Institute for the Study of War (from Nov 11): Russia advances slowly in Pokrovsk 

The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater. ISW has continued to observe relatively little geolocated footage of Russian advances in and near Pokrovsk in early November 2025 compared to confirmed advances in mid- to late-October 2025. Geolocated footage published on November 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Pokrovsk and marginally advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), respectively.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk; in northern, northeastern, and eastern Pokrovsk; to western Myrnohrad from positions within Pokrovsk; east and northeast of Myrnohrad; and within eastern Myrnohrad.[2] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), Kotlyne, and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[3] Russian milbloggers refuted claims of substantial Russian advances northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne from Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), however.[4] Russian forces are struggling to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction by advancing on the northern shoulder of the pocket near Rodynske, where they pose the greatest threat of closing the encirclement. Elements of the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have been fighting on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, including near Rodynske, in recent weeks and have been struggling to make advances comparable to the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which has been fighting and making gains on the western flank.[5]

Russian forces appear to be struggling to conduct successful ground assaults to take and hold additional ground despite having conducted a successful battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and infiltration missions to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[6] The urban terrain of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad is not conducive to mechanized, motorized, or mass infantry assaults intended to expand control of terrain, unlike Russian infiltration missions. The Russian military command has dedicated better-trained and better-equipped units to BAI and infiltration missions than they have to ground assaults. Elite dedicated drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are responsible for interdicting Ukrainian logistics and downing Ukrainian drones in the Pokrovsk direction, and Spetsnaz elements are responsible for initial infiltration missions aimed at disorganizing Ukrainian defenses and creating holes for standard Russian infantry to exploit on subsequent infiltration missions.[7] Russian forces are also struggling to extend logistics that would more easily enable Russian infantry who have already infiltrated into Pokrovsk to consolidate positions and accumulate personnel for further assaults.[8]

Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction. The Russian military command has chosen to maintain several offensive operations across the theater simultaneously, including northern Kharkiv Oblast in the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions; eastern Kharkiv Oblast in the Kupyansk direction; northeast of the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Siversk direction; near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border junction in the Velykomykhailivka direction; and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian forces have struggled to sustain simultaneous offensive operations on non-mutually supportive axes for much of the war.[9] Russia’s persistent dedication of manpower and resources to various directions and grinding advances, rather than prioritizing resources to the Pokrovsk direction, will prolong the Russian campaign to seize Pokrovsk. The Russian military command has proven willing to tolerate the significant losses and time required for such campaigns.[10] The Russian military command may fear that reducing the Russian force presence or tempo of offensive operations anywhere else in the theater may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to make gains or redeploy forces elsewhere. The Russian military command also likely seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are making substantial advances across the entire theater, contrary to the battlefield reality, and redeploying forces and means away from some areas of the front at the scale necessary to quickly collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction would undermine this Russian narrative.[11]

Key Takeaways

1.  The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater.
2. Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction.
3. Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and other areas of eastern Ukraine.
4. A months-long battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign likely facilitated recent Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions.
5. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11.
6. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.