foremost Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, did not expect an attack from Hamas, having incorrectly assumed that Hamas could be bought off by allowing into Gaza millions of dollars from Qatar to go to Hamas and allowing thousands of Gazans to work in Israel. Netanyahu, consequently, concentrated Israeli forces in the West Bank and in the north of Israel, facing Lebanon.
However, a year and a half into the war, the military situation was to change radically, and the position of Iran, Israel’s main foe in the region, was badly weakened. First, Israel has very severely damaged Hamas’s fighting battalions and weakened it as a military force, although it was still able to maintain a military/political presence in Gaza. Israel has killed Hamas’s main military leader Yahya Sinwar, and its chief political officer, Ismail Haniyeh, and the terrorist organization was not only badly weakened but also blamed by many Gazans for the extensive damage done to Gaza by Israeli attacks seeking to root out Hamas. According to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry some 50,000 Gazans were killed in Israeli attacks, a figure that includes both Hamas fighters and the civilians in which they were embedded. Similarly, in Lebanon, Israeli attacks badly weakened Hezbollah, as its senior leader Hassan Nasrallah and many of his lieutenants had been killed, and Hezbollah was forced to agree to a ceasefire with Israel, even as Hamas continued to fight. In fact, so weak had Hezbollah, the one-time power broker in Lebanon, become, that it was forced to accede to the establishment of a new Lebanese Government whose President, Joseph Aoun, and Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, were more attuned to the West and the Arab World than to Iran
While the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas were severe blows to Iran and its “axis of resistance”, Iran faced another blow when the regime of its Syrian ally, Bashar Assad, was overthrown and replaced by the Sunni Islamist organization, Hayat Tahrir al Sham or HTS, whose leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, had broken with Al-Qaeda in 2016. This hurt Iran in two ways. Not only had it lost a major ally, and most probably the economic benefits it had accumulated in Syria, but it also lost a direct communication link to Hezbollah through Syria. Iran was to suffer yet another blow in April 2024 after it launched a major drone and cruise missile itself directly against Israel. Not only were almost all the drones and missiles shot down, causing Israel little damage, but the Israeli retaliatory strike severely damaged one of Iran’s SAM-300 air defense systems, leaving it more vulnerable to a second Israeli attack. That attack was to come in October 2024, after another Iranian missile attack on Israel which again caused relatively little damage. This time Israel destroyed the remaining SAM-300 air defense systems, leaving Iran even more vulnerable to a future Israeli—or American—attack.
The weakening of most of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”, especially Hamas and Hezbollah, (the Houthis were an exception as they continued to fire at Israel, and at ships in the Bab-Al-Mandab area despite US airstrikes), and of Iran itself, and the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria were major Middle East changes following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. However, the change that many people expected–the fall of the right-wing government of Binyamin Netanyahu–did not occur. Indeed, despite the fact that most Israelis held it responsible for the Hamas attack of October 7th, not only did it survive, despite massive public demonstrations against it, it also sought to once again push through the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) the so-called “judicial reforms”, which it had suspended following the outbreak of the war. These “reforms” were aimed at weakening the Israeli judicial system, first and foremost Israel’s supreme court, so the court could not be a check on Netanyahu’s policies. And, of course, all of this proceeded while Netanyahu himself was on trial on corruption charges.
Meanwhile, the United States played a relatively limited role in these events. While the Administration of Joseph Biden provided large amounts of arms to Israel and helped protect it against drone and missile attacks from Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, there were also a number of clashes between Netanyahu and Biden, especially over the mounting toll of civilian casualties in Gaza from Israeli attacks that were aimed at rooting out Hamas fighters who were embedded in Gaza’s civilian population. The Biden Administration also sought to dissuade Israel from entering the heavily populated Rafah area of Gaza and suspended the supply of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel as a result, although the bombs were needed to penetrate the extensive tunnel system which Hamas had constructed underneath Gaza. Meanwhile Biden was coming under increasing pressure, because of his aid to Israel, both from liberal elements in his Democratic party and on college campuses, where pro-Palestinian and pro-Hamas demonstrations took place. These included the establishment of encampments with “Zionist Free Zones” which angered most Jewish Americans who saw Jewish students threatened, especially on Ivy League campuses such as Columbia and Harvard, whose presidents were forced to resign because of their inability to deal with the pro-Palestinian demonstrations.
Once Donald Trump became President in January 2025, however, the situation changed. Using the threat of withholding federal funding, he forced the new president of Columbia to take a much tougher stand on the pro-Palestinian protesters and resumed the sale of the 2,000-pound bombs to Israel. He also proposed that the Palestinians be moved out of war-ravaged Gaza and resettled elsewhere in the Middle East, preferably Jordan and Egypt, while, after it was rebuilt, Gaza would be transformed into a “Mediterranean Riviera”. Needless to say, Trump’s idea was rejected not only by the Gaza Palestinians, but also by the Arab League which came up with an alternative plan calling for the reconstruction of Gaza, with the Palestinians there remaining while new homes for them were being built, and the temporary rule over Gaza by a group of technocrats after Israel withdrew. However, the plan was vague about the future role of Hamas in Gaza whose continued presence in Gaza was anathema to both sides of the Israeli political spectrum.
