At the Munich Security Conference later this week, US Vice President JD Vance and envoy to Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg will use the stage to present European leaders with part of the Trump administration’s peace plan for the region. Nato membership for Kyiv will be excluded, and Russia will effectively be left with the Ukrainian land it currently holds — with the possible exception of a territorial swap involving Ukrainian withdrawal from Russia’s Kursk province, if its army can hold the territory long enough.
These “concessions” are in fact closer to recognitions of reality. Donald Trump has no intention of taking on additional security commitments in Europe, and it is militarily impossible for Ukraine to reconquer its lost territories unless Washington intervenes directly — which the US President certainly will not do.
Assuming that Trump’s recent conversation with Vladimir Putin was sufficiently frank, certain factors should now be obvious. Of these, the most important is that the idea floated by US officials of a ceasefire before a comprehensive settlement will be dead on arrival. The Russians have made clear they will not agree to this, given that their own military advances and the threat of Ukrainian collapse are Putin’s principal points of leverage in negotiations. If America fails to grasp this, a great deal of time — and many more lives — will be wasted.
The other reason why the Trump administration should give up on the idea of an early ceasefire is that there are many people in Ukraine, Europe and Washington who want the talks to fail in a way that can be blamed on Russia. Consequently, they could suggest that there is implacable opposition in Moscow to a compromise peace. The genuine hardliners in Russia, who are indeed opposed to compromise, would no doubt be glad to have evidence that the West is making impossible demands.
Another idea which is dead on arrival is that of a powerful European “peacekeeping” force for Ukraine. This will be vetoed by Russia; but, equally importantly, as soon as the Europeans say they would only provide such a force if its safety is formally guaranteed by the US, the Trump administration will abandon it. That is, if it has not done so already. A peacekeeping force will be necessary to separate the two sides and enforce a ceasefire, but it will have to come from neutral countries.
The general contours of a viable peace involve the US meeting wider Russian security concerns, and the Kremlin in return giving up its maximalist ambitions in Ukraine. What is less clear is how far, and how quickly, either side will be prepared to go. This will only become apparent during the negotiations themselves. Will the Trump administration be willing to offer significant Nato arms limitations? Will Putin abandon his demand for additional Ukrainian territory, beyond what Russia currently holds?
The extent of Russia’s eventual captured territory will be decided on the battlefield. From all the evidence of the past year, the longer the war goes on the more ground Ukraine will lose. Yet Russian forces are advancing very slowly. The key effect of drones has been to make it extremely difficult to create the local mass necessary for a decisive breakthrough. Tanks cannot be brought up to the front line at all; infantry can only be brought up in tiny packets. On the other hand, drones don’t compensate completely for Ukraine’s critical lack of troops. The danger of Ukrainian collapse is another reason why the Trump administration cannot afford to waste any time in these negotiations.