Institute for the Study of War: Russia rejects portions of U.S. “peace” plan

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov effectively rejected the following provisions:

• Freezing the current line of contact in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts;
• Restarting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rather than Russia;
• Requiring NATO only to cease further enlargement rather than insisting on rolling NATO back to its pre-1997 borders;
• Permitting European fighter jets to be stationed in Poland;
• Providing reliable security guarantees to Ukraine;
• Confirming Ukraine’s sovereignty; and
• Accepting EU regulations on the protection of religious minorities as the required basis for Ukrainian laws on the subject.

Lavrov stated that the Russian Constitution recognized illegally annexed Crimea and Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as “integral and equal subjects of the Russian Federation” and implied that Russia cannot give away territories enshrined in its constitution.[1] Lavrov also claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding at the Alaska Summit on August 15 based on the proposals that summarized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14, 2024, speech — in which Putin demanded complete Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as one of the prerequisites for peace negotiations.[2] Lavrov’s reiteration of the Russian demand for Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts contradicts the 21st point of the original peace plan, which states that Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will be frozen along the line of contact and that both Ukraine and Russia would de facto recognize the line of contact.[3] Russia’s commitment to establishing full control of Zaporizhia Oblast also contradicts the 19th point of the original peace plan, which states that the ZNPP would restart its operations under the IAEA and would equally distribute electricity between Russia and Ukraine.

Lavrov effectively rejected the third, fifth, and ninth points of the original peace plan, which respectively required only that NATO would not expand further, that European jets would be stationed in Poland, and that Ukraine would receive “reliable” security guarantees.[4] Lavrov stated that Russia “cannot agree” to any security guarantees for Ukraine that it would see as preparations for “another attack” against Russia and demanded that Russia receive security guarantees. Lavrov threatened that Russia would deem any “peacekeepers” in Ukraine “legitimate military targets,” effectively ruling out any meaningful Western security guarantees that could plausibly deter or defend against a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine as provided for under the fifth point. Point 8 of the 28-point plan reads: “NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine,” but there is no discussion of a NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. The 28-point plan did not preclude the deployment of forces from individual NATO member states as part of a security guarantee force. The Russians’ choosing to read that point as precluding the deployment of forces to guarantee the security of Ukraine would constitute a revision of the plan and would render any security guarantee toothless.

Lavrov’s December 11 statements indicate that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept the original 28-point peace plan but that Russia will instead demand further modifications should Ukraine agree to it. Lavrov’s effective rejection of key elements of the 28-point peace plan is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s November 27 statement that the 28-point plan could be the basis for future negotiations, but not a final agreement in itself.[10]

Russian State Duma deputies, whom the Kremlin uses to shape Russian public opinion, also made clear that Russia remains disinterested in signing any peace agreements, including the original 28-point peace plan. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on December 11 that he had not yet seen a single peace plan that “would be in line with [Russia’s] interests” and denounced any plans that involve freezing the frontline along the line of contact.[16] State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov stated on Russian state television on December 11 that any peace agreement that Russia signs will not guarantee “anything;” that physical force is more authoritative than law; and that Russia’s goal in Ukraine were not to confined to seizing Donbas but was rather to ensure “global security” — likely a nod to the Russian 2021 demands for “security guarantees” for Russia from the United States and NATO.[17]

Ukrainian forces struck an oil platform in the Caspian Sea for the first time and struck other Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 10 to 11. Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne and a person familiar with the matter told Bloomberg on December 11 that at least four Ukrainian long-range drones struck Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft’s Filanovsky Oil Field in the Caspian Sea overnight, halting oil and natural gas production at over 20 production wells.[40] Suspilne reported that the Filanovsky Oil Field is one of the largest explored oil fields in Russia and in the Russian part of the Caspian Sea, with reserves estimated at 129 million tons of oil and 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on December 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Dorogobuzh Combined Heating and Power Plant (CHPP) that provides power to the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant in Verkhnedneprovsky, Smolensk Oblast, overnight.[41] Kovalenko reported that the chemical plant produces chemicals critical to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), including ammonia, nitrates, and nitrogen fertilizers. Russian opposition outlet Astra geolocated footage of overnight explosions in Verkhnedneprovsky to nearby the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant.[42] Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows a fire and explosions at the Akron Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Veliky Novgorod, Novgorod Oblast.[43] An Astra source within the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at the Akron plant, halting operations at five workshops.[44] Astra reported that the plant produces ammonium nitrate for both military and civilian use.[45] Novgorod Oblast Governor Aleksander Dronov claimed on December 11 that falling drone debris damaged buildings in unspecified areas of Novgorod Oblast.[46] Astra geolocated footage of damaged buildings in Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast, published on December 10 to near a CHPP and the Voronezhsintezkauchuk Plant, a manufacturer of thermoplastic elastomers and synthetic rubber products.[47] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev claimed that falling drone debris damaged a power line in Voronezh City, leading to power outages, and an industrial building in an unspecified location in southern Voronezh Oblast late on December 10 and overnight.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 11 that Russian forces downed 287 Ukrainian drones overnight, including six over Smolensk Oblast, 19 over Novgorod Oblast, and four over Voronezh Oblast.[49]

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine.
2. Lavrov’s December 11 statements indicate that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept the original 28-point peace plan but that Russia will instead demand further modifications should Ukraine agree to it.
3. Lavrov’s effective rejection of key elements of the 28-point peace plan is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s November 27 statement that the 28-point plan could be the basis for future negotiations, but not a final agreement in itself.
4. Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin, have similarly rejected key points of the 28-point plan in recent weeks.
5. The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk as part of the Kremlin’s intensified cognitive warfare effort that seeks to portray Ukraine’s frontline as on the verge of collapse, and Russian battlefield victory as inevitable. Neither is true, and the Russian seizure of Siversk is unconfirmed as of December 11.
6. The Kremlin is attempting to portray the claimed fall of Siversk as the start of the battle for Slovyansk – a battle the Kremlin has not set conditions on the ground to begin.
7. Putin’s December 11 meeting is part of a pattern of senior Russian officials aggrandizing claimed battlefield victories in the past several weeks to create the false perception that the frontlines are collapsing to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse.
8. Russian forces are only making tactical gains across most of the theater.
9. Ukrainian forces struck an oil platform in the Caspian Sea for the first time and struck other Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 10 to 11.
10. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk.