The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector. Reuters reported on October 23, citing multiple trade sources, that major PRC state oil companies — including PetroChina, SinoPec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil — suspended purchases of seaborne Russian oil “at least in the short term” following the October 22 US sanctions against Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil.[i]Trade sources told Reuters that Rosneft and Lukoil sell most oil to the PRC indirectly by going through intermediaries, but that intendent PRC refiners are more likely to pause buying to assess the impact of sanctions. The trade sources stated that independent PRC refiners would still likely seek to purchase Russian oil despite the sanctions. Bloomberg and Reuters reported on October 23 citing refineries and industry sources that Indian oil refineries will significantly cut Russian oil imports due to the US sanctions.[ii] An industry source told Reuters that India’s cut of Russian oil imports will be “massive” but not total or immediate as Indian refineries will still import some barrels of Russian crude oil through intermediaries.[iii]
The EU sanctions package bans Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the EU beginning in January 2027 for long-term contracts and within six months (by April 23, 2026) for short-term contracts.[iv] The package also targets tankers assessed to be part of the Russian shadow fleet, a United Arab Emirates (UAE) entity that serves as a conduit for the Russian shadow fleet by circumventing EU sanctions, and four PRC oil refineries. The EU also sanctioned Russian financial institutions and operators from the UAE and the PRC that supply military and dual-use goods to Russia. The EU imposed additional travel restrictions and authorization requirements for Russian diplomats and sanctioned 11 individuals involved in the illegal deportation, abduction, and militarized education of Ukrainian children.
Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia’s adversary and “unfriendly” to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 23 that Trump imposed these sanctions to pressure Russia and noted that the sanctions are “an unfriendly act toward Russia.”[v] Putin claimed that Trump’s actions are damaging Russian-US relations and disrupting the global energy market. Putin continued to posture Russian economic resilience regarding Western sanctions, claiming that “[Russia] feel[s] confident [and] stable despite certain losses” but noted that “there is nothing good or pleasant” about the new US sanctions against Russia — an implicit acknowledgement that the sanctions will harm Russia’s economy. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts on October 23 that “the United States is [Russia’s] adversary” and that the United States is now fully embracing its “warpath against Russia.”[vi] Medvedev added that Russia’s war in Ukraine is now Trump’s war and that the United States recent policy decisions are an “act of war against Russia.” The Kremlin typically permits Medvedev to insert hyperbolic statements into the information space that reflect the fringe of the Kremlin’s positions and directly communicate the subtext of messages from other Russian officials.[vii] Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have not publicly defined the United States as Russia’s adversary during the Trump administration until October 23 and have been careful in their criticisms of the United States under the Trump administration, likely to achieve concessions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, avoid US sanctions, and attempt to conclude bilateral economic deals.[viii] Putin and Medvedev’s statements are a significant rhetorical inflection that likely seek to exculpate Russia for refusing to negotiate with Ukraine or agree to ceasefires previously proposed by the United States and Ukraine.
Other Russian officials continue to posture economic resilience and the necessity of achieving Russia’s war aims, likely to prepare Russian domestic audiences for the economic impact of Western sanctions and a prolonged war effort. Russian State Duma Deputy Svetlana Zhurova claimed on October 23 that sanctions against Russia will not impact Russia’s policies – likely referring to the war in Ukraine — and that the Trump administration’s pressure against Russia does not address the issues necessary to end the war.[ix]Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa responded on October 22 to Trump’s criticisms of Putin’s willingness to make peace, claiming that Trump’s “blunt and sweeping” statements and cancellation of the Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest do not mean that the United States and Russia have stopped preparations for the next summit.[x] Chepa claimed that Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire will have no effect as it does not address the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, justifying to domestic Russian audiences Putin’s rejection of Trump’s peace efforts.[xi] These statements from senior Kremlin officials and prominent Russian State Duma deputies deflect blame from Russia’s long-standing rejection of repeated attempts to progress the peace initiative in Ukraine, the actual reason for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations. Trump, when asked a question about how Putin stated that sanctions will not meaningfully impact Russia, stated, “I’m glad [Putin] feels that way. I’ll let you know about it six months from now… Let’s see how it all works out.”[xii]
Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations. Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized and motorized assault toward Siversk from Serebryanka (north of Siversk) and Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[xxi] A Ukrainian drone battalion that repelled the assault reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), three buggies, and roughly 20 motorcycles in the assault.[xxii] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 23 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Chasiv Yar, destroying two MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and killing roughly 40 Russian servicemembers.[xxiii] Weather monitoring services indicate that the Siversk and Chasiv Yar areas experienced cloudy conditions on October 23, and that it rained in Chasiv Yar on October 23.[xxiv] Russian forces conducted an at least reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) on October 22 as the area experienced cloud cover.[xxv]ISW observed that Russian forces exploited precipitation to conduct a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) on October 20.[xxvi]ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting poor weather conditions to conduct mechanized assaults as foggy and rainy conditions degrade the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone surveillance and strikes.[xxvii] The season change to autumn is also reportedly making drones more effective by depriving Russian soldiers of some concealment. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the autumnal lack of foliage is complicating Russian forces’ ability to evade Ukrainian drones.[xxviii]
Key Takeaways
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector.
- Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia’s adversary and “unfriendly” to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia’s energy sector.
- The Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast – a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners.
- Available evidence continues to indicate that Russian forces have not established a bridgehead or begun an offensive in west bank Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations.
- Ukraine’s partners continue to support Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine.
- Russian forces continue to target and kill civilians, first responders, and journalists.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on October 23.
- Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Velykomykhailivka.