Data on Russian forces’ rate of advance indicates that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, and a rapid Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent. A senior US military official reportedly stated that the war will only worsen for Ukraine as Russia can fight indefinitely and that it is better for Ukraine to negotiate a peace settlement now rather than negotiate from a weaker position later.[1] The Kremlin has consistently pushed a narrative claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable — particularly since reports first emerged of the 28-point peace proposal — in order to push Ukraine and the West to acquiesce to Russia’s demands. The reality on the battlefield indicates that a Russian victory in Ukraine is far from certain, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military commanders have been attempting to portray Russia as capable of rapidly seizing Donetsk Oblast militarily, but hard data on the rate of Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast does not indicate that Russian forces will imminently seize the rest of the oblast.[2] Russian forces have been prioritizing completing the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but have been slow to do so as Ukrainian forces have successfully stymied the rate of Russian advance in Pokrovsk to footpace. Russian forces entered Pokrovsk for the first time by July 31, and Russian forces have advanced an average of 0.12 kilometers per day in Pokrovsk from July 31 to November 26. Russian forces have not seized Pokrovsk — a town of 11.5 square miles — despite operating within the town for over 118 days. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have consolidated advances in 66 percent of Pokrovsk as of November 26, a low percentage given the time and manpower (elements of at least two combined arms armies) Russia has dedicated to pursuing this effort.
The Russian rate of advance across the theater intensified since the Alaska summit on August 15, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day across the entire theater, between August 15 and November 20, but these advances are still constrained to footpace.[3] Russian forces could seize the remainder of Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast by August 2027, assuming a constant Russian rate of advance.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire theater.[5] Russian forces have most rapidly advanced in eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts in recent weeks, inflating the theater-wide rate of advance compared to Russian forces’ comparatively slower rate of advance in Donetsk Oblast.[6]
Recent Russian advances elsewhere on the frontline have largely been opportunistic and exploited seasonal weather conditions. Russian forces are pursuing an offensive campaign design that consists of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration missions to degrade the efficacy of Ukrainian defenses.[7] Russian forces leveraged this campaign design and a porous frontline in the area to make relatively rapid advances toward Hulyaipole from the northeast and east, but even these advances are constrained to footpace.[8] Russian infiltration missions elsewhere on the frontline have not resulted in advances similar to the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, however. Russian forces have leveraged infiltration missions and interdiction efforts in the Vovchansk and Kupyansk directions, but have failed to make rapid, sweeping gains this campaign design hopes to enable.[9] These Russian forces are forced to engage Ukrainian forces in attritional urban combat and make only creeping gains, all at disproportionately high manpower losses. The Russian military command would likely have to commit the time and resources to other areas of the frontline as it is currently committing in the Pokrovsk direction to replicate the results of the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole efforts elsewhere on the frontline, particularly areas that Ukrainian forces are better fit to defend.
Ukrainian forces have proven effective at constraining Russian advances and conducting successful counteroffensives, particularly when well-staffed and well-equipped. Ukraine notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast and elsewhere in northern Ukraine in April 2022, liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast in a surprise counteroffensive in September and October 2022, and forced Russian forces to withdraw from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022 following a successful summer-fall interdiction campaign.[10] Ukrainian forces have liberated over 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have seized since 2022 and forced Russia to expend manpower, equipment, time, and energy on attritional offensives that generate losses disproportionately high relative to the amount of gains.[11] Ukrainian forces have thwarted the Russian offensives into northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in Spring 2024 and January 2025, respectively.[12] Ukraine has forced Russia into a positional war that denies Russia the ability to conduct operational maneuver. ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to stop Russian battlefield advances cold, especially if Ukrainian forces leverage their well-developed fortifications in Donetsk Oblast.[13]
Kremlin officials continue setting conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist demands. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 26 that “there can be no talk of any concessions or any surrender” of the “key aspects” of Russia’s challenges with Ukraine in response to the US peace plan.[14] Ryabkov stated Russia “is prepared to achieve its stated goals” in negotiations – referring to Russia’s long-held and oft-repeated demands — and noted that Russia will continue its war in Ukraine if there are “any setbacks” in negotiations.[15] Ryabkov reiterated that Russia’s position has not changed and invoked the alleged “understanding” that the United States and Russia reached at the August 2025 Alaska summit, despite the fact that there are no public-facing agreements resulting from the summit.[16] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to exploit the lack of clarity about the Alaska summit to conceal the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to compromise and its commitment to achieving nothing short of a full victory in Ukraine.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 26 that ”it is too early to say” when responding to a question asserting that Ukraine and Russia had never been so close to concluding a peace deal, a further indication that the Kremlin is distancing itself from the peace proposal, likely because Russia intends to reject it.[18]
