Russian forces have conducted three company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults in priority areas of Donetsk Oblast over the last two weeks, marking an inflection in recent Russian armor usage in Ukraine. Russian forces largely stopped conducting reinforced company-sized mechanized assaults in late 2024 and have only conducted a handful of battalion-sized mechanized assaults during 2025. Russian forces, before October 2025, most recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast in April 2025.[1] Russian forces have largely favored leveraging small groups of infantry to conduct infiltration missions and make slow advances throughout the frontline over conducting mechanized assaults during the first nine months of 2025.[2] Russian forces are still leveraging infantry to advance but have conducted several comparatively larger mechanized assaults in their priority Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas of Donetsk Oblast in recent weeks.
Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) around October 6, during which Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed four tanks and eight armored vehicles.[3] Russian forces conducted a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault south of Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (both immediately northeast of Pankivka) on October 9.[4] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces used 35 tanks and armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles during the assault and that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed three tanks, 16 armored vehicles, and 41 motorcycles during the assault. Ukraine’s 1st Azov Army Corps [AC] reported on October 13 that Russian forces conducted another reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and that Russian forces attacked with 16 tanks and armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles.[5] Ukraine’s 1st Azov AC reported that Russian forces were again attempting to seize Shakhove, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 armored vehicles, three tanks, and three motorcycles involved in the attack. Ukraine’s 1st Azov AC reported that Russian mechanized assault tactics remain the same and that Russian forces are using motorcycles and armored vehicles to transport infantry to frontline positions. Ukraine’s 1st Azov AC reported that Russian forces are using electronic warfare (EW) systems to suppress Ukrainian drones during mechanized assaults and that Russian infantry attack Ukrainian positions after dismounting from the armored vehicles. A Ukrainian officer stated on October 13 that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are participating in mechanized assaults in the area.[6]
Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations. The Ventusky weather radar recorded moderate to slightly heavy rainfall during the morning of October 9 and light rainfall on the morning of October 13 at the respective locations of the Russian mechanized assaults.[7] Another weather monitoring service indicated that the Dobropillya area had several hours of cloudy conditions and fog on the morning of October 6.[8] Several Ukrainian military sources throughout Fall 2025 have discussed how Russian forces have exploited rainy weather conditions that limit Ukraine’s drone operations.[9] An OSINT analyst on X (formerly known as Twitter) reported that Russian forces have also taken advantage of a period of limited Ukrainian drone activity caused by windy weather to create a “bridge“ through a river in the Lyman direction, indicating that Russian forces are attempting to seize on poor weather conditions to set up logistics as well as make advances in several frontline areas. The analyst noted that Russian forces moved five tanks, one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and self-propelled artillery over the bridge while Ukrainian drones were not able to operate. The lingering dampness and poor conditions that immediately follow rainfall likely degraded Ukrainian drone capabilities for several hours.
Russian forces may also be reverting back to conducting mechanized assaults in areas where Russian infantry are struggling to advance. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on October 13 that the Russian units operating in the Dobropillya salient, particularly elements of the 51st CAA, have recently struggled to seize Shakhove after advancing near the settlement.[10] Elements of the 51st CAA, including the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, conducted many of the mechanized assaults that Russian forces leveraged to advance west of Donetsk City in Summer and Fall 2025.[11] These units may be reverting back to conducting mechanized assaults in the face of more challenging Ukrainian defensive positions near Shakhove, or potentially after Russian forces assess that Ukrainian defenses are attritted following weeks of Russian infantry assaults.
Kremlin officials continue to apply the same narratives to the Baltic states that Russia has used to justify its invasions of former Soviet states in the past three decades. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on October 14 that Latvian authorities are “persecuting” Russian speakers in Latvia and that Russia must protect its “compatriots” in the Baltic states.[12] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky also claimed that Russians in Latvia are part of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir). The Kremlin’s Russian World framework is an intentionally vague ideological idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined as including any former territory of the Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation, as well as any people who feel kinship or belonging with Russia.[13] Russia has long claimed that Russia has a duty to protect its “compatriots abroad” and used this narrative to justify its invasions of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.[14] Kremlin narratives about Russia’s “compatriots” in the Baltics and the wider Russian World are part of the Kremlin’s years-long efforts to set conditions to justify possible Russian aggression against NATO in the future.[15]
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise or engage in good-faith peace negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 14 that Russia is ready for a peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine but is continuing the war due to “lack of alternatives.”[16]Peskov claimed that Russia will ensure its interests in “one way or another” and achieve its war goals. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring Ukraine from joining NATO and other international alliances.[17] Peskov’s statements are in line with boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically.[18]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces have conducted three company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults in priority areas of Donetsk Oblast over the last two weeks, marking an inflection in recent Russian armor usage in Ukraine.
- Russian forces appear to be conducting larger mechanized assaults during rainy and foggy weather conditions, which complicate Ukrainian drone operations.
- Kremlin officials continue to apply the same narratives to the Baltic states that Russia has used to justify its invasions of former Soviet states in the past three decades.
- The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to compromise or engage in good-faith peace negotiations.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.