Institute for the Study of War: Russia gained under 1 per cent of Ukraine territory in 2025 at a cost of nearly 400,000 casualties

The Kremlin is significantly intensifying its cognitive warfare effort to present the Russian military and economy as able to inevitably win a war of attrition against Ukraine. High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have been aggressively promoting exaggerated battlefield advances and the alleged strength and resilience of the Russian economy.[1] This multipronged cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia’s demands now during negotiations out of fear of intensified, protracted Russian military operations in the future. Though the situation in specific sectors of the frontline is serious, especially in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, most of Putin’s assertions of Russian victories do not correspond to the battlefield reality, nor do they indicate that the frontlines in Ukraine will collapse imminently.[2] Putin’s claims about the strength of the Russian economy also ignore how the Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is facing mounting costs in the face of Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the compounding costs of the war.[3]

The Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aims to achieve several of Putin’s original war aims through a negotiated settlement, as Russian forces are currently unable to achieve them on the battlefield. Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly and publicly reiterated their commitment to Russia’s original war aims, including granting Russia a veto over future NATO expansion, the removal of the Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government, and limits on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.[4] Putin reiterated on December 9 his call for Ukraine to cede all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts – including areas that Russian forces currently do not occupy. Putin claimed that Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are Russia’s “historical territory” and were “always part of Russia.”[5] Putin repeated his narrative that Ukraine is an artificial state that Soviet authorities whimsically created. The Russian Federation has notably recognized Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders several times in the past three decades, including with its recognition of Ukrainian independence in 1991, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty.

ISW continues to assess that the Russian campaign to militarily seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt, would likely take at least two-to-three years, pose a significant challenge, and result in difficult and costly battles that the Russian Federation may not be able to sustain.[6] Russia’s cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West to cede this heavily defended territory to Russia without a fight, allowing Russia to avoid spending significant amounts of time and resources to try to seize it on the battlefield. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would also notably set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing, particularly as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to indicate that their longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine – not only its southern and eastern regions – remains unchanged.[7]

Russian forces have gained 0.77 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2025 while suffering disproportionately high personnel costs. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 4,669 square kilometers since January 1, 2025. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces have suffered a total of 391,270 casualties in that time – or about 83 casualties per square kilometer. The Russian rate of advance has not exceeded a footpace, even in areas where Russian forces have been making relatively quicker gains recently, such as in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions. Russian advances are unlikely to move faster than a footpace in the near- to medium- term. The drone-dominated battlefield denies Russian forces the ability to conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances that restore maneuver to the battlefield.[8] Ukraine’s drone-based defenses have some vulnerabilities (e.g. weather factors) that Russian forces have managed to exploit to make tactically significant advances, but Ukraine’s drone defenses overall have denied Russian forces the ability to use armored vehicles and conduct mechanized maneuver and have forced Russian forces into grinding attritional infantry missions.[9] This equilibrium is unlikely to change rapidly, barring any sudden changes in the fundamental technologies and operational concepts underpinning the current war in Ukraine.

Russia’s resources are not endless as Putin is trying to assert, and Putin currently appears to be facing difficult decision points regarding the strategic sustainment of Russian force generation. ISW assessed in February 2025 that Russia would likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in the next 12 to 18 months as the mounting costs of the war compounded over time.[10] Russia’s main force generation recruitment system that uses high financial incentives to attract personnel appears to be hitting diminishing returns and negatively affecting the Russian economy.[11] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s slowing recruitment efforts likely could not indefinitely replace Russia’s casualty rates without a compulsory reserve mobilization.[12]

Putin is very likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near-exhaustion of voluntary recruitment in 2026 by mobilizing elements of Russia’s strategic reserve to sustain combat operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unlikely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time, however, and is most likely to persistently recruit reservists on a rolling basis. Putin signed a decree on December 8 authorizing the compulsory call-up of an unspecified number of Russian inactive reservists who will undergo compulsory “military assemblies” in the Russian Armed Forces, National Guard (Rosgvardia), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Emergency Situations military rescue units, and other state security agencies.[13] Putin tasked the Russian government with calling up the inactive reservists and organizing the assemblies in 2026, but the publicly released version of the decree classified two of the four provisions.[14] Military assemblies in Russia refer to the gathering of staff at a training ground or a unit’s headquarters, usually within the context of preparing units for military exercises or service.[15] Russia’s resolution titled, “On Military Assembly and Certain Issues of Ensuring the Fulfillment of Military Duty,” states that the Russian president may order military assemblies for training purposes or to check combat and mobilization readiness; that the assemblies may last no longer than two months; and that the total duration of a mobilized person’s participation in a military assembly may not exceed 12 months.[16]

A Kremlin official suggested that Russia may try to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine due to the Ukrainian government’s alleged “illegitimacy” – as ISW has long warned. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed on December 9 that Ukraine must hold elections in order to “legitimize” the government.[27] Slutsky stated that Russia must be “absolutely certain” that no one can challenge the authority of the Ukrainian signatories on a future peace agreement. The Kremlin, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long used deliberate misinterpretations of Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian constitution to allege that Zelensky is illegitimate.[28] Slutsky’s statement is in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment that the Kremlin may use its false claims about Zelensky’s illegitimacy to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine at a time of Russia’s choosing.[29]

Key Takeaways

1. The Kremlin is significantly intensifying its cognitive warfare effort to present the Russian military and economy as able to inevitably win a war of attrition against Ukraine.
2. The Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aims to achieve several of Putin’s original war aims through a negotiated settlement, as Russian forces are currently unable to achieve them on the battlefield.
3. Russian forces have gained 0.77 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2025 while suffering disproportionately high personnel costs.
4. Russia’s resources are not endless as Putin is trying to assert, and Putin currently appears to be facing difficult decision points regarding the strategic sustainment of Russian force generation.
5. Putin is very likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near-exhaustion of voluntary recruitment in 2026 by mobilizing elements of Russia’s strategic reserve to sustain combat operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unlikely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time, however, and is most likely to persistently recruit reservists on a rolling basis.
6. A Kremlin official suggested that Russia may try to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine due to the Ukrainian government’s alleged “illegitimacy” – as ISW has long warned.
7. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the latest 20-point US-proposed peace plan.
8. Ukraine continued discussions with its European allies on December 8 about the ongoing peace negotiations.
9. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka.