October 9, 2024

Institue for the Study of War: Russians maintain high tempo of mechanized assaults as U.S. continues to withhold advanced systems from Ukraine 

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties. Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on October 8 that Russian forces are increasing their use of armored vehicles on the battlefield — specifically in the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions — in order to take advantage of dry road and terrain conditions before rainy seasonal weather causes muddy grounds conditions.[1] Russian forces have been conducting a high tempo of mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since late July 2024 and have conducted at least four observed battalion-sized mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine since July 25, 2024.[2] Russian forces have also resumed relatively large mechanized assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since late September 2024.[3] The Russian military command likely aims for intensified mechanized offensive activity to allow Russian forces to advance across open fields and consolidate in nearby frontline settlements that Russian forces can then use as a foothold for staging and launching offensive operations that seek to achieve operational objectives — such as the seizure of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast or the seizure of Pokrovsk.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 9 that muddy seasonal conditions have already started in Kursk Oblast and are constraining maneuver for wheeled vehicles.[5] ISW has not yet observed wide reporting that muddy terrain is constraining mechanized maneuver on any sector of the front in Kursk Oblast or in Ukraine, however.

Fall weather conditions will also likely constrain Russian infantry maneuver, and the Russian military command likely hopes that mechanized advances that Russian forces can achieve now will limit the number of open fields that Russian infantry will have to cross after weather conditions deteriorate. Russian forces have relied on small infantry groups to advance under the concealment of windbreaks in open fields from settlement to settlement, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction.[6] Fall weather will cause many windbreaks comprised of deciduous trees to lose most of their foliage and will provide less concealment for Russian infantry groups during fall 2024 and winter 2024-2025 — leaving Russian infantrymen more vulnerable to pervasive Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and tactical fires.

Russian forces will likely not cease offensive operations following the fall mud season, though adverse weather conditions will likely degrade Russian infantry effectiveness. Russian forces made a concerted effort to regain the theater-wide initiative during the period of the most difficult weather conditions for mechanized offensive operations in fall 2023, however, and may seek to retain the theater-wide initiative though consistent offensive pressure in fall 2024 under similar weather conditions.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command are pursuing a strategy that aims to prevent Ukraine from accumulating manpower and materiel to contest the theater-wide initiative by maintaining consistent offensive pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline and will likely continue to pursue this strategy despite seasonal constraints on mechanized and infantry maneuver.[8] Russian forces have exhausted many of the reserves that they established for their intensified Summer 2024 offensive operation that has heavily focused on advancing in Donetsk Oblast, and ISW continues to assess that the ongoing Russian offensive operation will likely culminate within the coming months.[9] Poor weather conditions that constrain battlefield maneuver will likely contribute to culmination, but the culmination of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive operation will not necessarily result in a complete end of consistent Russian offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025. Russian forces have an established pattern of fighting beyond their culmination points as well as fighting through adverse weather conditions.

US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly stated that the US is withholding several US weapon systems and other military communications networks from Ukraine that could support Ukraine’s war effort. CNN reported on October 8, citing sources familiar with the situation, that Cavoli outlined a list of several US capabilities that could better support Ukraine’s war effort in a September 2024 report to the US Congress.[10] Another source familiar with the matter told CNN that that the list included the air-launched Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSMs) cruise missile and the Link 16 system – a data sharing network that the US and other NATO countries use for communication and command and control (C2). CNN reported that Cavoli’s report does not explain why the US has not yet provided Ukraine with systems that the US assesses could aid Ukraine’s war effort. An unspecified source told CNN that the US has likely refrained from providing Ukraine with the Link 16 system over operational security concerns.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun stated on October 8 that a limited number of North Korean military personnel are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.[11] Kim stated that North Korea likely deployed several military personnel to Ukraine to support Russia’s war effort in response to a report that a Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City killed several North Korean military officials on October 3.[12] Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, stated on October 5 that a small number of North Korean military personnel, mainly engineering personnel, are operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast and are repairing or somehow improving the quality of a large amount of low-quality ammunition that North Korea provided to the Russian military.[13]

Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen’s Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 7, citing a European security official and other sources familiar with the matter, that Bout assisted in negotiations for small arms sales worth $10 million when a Houthi delegation visited Moscow in August 2024.[14] The WSJ’s sources stated that the first two deliveries would consist of mostly AK-74 assault rifles and that the Houthis also discussed the potential transfer of Kornet antitank missiles and anti-air weapons. The sources stated that they were unsure whether Bout negotiated the deal on behalf of the Kremlin or just with the Kremlin’s tacit approval, and the WSJ noted that the transfer has not yet occurred and the source of the arms is still unclear.[15] The WSJ reported that these deliveries could begin as soon as October 2024 to Hodeidah Port under the guise of food supplies. Both Bout and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied the WSJ report.[16] Russia has reportedly been involved in Iranian-brokered “secret talks” to transfer Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis, but it is unclear whether these transfers have or will occur.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making, particularly to deter the West from supporting Ukraine over fears of Russian escalation against the West, including escalating in a different theater.[18]

Russia banned the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, likely degrading some frontline Russian forces’ ad-hoc communications in the near term. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor announced on October 8 that it had banned Discord within Russia on October 8 following recent Russian fines against Discord for failing to comply with Russian censorship laws.[19]Some frontline Russian forces use Discord for coordinating operations, including combat drone operations, and this ban will likely impede some Russian military communications on the frontline in the near term.[20] The Kremlin has recently implemented several measures that have threatened frontline ad-hoc communication systems, including limiting the use of personal electronic devices on the frontline, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to establish a secure and effective official communications system for Russian forces to use instead.[21] Some Russian milbloggers responded to the Discord ban by reiterating complaints about the lack of adequate alternative communications systems for Russian forces on the frontline.[22] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that the Russian MoD has failed to address this issue for the past three years but claimed that Russian forces have been able to use other communications services to coordinate combat operations successfully.[23]

Russian forces continue to use chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a party. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported on October 8 that Russian forces continue to use K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing harmful but not necessarily lethal riot control agents (RCA), which are prohibited in combat by the CWC.[24] The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported that there have been 250 cases of Russian forces using munitions containing unknown types of dangerous chemical agents in Ukraine in September 2024. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported that Russian chemical weapons use has been systematic since February 2023 and that as of September 24 Ukraine has recorded Russian forces using munitions equipped with chemical weapons 4,228 times. ISW has consistently reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC.[25]

Key Takeaways:

  • The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties.
  • US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly stated that US is withholding several US weapon systems and other military communications networks from Ukraine that could support Ukraine’s war effort.
  • South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun stated on October 8 that a limited number of North Korean military personnel are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.
  • Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen’s Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation.
  • Russia banned partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, likely degrading some frontline Russian forces’ ad-hoc communications in the near term.
  • Russian forces continue to use chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a party.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Robotyne.
  • Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev stated on October 8 that Russian forces may have exhausted their preexisting stocks of aerial bombs for glide bomb strikes.

(For full report:https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/DraftUkraineCoT%20October%209%2C%202024%20.png )

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Wilson Center

Forced displacement represents one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of our time. Individuals and families, torn from the fabric of their communities, find themselves navigating a world of uncertainty, often without basic necessities or a clear path to safety. There are currently some 110 million forced displaced, and this number is growing by 10 million each year!

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