The Kremlin is reportedly concerned that the United States will correctly interpret Russia as unwilling to meaningfully engage in negotiations and accept any peace deal that compromises its ability to achieve its maximalist claims. Bloomberg published on November 25 the transcript of an October 29 call between lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in which Ushakov expressed concerns about Dmitriev’s plan to present a peace proposal based on Russia’s position to the United States.[19] Ushakov stated that Russia needs the “maximum” of its demands and asked, “otherwise, what’s the point” of passing on proposals to the United States. Ushakov stated that the United States “might not take [Russia’s proposal] and say that it was agreed with [Russia],“ expressing concern that the United States might not understand and accept all of Russia’s demands. Russia has not engaged in meaningful negotiations since launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and continues to reject terms that compromise on any of its maximalist demands.[20] Kremlin officials continue to deflect blame for Russia’s willingness to negotiate through a variety of means, including shifting blame for the lack of meaningful negotiations onto Ukraine and Europe.[21] US Vice President VD Vance stated that Russia is ”asking for too much” to end the war in Ukraine in May 2025.[22]
Recent Ukrainian counterattacks may further delay Russian forces’ seizure of Pokrovsk, though the situation in Pokrovsk remains serious and dynamic at this time. Recent Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Pokrovsk and northwest of the town continue to slow the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured key positions in northwestern and western Pokrovsk during counterattacks, and a Ukrainian journalist reported that Ukrainian forces advanced near the Donetska Railway line in northern Pokrovsk and prevented Russian forces from advancing toward Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[23] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in northern Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 26 indicates that Russian forces also infiltrated into positions in northeastern Pokrovsk.[24] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), cohering with Ukrainian reports of advancing in northern Pokrovsk.[25] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in northern Pokrovsk. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Pokrovsk and that the frontline largely runs along the Donetska Railway line, cohering with recent reports indicating that Russian forces have seized the area south of the Donetska Railway line.[26] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces continue attempts to encircle Myrnohrad and attack the town from the north and south, and Myrnohrad City Military Administration Head Yuriy Tretyak stated that Russian forces are attacking from the west near Rivne and Svitle, all likely in an attempt to fix Ukrainian forces within Myrnohrad while also tightening the encirclement around Myrnohrad.[27] Ukraine’s East Group of Forces reported on November 26 that Ukrainian forces are adapting to Russian attempts to cut off Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, including by building protective corridors with nets, covering logistics routes with air defenses, and using heavy drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics.[28] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[29]
Russia’s long-range strike campaign is increasingly killing and injuring civilians. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported on November 25 that Russian forces significantly increased long-range strikes in 2025, killing 548 civilians and injuring 3,592 civilians from January to October.[34] The HRMMU reported that this was a 26 percent increase in civilian deaths from January to October 2024, in which long-range strikes killed 434 civilians and injured 2,045 civilians. Russian forces have conducted at least 15 combined strikes against Ukraine with strike packages of over 500 long-range weapons each, with a record high strike of 823 total drones and missiles on September 7, 2025.[35] The HRMMU reported that Russian strikes inflicted four times more total casualties in Kyiv City from January to October 2025 than in all of 2024 and that long-range strikes inflicted significant increases in civilian casualties in Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia cities as well.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to leveraging its long-range strikes that target Ukraine’s civilian populace in an effort to sow fear and demoralize the Ukrainian people and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[37]
Key Takeaways
- Data on Russian forces’ rate of advance indicates that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, and a rapid Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent.
- Recent Russian advances elsewhere on the frontline have largely been opportunistic and exploited seasonal weather conditions.
- Ukrainian forces have proven effective at constraining Russian advances and conducting successful counteroffensives, particularly when well-staffed and well-equipped.
- Kremlin officials continue setting conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist demands.
- The Kremlin is reportedly concerned that the United States will correctly interpret Russia as unwilling to meaningfully engage in negotiations and accept any peace deal that compromises its ability to achieve its maximalist claims.
- Recent Ukrainian counterattacks may further delay Russian forces’ seizure of Pokrovsk, though the situation in Pokrovsk remains serious and dynamic at this time.
- Russia continues setting conditions to deploy active reservists to combat against Ukraine.
- Russia’s long-range strike campaign is increasingly killing and injuring civilians.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.