Institute for the Study of War: Putin demands Russian forces capture Pokrovsk by mid-November

Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), but these advances are unlikely to cause an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on October 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and eastern Pokrovsk and northeastern Myrnohrad.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced in eastern Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne (just northwest of Pokrovsk).[3] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported on October 28 that Russian forces do not have full control over any positions in Pokrovsk, but noted that Russian forces maintain a 10-to-one drone advantage over Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[4] Shapoval’s statement is consistent with ISW’s definition of the assessed Russian advances as verifiable areas in which Russian forces have operated in or conducted attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. Control is doctrinally defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.”[5] Russian forces almost certainly do not currently control any positions within the city of Pokrovsk itself.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly demanded Russian forces seize Pokrovsk by mid-November 2025, although Russian forces are unlikely to meet this deadline. Ukrainian sources amplified a since-deleted Financial Times (FT) report that cited unnamed media sources reporting that Putin tasked the Russian military command with taking control of Pokrovsk by mid-November 2025.[6] Russian forces have repeatedly missed Putin’s arbitrarily demanded deadlines to seize specific territory in Ukraine, including Putin’s early demand to seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 2022.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa assessed on June 5, 2025 that Russian forces aimed to seize an operationally significant area of Donetsk Oblast (including Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk) by September 1, 2025; the rest of Kherson Oblast and a ”buffer zone” in northern and southern Ukraine by the end of 2025; and all land east of the Dnipro River in northern and eastern Ukraine, as well as most of Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts by the end of 2026.[8] Russian forces have failed to seize any of these major cities in Donetsk Oblast as of late October 2025, and ISW continues to assess that seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt will be a multi-year-long effort for Russian forces.[9] Putin regularly tasks the Russian General Staff with seizing operationally significant swaths of land within unrealistic timeframes, and the timeframe within which Putin aims to seize Pokrovsk is not a realistic reflection of Russian forces’ ability to seize the town.

Russian tactics in Pokrovsk have entrapped civilians within the city, intensifying the risk of indiscriminate civilian harm. The Ukrainian Pokrovsk Military Administration reported that Russian forces have fire control over all egress routes from Pokrovsk, effectively entrapping 1,200 civilians within Pokrovsk.[10] The Pokrovsk Military Administration reported that Russian forces are killing civilians who attempt to evacuate both on foot and in vehicles. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes as part of deception tactics that may amount to perfidy, a war crime that the Geneva Convention defines as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.”[11] Russian forces’ systematic resort to perfidy in Pokrovsk has added a significant degree of confusion and chaos to the area, likely putting Ukrainian civilians at even greater risk of harm. The drone saturation in the skies over Pokrovsk also poses an intensified threat to the safety of civilians, especially as Russian forces frequently use drones to purposefully target civilians.[12] ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces indiscriminately target both civilian and military vehicles traveling in frontline oblasts and that the indiscriminate strikes on vehicles complicate or block medical services and evacuations from the frontlines.[13]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 28 that Ukraine and Sweden agreed to localize production of Swedish Gripen fighter jets in Ukraine.[14] Zelensky noted that training for Ukrainian pilots to operate Gripens lasts six months and that Gripens require a small maintenance team.[15] Zelensky announced on October 25 that Ukraine also expects Sweden to begin delivering its promised 150 Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine in early 2026. Zelensky stated on October 28 that he is also in talks with France to supply Rafale fighter jets to Ukraine.[16]

The Russian State Duma approved a bill on October 28 allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” to protect Russian critical facilities and infrastructure.[27] Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” is Russia’s higher-readiness active reserve in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up.[28] The bill states that reservists will participate in special training sessions to ensure the production of critical facilities and that the Russian government will establish the training procedures for reservists. Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate, Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky, stated on October 22 that Russian authorities will send reservists to training camps to prepare to protect critical infrastructure and defend against drones.[29] Tsimlyansky clarified that this bill does not require reservists to participate in military operations or missions outside of Russia. The October 28 bill differs from the Russian MoD’s October 13 draft amendment that requests permission for the Russian military to use members of Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or state of war, which the State Duma has not approved as of this report.[30] It is unclear if the Kremlin will use the October 28 bill to deploy reservists to rear areas of occupied Ukraine, as Russian officials continue to falsely insist that occupied Ukraine is part of Russia.[31] The Kremlin may leverage the October 28 bill as a stepping stone toward mobilizing reservists on a rolling basis to fight in Ukraine, as ISW previously forecasted.[32]

European authorities recently reported unidentified drones near airports in Spain and a military base in Estonia. Authorities at the Miguel Hernández Airport in Alicante, Spain, reported that unidentified drones flying near the runway forced the airport to close on the evening of October 27.[33] Spanish authorities have launched an investigation to determine the drone launch point and the actors responsible. Spanish authorities also reported that the Palma de Mallorca Airport suspended operations on the evening of October 19 after an unidentified drone sighting in the airport’s airspace.[34] Estonian General Staff Spokesperson Liis Waxmann reported that authorities detected two unidentified drones flying near the Camp Reedo military base of the Estonian 2nd Infantry Brigade in southern Estonia on the afternoon of October 17.[35] Authorities reportedly shot down one of the drones but could not find the wreckage. Camp Reedo also houses the US 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment (5-7 CAV). Neither Spanish nor Estonian authorities have identified the drones as Russian as of this writing.

Key Takeaways

1. Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), but these advances are unlikely to cause an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction.
2. Russian tactics in Pokrovsk have entrapped civilians within the city, intensifying the risk of indiscriminate civilian harm.
3. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 28 that Ukraine and Sweden agreed to localize production of Swedish Gripen fighter jets in Ukraine.
4. The Kremlin is resurrecting Soviet-era narratives of Russia’s perpetual victimhood in the face of perceived external aggression in a dual attempt to justify Russia’s future aggression against both Europe and the Asia-Pacific and the longer-term mobilization of Russian society.
5. Russian officials also appear to be setting conditions to justify further militarization and full-scale mobilization of Russian society.
6. The Russian State Duma approved a bill on October 28 allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” to protect Russian critical facilities and infrastructure.
7. European authorities recently reported unidentified drones near airports in Spain and a military base in Estonia.
8. European officials continue to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years.
9. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and the Pokrovsk direction and marginally advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.