Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to invoke nuclear threats as part of his ongoing information campaign to discourage further Western support for Ukraine and undermine the international community’s efforts to cohere its strategic vision for defeating Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine. Putin claimed during a speech to graduating Russian officers on June 21 that Russia plans to further develop its nuclear triad as a “guarantee of strategic deterrence” and to maintain the balance of power in the world. Putin noted that Russia is also working to increase its conventional combat capabilities and defense industrial production. Putin claimed during a press conference in Vietnam on June 20 that Russia is considering “lowering the threshold” for nuclear use in Russia’s nuclear doctrine and that a possible future strategic defeat of Russian forces on the battlefield in Ukraine would result in the “end of [Russia’s] statehood.” ISW noted that Putin may have falsely equated a Russian defeat in Ukraine with an existential threat to the Russian state in order to invoke an “exceptional case” in which existing Russian nuclear doctrine would allow for the use of nuclear weapons. Putin’s June 21 statement appears to be the continuation of his recent information operation intended to sabotage the West’s efforts to develop a common strategic objective of decisively defeating Russia’s invasion as the West’s envisioned end state for the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that the threat of nuclear escalation is a core aspect of Russia’s ability to manipulate foreign decision-makers and is highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation due to nuclear and conventional deterrence.
Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to emphasize Russia’s initiative to create an alternative “Eurasian security architecture,” likely as part of ongoing efforts to establish a coalition of friendly states to act as an alternative to the West and undermine NATO. Putin reiterated on June 21 his intention to create “equal and indivisible security in Eurasia.” Putin claimed that Russia is ready to discuss Eurasian security issues with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and BRICS and claimed that Russia is ready to have discussions with European and NATO countries “when they are ready.” Lavrov similarly emphasized Russia’s effort to form a “Eurasian security architecture to replace… the Euro-Atlantic [security system]” at a June 21 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Lavrov further promoted the need for joint efforts to create a new Eurasian security architecture and coordination with other unspecified multilateral organizations on the Eurasian continent. Lavrov is likely referencing Russian efforts to increase cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as Putin signaled his interest in developing relations with ASEAN during his state visit to Vietnam on June 20. Putin notably included Vietnam – a country not typically included in political conceptions of Eurasia – in addition to North Korea in his proposed formation of a new Eurasian security system, suggesting that Putin seeks to include Southeast Asia into this alternative Eurasian security structure by leveraging select Southeast Asian countries’ historically friendly ties with the Soviet Union. Putin first laid the informational groundwork for this Eurasian security structure during his visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in May 2024 before proposing it in a speech on June 14, in which he claimed that the “Euro-Atlantic security system” is collapsing and that Western “schemes for security and prosperity in Europe do not work.” ISW continues to assess that Putin and other senior Russian officials will likely continue to amplify Russia’s efforts to create a coalition of countries that Putin could use to posture as an alternative to NATO while also supporting ongoing Kremin information operations to falsely portray Western countries as Ukraine’s only supporters.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to invoke nuclear threats as part of his ongoing information campaign to discourage further Western support for Ukraine and undermine the international community’s efforts to cohere its strategic vision for defeating Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine.
- Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to emphasize Russia’s initiative to create an alternative “Eurasian security architecture,” likely as part of ongoing efforts to establish a coalition of friendly states to act as an alternative to the West and undermine NATO.
- The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized South Korean and Japanese objections to the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement and directly tied the agreement to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “Eurasian security architecture” initiative.
- Ukrainian forces struck oil refineries and military targets in Bryansk and Astrakhan oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea on the night of June 20 to 21.
- Moscow State University (MGU) announced on June 21 that it has opened enrollment for a master’s program on “strategic communications, information, and hybrid wars” under the guidance of Russian ultranationalist and former State Duma Deputy Zakhar Prilepin and other select Duma deputies.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, southwest of Svatove, and west and southwest of Donetsk City.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be taking steps to address known bureaucratic issues as part of its efforts to formalize irregular Russian formations.
- An investigation by Russian opposition outlet Verstka highlights how Russia is importing Russian judges to serve in courts in occupied Ukraine, supporting Russian efforts to control the judiciary while also providing a convenient cover for the resettlement of Russian citizens into occupied Ukraine.
For full report: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024