Institute for the Study of War: Next Russian target is Hulyaipole

The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 12 that the situation in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) directions has “significantly worsened” as Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions and have seized three unspecified settlements.[1] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions near Novouspenivske and Nove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) and that fighting is ongoing for Rivnopillya, Yablukove, and Solodke (all northeast of Hulyaipole and west to northwest of Nove and Novouspenivka).[2] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that mixed-weapon Russian strikes destroyed Ukrainian defensive positions and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the Rivnopillya area on the evening of November 11.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yablukove (north of Hulyaipole), west of Rybne, south of Solodke, and west of Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[4] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern boundary of Yablukove and that the terrain in the Hulyaipole area favors rapid advances but that Ukrainian mining operations are hindering them.[5]

Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics. This new campaign design consists of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that degrades Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces such that Ukraine cannot defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations in the area; tactical interdiction efforts targeting local supply lines and Ukrainian drone operators; infiltration missions intended to identify, worsen, and exploit the resulting weak points in Ukrainian defenses such that Ukraine defenses become disorganized; and mass small group assaults to make rapid advances and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from an area.[6] Russian forces have been conducting a monthslong BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, including highways, roads, and railway lines.[7] This campaign is similar to the BAI campaign that Russian forces waged against Pokrovsk starting in Spring-Summer 2025, ahead of intensified operations to seize the town beginning in October 2025.[8] Russian forces intensified infiltration missions and have been making relatively quick advances in the Hulyaipole direction in recent weeks, and Russian milbloggers have identified interdicting and cutting the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway as a goal of these Russian advances.[9]

Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole. Elements of the Russian 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are currently responsible for and advancing in the area northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[10] Elements of the 5th CAA will likely push west to cut the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway before pursuing a relatively small encirclement. The Russian military command could choose to pursue a wider encirclement of Hulyaipole, which would threaten a larger portion of Ukrainian forces and land in the pocket at the expense of more time and resources. Elements of the 5th CAA are currently better arrayed to conduct a smaller encirclement of Hulyaipole that would more likely result in more limited advances and inflict fewer losses on Ukrainian forces, but would likely allow Russian forces to make an operationally significant advance in a shorter amount of time at a lower resource cost. Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (EMD) are operating on the northern flank of the 5th CAA in the area southeast to southwest of Velykomykhailivka.[11] Elements of the 29th CAA will likely pursue operations supporting Russian efforts to advance southwest and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Pokrovske, which could reinforce efforts to seize Hulyaipole given the area’s proximity to Ukrainian GLOCs supporting Hulyaipole, such as the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway. Elements of the 35th CAA (EMD) are operating southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne, but elements of the 35th CAA have not begun actively pursuing offensive operations in the area south and southwest of Hulyaipole in recent weeks. The Ukrainian defenses in the Hulyaipole direction are best suited to defend against pushes from the south, so it is unlikely that elements of the 35th CAA would activate in this area as long as these defenses pose a significant challenge to Russian forces.[12]

Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design. Russian operational-level BAI campaigns supporting offensive pushes in the Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole, and Kupyansk directions have lasted for months and preceded intensified Russian infiltrations toward or in the towns.[13] Russian forces begin these BAI campaigns by interdicting major Ukrainian GLOCs at operational depth using artillery, air, and drone strikes conducted by elite drone units. This interdiction campaign aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses sufficiently to allow Russian drone and artillery crews to advance to within tactical range of these GLOCs and local logistics lines to Ukrainian forward positions and thereby to intensify interdiction efforts at the tactical level as well. Russian BAI and tactical interdiction campaigns also intensively target Ukrainian drone operators and artillery crews, which are integral parts of Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian infiltration missions and infiltration assaults. Degrading Ukraine’s drone and artillery capabilities creates holes in Ukrainian defenses that Russian forces can exploit for more rapid gains. Russian technological and operational-tactical innovations are the primary factors facilitating Russian advances in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk areas. Ukrainian forces will have to develop technological, operational, and tactical responses to this new Russian approach in order to disrupt it.

Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal.  Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk.[14] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in eastern Novopidhorodne, and south of Molodetske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[15] Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces either maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk and Zakhidnyi Microraion (central Myrnohrad), areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[16] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 12 that Russian forces launched a large-scale multi-day motorized assault against Pokrovsk employing light equipment on the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway that runs through eastern Pokrovsk.[17] The corps reported that Russian forces have established firing positions in multiple areas of Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still maintain logistics to Pokrovsk. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in Myrnohrad reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad continue to receive supplies.[18] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, but did not retake the settlement.[19] The milblogger added that Russian forces continue to employ glide bomb strikes to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Myrnohrad.

ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally-significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub — an objective that Russia already achieved by July 2025.[20] The further operational significance of the seizure of Pokrovsk remains unclear but depends on several factors, including whether Ukrainian forces conduct an orderly withdrawal or disorderly retreat; whether Ukrainian forces are able to conduct a successful defense after the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket; and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the collapse of the pocket and conduct a successful pursuit.

Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the majority of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) is a contested ”gray zone” and that Russian forces have “firm control” of Pokrovsk, having exploited recent thick fogs – likely referring to recent footage of Russian servicemembers entering Pokrovsk on motorcycles.[21] Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 and 12 that Russian forces had nearly seized Pokrovsk.[22] Milbloggers and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) also amplified artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of alleged Ukrainian mass surrenders in Myrnohrad, whose authenticity the Ukrainian General Staff and many of the milbloggers themselves refuted.[23] One milblogger claimed that Ukraine is distributing the footage in order to discredit and drown out “legitimate” footage showing the conditions of Ukrainian forces in the pocket — still portraying Russian forces as exerting more control in the area than available evidence currently supports.[24] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 46 percent of Pokrovsk and 10 percent of Myrnohrad.

The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear. Deputy Commander of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov announced on November 11 that the Russian MoD created an independent Unmanned Systems Forces service that includes drone regiments, battalions, and other units.[25] ISW observed Russian efforts to establish a separate Unmanned Systems Forces service beginning in Summer 2024.[26] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced in December 2024 that the Russian MoD would establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as an independent service by the third quarter of 2025.[27] Ishtuganov stated that Russian forces will assign drone operators, engineers, technicians, and other support personnel to such elements, which coordinate with Russian manufacturers on drone and electronic warfare (EW) development.[28] These efforts are in line with the Russian MoD’s efforts to centralize Russian drone procurement and establish control over informal drone units that organically emerged within Russian military units since 2022.[29] Ishtuganov reiterated Russian intentions to create a dedicated higher military school for drone operators.[30] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree in July 2025 to create a higher military school for drone operators by 2027.[31] Ishtuganov and other Russian sources notably did not clarify the relationship of the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone crews to the newly-formed Russian Unmanned Systems Forces.

Key Takeaways

1. The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement.
2. Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics.
3. Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole.
4. Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design.
5.  Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal.
6. Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space.
7. The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear.
8. The Kremlin is conducting multiple information operations against the Baltic states as it did to justify the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of Phase Zero conditions-setting for a possible attack on the Baltic states at some point in the future. ISW is not currently forecasting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics.
9. Officials reported aerial incursions in French and Lithuanian airspace.
10. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.