Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Siversk direction following a recent reported command change of the Russian forces operating near Siversk. Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on December 15 that Russian forces conducted a three-pronged mechanized assault with over 400 personnel, up to 30 armored vehicles, 13 buggies, and 60 motorcycles north, east, and south of Siversk on December 14.[1] Geolocated footage published on December 15 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault north of Vesele (south of Siversk) — likely a component of the larger attack.[2] Butusov reported that Russian forces managed to wedge into four Ukrainian defensive positions and drop infantry but that Ukrainian drone and artillery fire as well as close combat ultimately repelled the assault.[3] Butusov stated that Russian forces aimed to wedge two to three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers in depth from the direction of Zolotarvika (east of Siversk).[4] ISW is currently unable to confirm the extent of Russian advances in this assault, and additional footage of the Russian assault will likely emerge in the coming days. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated on December 14 that Russian forces fielded more than 100 pieces of equipment in a recent assault in the Siversk direction and noted that there were 55 combat engagements in this direction on December 13 — a significant increase in tempo in this area of the frontline.[5]
The recent Siversk assault indicates that Russian forces appear to be learning to conduct more effective assaults but remain far from restoring maneuver to the battlefield. This Russian assault was much larger and more coherent than most Russian assaults in the Siversk direction, and Butusov assessed that Russian forces carefully prepared this assault.[6] Butusov noted that Russian forces specifically coordinated interactions between assault units and communications, electronic warfare (EW), and drone operations – all elements of command and control (C2) with which the Russian military command has historically struggled to conduct effectively.[7] A more prepared Russian assault may be the result of the recent reported command changes in the area. Russian forces near Siversk have especially struggled to conduct effective assaults, as a failed Russian mechanized assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka in early November 2024 and exaggerated claims of success in the area contributed to the Russian military command’s reported removal and arrest of several brigade commanders within the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]).[8] A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted Russian command changes claimed on December 13 that the Russian military command recently removed 3rd CAA Commander Major General Dmitry Ovcharov.[9] A Russian milblogger rejected this claim on December 15, instead claiming that Major General Alexei Kolesnikov was the most recent commander of the 3rd CAA and that Kolesnikov recently took up a new, unspecified position.[10]
North Korean forces are reportedly facing expected struggles with high casualties and poor communication with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely disrupting coordination between North Korean and Russian personnel and undermining Russian military operations. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 14 that North Korean forces operating in Kursk Oblast recently fired at Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz battalion vehicles and killed eight Chechen personnel in a friendly fire incident, likely due to the language barrier between the Russian and North Korean forces.[11] The GUR noted that the language barrier also hinders effective combat coordination between Russian and North Korean forces.[12] The GUR reported that a contingent consisting of Russian and North Korean servicemen in Kursk Oblast lost 200 personnel as of December 14 and that Ukrainian drones swarmed a North Korean position, which is consistent with recent reports of North Korean forces engaging in attritional infantry assaults.[13] The poor integration and ongoing communication problems between Russian and North Korean forces will likely continue to cause friction in Russian military operations in Kursk Oblast in the near term.
Russia’s immediate plans for its military assets in Syria remain unclear as reports continue that Russia has secured agreements to keep its main military bases in western Syria while also withdrawing from its other bases in the country. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP’s December 15 Iran Update. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 15 that rumors are circulating among Russian troops that the Kremlin and unspecified Syrian actors agreed to allow Russia to maintain its military presence at the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia with up to a total of 3,000 Russian military personnel.[14] The GUR also reported that Russian military personnel at the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base and on nearby ships “in the region” are having problems with drinking water and food supplies and are awaiting food deliveries from Russian military transport aircraft involved in Russia’s evacuation of military assets from Syria. Reports that Russian military personnel are awaiting additional food supplies suggest that the Kremlin may not plan or is unable to fully evacuate the bases in the immediate future. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported on December 15 that satellite imagery captured on December 15 shows the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate and possibly the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate still in a holding pattern roughly 15 kilometers away from the Port of Tartus.[15] The satellite imagery does not include the other vessels in the Russian Mediterranean Sea Flotilla that have recently been offshore.[16]
The GUR also reported on December 15 that unspecified armed groups that fought against the Assad regime are accompanying Russian forces as they withdraw from “remote areas” of Syria, likely towards the western coast.[17] A Syrian anti-Assad regime media outlet claimed on December 15 that Russian forces withdrew from the Tiyas Air Base (west of Palmyra and in Homs Governorate) toward Hmeimim Air Base.[18] The GUR reported on December 14 that some Russian soldiers were waiting at the Tiyas Air Base while a Russian military commander attempted to negotiate security guarantees for the Russian soldiers from military contingents of other unspecified states.[19] Russia has also reportedly recently withdrawn from a series of bases in the Manbij and Kobani areas in northern Syria amid the ongoing Turkish-backed offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[20] Russia will probably withdraw from its last sizeable base in northern Syria, Qamishli, because Turkey and the groups on the ground in Syria—including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA)—do not appear to be prepared to allow Russia to remain there. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler also offered on December 15 to ”support” Russia’s consolidation at Hmeimim and Tartus, suggesting Turkey will not support other Russian bases.[21]
A Russian insider source claimed on December 15 that Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin may have fallen out of favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin following the Assad regime’s collapse since Putin reportedly recently rescinded a decree to present Naryshkin with a state award.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Siversk direction following a recent reported command change of the Russian forces operating near Siversk.
- The recent Siversk assault indicates that Russian forces appear to be learning to conduct more effective assaults but remain far from restoring maneuver to the battlefield.
- North Korean forces are reportedly facing expected struggles with high casualties and poor communication with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely disrupting coordination between North Korean and Russian personnel and undermining Russian military operations.
- Russia’s immediate plans for its military assets in Syria remain unclear as reports continue that Russia has secured agreements to keep its main military bases in western Syria while also withdrawing from its other bases in the country.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Russian sources continue to complain about the Russian military’s insufficient training system and inept military instructors.