December 4, 2025

Institute for the Study of War: Putin reaffirms original territorial goals in Ukraine 

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process. Putin gave an interview to India Today English-language news magazine ahead of his December 4 state visit to India.[1] Putin stated that Russia will end its war in Ukraine when it achieves the goals that Putin set forth at the start of the full-scale invasion. Putin stated that Ukraine must understand that the “best way” to solve the war is for Ukraine to agree to a peace settlement like the one Russia tried to impose on Ukraine in 2022 – referencing the 2022 Istanbul agreement that amounted to Ukraine’s full capitulation.[2] Putin responded to a question about what constitutes a victory for Russia, stating that Russia wants to “protect” ethnic Russians, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine – justifications the Kremlin has often used for its demand for the removal of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with a pro-Russian government.[3] Putin also demanded that NATO not expand further, essentially calling for a revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy and return to NATO’s 1997 borders. ISW continues to assess that Putin, in part, launched his full-scale invasion in order to destroy NATO and seize control of all of Ukraine, and Putin’s original war demands notably include not only demands of Ukraine but of NATO and the West as well.[4]

Putin is attempting to falsely frame his war aims as solely geographically limited to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Putin falsely claimed that Russia “had no choice” but to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), that he offered Ukraine to withdraw its forces from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to avoid hostilities in 2022, and that Ukraine subsequently refused. Putin claimed that Russia will now either seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts through military means or Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the areas of the two oblasts that Ukraine still controls. Putin’s focus during the December 4 interview on Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts ignores the way that his full-scale invasion initially sought to capture far more territory than just those two regions, including Kyiv City, and to fully control Ukraine through a Kremlin-installed government. Russia had to rescope its strategy after its failure to take Kyiv City to focus instead on more limited operations in eastern Ukraine.

Putin attempted to obfuscate his rejection of the latest US peace proposal in the December 4 interview. Putin discussed the December 2 meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, claiming that the peace proposals from the US delegation were “in one way or another” based on the agreements from Putin’s previous meeting with US President Donald Trump in Alaska. Putin stated that there were points in the US-proposal to which Russia could not agree, but that he would not offer more specifics so as to not “disrupt” Trump’s peace process. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is purposely refraining from publicly discussing the December 2 meeting in order to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal that did not concede to all of Russia’s absolutist war demands.[5]

SW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported on December 3 that Ukrainian servicemembers stated that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of November 29, and one of the sources stated that Ukrainian forces in the area have not rotated since November 12.[17] A source told Hromadske that Ukrainian attempts to relieve the encirclement have been partially successful. The source also indicated that Ukrainian forces could hold Myrnohrad if Ukrainian forces retook Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) and Rodynske (just northwest of Chervonyi Lyman). Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi refuted claims that Russian forces had surrounded Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, reporting that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct rotations and limited logistics within the town.[18] ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian reports to assess that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, though the situation is likely extremely difficult, and Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and GLOCs with artillery and drones.

Ukrainian forces are still operating within Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the area. Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported on December 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within Pokrovsk and even hold unspecified areas of the town.[19] Geolocated footage published on December 1 and 3 shows two Russian servicemembers unconfidently operating north of Pokrovsk and two operating in central Rivne (between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad).[20] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces are infiltrating in fireteams of two to three personnel into northern Pokrovsk during poor weather conditions.[21] The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command has concentrated roughly 150,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, about 11,000 to 12,000 of which are conducting assaults. The spokesperson stated that Russian drones are complicating Ukrainian logistics but that Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct several rotations and bring in supplies in the past few days.

Key Takeaways

  1. Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process.
  2. Other Kremlin officials continued to publicly display their commitment to Putin’s original war aims.
  3. The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian “concession” in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities.
  4. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
  5. Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City against the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations.
  6. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
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Wilson Center

Forced displacement represents one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of our time. Individuals and families, torn from the fabric of their communities, find themselves navigating a world of uncertainty, often without basic necessities or a clear path to safety. There are currently some 110 million forced displaced, and this number is growing by 10 million each year!

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International Humanitarian Law (IHL), with its core principles centered on the protection of civilians during conflicts, plays a pivotal role in this discourse. Yet, despite clear legal frameworks, compliance remains
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