The Trump Administration did help negotiate a temporary ceasefire between Hamas and Israel that led to the release if 33 living Israelis (plus five Thais and a number of dead hostages) in return for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, some with Israeli blood on their hands after participating in terrorist attacks. However, the ceasefire never made it to its planned second stage, in large part because it required the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and an “end to the war”, leaving open the future of Hamas in Gaza. Since Hamas both by its charter and its actions is committed to the destruction of Israel and to its replacement by an Islamic State from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea (“From the River to the Sea” is both the mantra of Hamas and its supporters on US college campuses) a simple “end to the war” was never realistic in that it would give Hamas the opportunity to rebuild and prepare for another attack on Israel. While US mediator Steve Witkoff sought a compromise agreement involving the extension of phase one of the ceasefire, Hamas rejected the compromise and Netanyahu decided to return to war, a decision, at least initially, supported by the Trump Administration. The decision by Netanyahu led to the strengthening of his coalition, as the ultra-right wing Jewish Power faction, that had pulled out of the coalition due to Netanyahu’s agreement to the ceasefire, returned to the government coalition. On the other hand, the return to war, which endangered the lives of the remaining Israeli hostages in the control of Hamas led to mass demonstrations, not only against the war but also against Netanyahu’s attempts to fire the Israeli Attorney General and the head of Israel’s Shin Bet security organization.
In sum, therefore, the Israel-Hamas war has brought major changes to the Middle East, the most important being the weakening of Iran and its major allies, Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria. What did not change was the right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Meanwhile, the region as a whole remains in flux, with three major issues still very much undecided. They are as follows:
1. The future of Syria
The HTS regime currently running Syria is a loose amalgam of many groups ranging from Syrian exiles who have returned to their homeland to create a “New Syria” to jihadi elements whose brutality was demonstrated in the suppression of an Alawite rebellion that began with attacks on HTS security forces. Yet HTS leader Al-Shaara has more than just Alawites and jihadis to worry about as he seeks to rebuild Syria. The country has a large number of minorities including Alawites, Turkomans, Kurds, Druze and Christians. While Al-Sharaa appears to want a highly centralized state where the minorities would be subordinate to the center, the minority groups, and especially the Druze and Kurds want more of a federal system where they would have some autonomy. While Al-Sharaa did reach an agreement with the Kurds, many of its details remain to be worked out, especially the disposition of the large Syrian Kurdish army. At the same time Al-Sharaa’s relations with the Druze of Southern Lebanon have been strained, a situation exacerbated by Israel’s offer of aid to the Druze. Yet Israel’s offers of aid to the Syrian Druze are not the only examples of Israeli interference in post-Assad Syria, as Al-Sharaa seeks to centralize control over the country. Israel has taken over the demilitarized zone between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Syria set up after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as Netanyahu claims that the area is needed for protection as the HTS regime is nothing more than the reincarnation of Al-Qaeda. Whether this is a wise policy is a matter of debate since the HTS regime offered friendship to Israel when it took power, and Netanyahu’s alienation of the new Syrian regime may not be in Israel’s long-term interest.
Israel, however, is not the only outside power seeking to influence developments in Syria. Turkey has been the main backer of HTS, supporting it when it was restricted to the Idlib province in Northwest Syria and helping to protect it against the attacks of Assad’s regime and Russia. Turkey is currently an autocratic Islamic regime under its leader Recip Erdogan, who just jailed his main political opponent, Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul. Given the very tense relationship between Turkey and Israel at the present time (they were allies in the pre-Erdogan period), Israel is concerned that Turkey will use its influence with HTS to outflank Israel in Syria and perhaps even take over the Russian air and naval bases in the country which would put Israel at a strategic disadvantage. Meanwhile, Iran, the biggest loser in Syria because of the fall of the Assad regime, may have been behind the Alawite attacks on the HTS security forces in an effort to destabilize the new Syrian regime.
2. Lebanon
Lebanon faces economic, political and security challenges. Its economy was in deep difficulty even before the damage caused by the Israel-Hezbollah war which exacerbated its problems and Lebanon desperately needs outside economic aid. The logical place to receive this aid would be the Gulf Arab States. Yet, these states are concerned about residual Iranian influence in Lebanon in the form of even a weakened Hezbollah. If the new Lebanese regime can solidify its support in the country, and get Hezbollah to disarm–a very big if–it might become a more attractive place for the Gulf Arabs to invest in. Yet, Lebanon also faces a serious security problem on its southern border with Israel. Israel does not want any Hezbollah forces to go south of the Litany River (as per UN Security Council Resolution 1701). If the new Lebanese government can prevent Hezbollah forces from going south of the Litany and is able to maintain the ceasefire with Israel—another big if—Lebanon’s future could be much brighter.
3. Israel and the Palestinians
While Israel has been militarily successful in its war on many fronts (except with the Houthis although the Trump Administration is stepping up US attacks on the Houthis at the current time), its biggest failure has been in the political realm by not putting forth a plan for “the day after” the end of the war in Gaza. The Trump plan for a “Mediterranean Riviera” is clearly not viable, however much right-wing Israelis might applaud it. What Israel seems to be hinting now—the long-term Israeli military occupation of Gaza—is also not viable, as it would lead to an extended guerrilla war and numerous Israeli casualties. The only possibly viable solution is for Israel to work with the Arab States to create a transitional government in Gaza, led by technocrats, leading to Palestinian Authority control–not Hamas control–of Gaza. While the Israeli public, still burned by the events of October 7th, is not currently ready to consider a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, should the Palestinian Authority prove successful in governing Gaza–another very big if–then consideration of a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be possible although it will have to await a new, and more moderate, Israeli government. Whether such a government will arise before the scheduled 2026 Israeli elections remains to be seen.