Institute for the Study of War: Russia advances in Donetsk town of Pokrovsk

Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear. Geolocated footage published on October 23 and 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and western Pokrovsk and seized positions along the Pokrovsk railway line.[1] ISW has observed footage of small Russian infantry groups operating in central and western Pokrovsk over the last week (since roughly October 17) and therefore assesses that Russian forces likely maintain isolated but enduring positions south of the railway line in western Pokrovsk.[2] ISW defines the Assessed Russian Advance layer as verifiable areas in which Russian forces have operated in or conducted attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. Russian forces almost certainly do not maintain control over any positions in Pokrovsk, which is defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.”[3] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged that the situation within Pokrovsk is unclear and that it is impossible to determine where Russian forces may hold enduring positions in the town.[4] Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Pokrovsk, although Russian forces appear to be undertaking significant efforts to consolidate advances and seize Pokrovsk in the coming months. Additional geolocated footage published on October 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southeastern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[5] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces are also attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), although Ukrainian forces appear to be defending more successfully in Myrnohrad at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 24 that elements of the Russian 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking Myrnohrad from Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka (all northeast of Myrnohrad).[6] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently pushed the limited number of Russian forces in Myrnohrad back from the eastern and northern outskirts of the town. ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces have conducted successful infiltration operations beyond Myrnohrad’s eastern outskirts, suggesting that Russian forces are struggling to penetrate Myrnohrad despite recently advancing into Pokrovsk. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are also struggling to hold positions in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and in Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad.[8] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have temporarily paused their attacks in Myrnohrad and are advancing within Rodynske.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Promin (east of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Promin.[10]

Ukrainian forces are also reportedly conducting limited infiltration missions into the Russian near rear northeast of Pokrovsk, underscoring the high degree of permeability of positions in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently infiltrated into the Russian near rear near Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and ambushed Russian forces.[11] Mashovets stated that Ukraine’s ability to also conduct infiltration missions indicates that Russia’s forward line of owned troops (FLOT) is similarly porous to Ukraine’s and that Russian forces are unable to deny Ukrainian forces access to all territory currently under ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances layer. The increasingly porous front line near Pokrovsk and throughout Ukraine reinforces for both sides the importance of being able to seize on an opportune moment or defend against a surprise attack. The fact that Russian and Ukrainian forces occupy non-contiguous intermingled positions in and near Pokrovsk also complicates assessments on the timeline by which Russian forces may seize Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk had a pre-war population twice that of Toretsk, another large urban settlement in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces expended over 14 months to seize after initially establishing positions in Toretsk in June and July 2024.[12] Russian forces may engage in several more months of combat before they fully capture Pokrovsk, assuming Russian forces do not collapse the flanks around Pokrovsk. Russian forces will also have to clear or force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Myrnohrad before Russian forces will be able to fully exploit the seizure of Pokrovsk, as enduring Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad would complicate Russian operations in the area.

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.[28]CNN, citing sources with knowledge of the visit, reported that Dmitriev will visit with Trump Administration officials to continue discussions about the bilateral relationship.[29] Axios and Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Dmitriev will meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff on October 25.[30]

Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems. The Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported on October 24 that Russian Su-34 fighters launched three long-range guided glide bombs against Odesa Oblast.[36] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that the strikes were the first Russian glide bomb strikes against Odesa Oblast.[37] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted strikes with modified long-range glide bombs against Poltava Oblast on October 20, against Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast on October 18, and against Mykolaiv City, Mykolaiv Oblast on October 16.[38] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 24 that Russian forces employed UMPB-5R precision guided glide bombs with an extended range of 100 to 180 kilometers and a payload of 100 kilograms — significantly smaller than the 500-to-3,000-kilogram payload of typical Russian glide bombs that Russian forces use against frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and settlements.[39] Beskrestnov noted that the UMPB-5R glide bombs are a cheaper analogue to jet-propelled Shahed-type drones and missiles and are similar to previous Russian developments, such as the Banderol cruise missile and the D30 guided glide bomb. Beskrestnov previously reported that Russia relies on Chinese-produced jet engines to increase the glide bomb’s range and that Russian aircraft launch the bombs from an altitude of at least 10 kilometers.[40]

Russian forces likely seek to restore their long-range strike capabilities, allowing Russian aircraft to operate farther from the front line and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems. ISW observed that Russian forces reduced glide bomb strikes in late 2024 in response to higher rates of Ukrainian air defenses shooting down Russian aircraft.[41] The recent longer-range glide bomb strikes indicate that Russian forces are launching these new glide bombs without the same risk of Ukrainian air defenses, exploiting Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems that have a long range and are capable of downing aircraft covering the front line. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an umbrella that uses more Patriot systems, would degrade Russia’s ability to conduct airstrikes, underscoring the critical necessity of timely Western provisions of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, as the system is the longest-range air defense option in Ukraine’s current arsenal.[42] ISW observed that Russian forces are attempting to use medium-range Lancet loitering munitions to counter Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea at ranges over 50 kilometers, which may be part of Russian efforts to reestablish low- and high-altitude superiority to enable long-range glide bomb strikes against southern Ukraine from airspace over the Black Sea.[43]

Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23. The Lithuanian Armed Forces reported that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet and a Russian Il-78 Aerial Tanker illegally entered Lithuanian airspace on October 23, and NATO scrambled two Spanish Eurofighters from a Lithuanian base in response to the aerial incursion.[45] The Eurofighters are part of NATO’s ongoing Baltic Air Policing Mission. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda condemned Russia’s incursion into Lithuanian airspace as a ”gross violation of international law.”[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rejected accusations that Russian aircraft violated Lithuanian airspace, claiming that the Su-30 and Il-78 aircraft were conducting “scheduled training flights over Kaliningrad Oblast.”[47] ISW previously reported that three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonian airspace on September 19.[48]

Key Takeaways

1. Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear.
2. The Kremlin continues its multifaceted cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing US decision makers in Russia’s favor in response to recent US sanctions.
3. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.
4. The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the fourth time since June 2025, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability against the backdrop of new US sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending.
5. Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems.
6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly increasing its purchases of domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles despite Western sanctions that aim to contain Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) production.
7. Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23.
8. Belarusian security officials are supporting Russian cognitive warfare efforts against Poland and Lithuania.
9. Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.