Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia’s bases in Syria in the long-term. Bloomberg reported on December 12 that unspecified sources with knowledge of the matter stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) thinks it has an “informal understanding” with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) that would allow Russian forces to stay at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus but noted that the situation could change due to instability in Syria.[1] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS in Damascus and that Russian bases “continue to be located on Syrian territory.”[2] Bogdanov expressed hesitancy in response to a question about whether Russia expects its bases to remain in Syria, stating that the bases will “probably” remain but that there are no other decisions yet on the matter.[3] Bogdanov implied that Russia’s continued presence in Syria is important for the ongoing fight against terrorism in the country, likely as part of efforts to convince Syrian authorities to allow Russia to continue to operate its bases in the long-term. Russia has been using the cover of “fighting terrorism” as an excuse for military activities primarily aimed at supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime since it entered the Syrian Civil War in 2015.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 11 that Syrian “militants” have surrounded Hmeimim Air Base and are periodically attempting to conduct provocations and shell the facility.[5] The milblogger claimed that Russia reached a “preliminary” agreement about the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria but that the agreement only lasts for 75 days, after which Russia will withdraw from Syria. It is unclear if the reported Russian agreement with Syrian authorities is permanent or temporary. The Syrian opposition encompasses several factions with varying ideologies and political objectives, and it is unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition factions necessary to guarantee the safety of Russian military bases in Syria.[6]
Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations —further demonstrating the Kremlin’s current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 12 that Russian forces from throughout Syria are withdrawing to Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus and that Russian forces are flying four to five miliary transport sorties daily between Hmeimim and unspecified airfields in Russia.[7] The GUR stated that Russia is moving its Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship to Tartus to evacuate weapons and equipment. The GUR stated that the two ships are currently in the Norwegian Sea and are scheduled to pass the English Channel in “a few days.” The GUR stated that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships also left Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg, respectively, and are heading to Tartus. It will likely be weeks until these ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and arrive at the Port of Tartus, and Russia may be moving these ships as a precaution should Moscow decide to conduct wider evacuations of the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in the coming weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.[8]
Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s claim that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange with Russia. Orban accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on December 11 of rejecting his proposal for a ceasefire and POW swap with Russia — a statement that Russian authorities subsequently used to forward Russia’s ongoing information operation portraying Ukraine as unwilling to engage in POW exchanges and broader peace talks.[9] Ukrainian presidential aide Dmytro Lytvyn responded on December 12, stating that Hungarian officials did not discuss anything with Ukraine or inform Ukraine about Orban’s December 11 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[10] Lytvyn added that Ukraine has been negotiating with Russia for two weeks about a large-scale POW exchange at the end of 2024.[11] Zelensky criticized Orban’s direct engagement with Putin without consulting Ukraine and stated that Orban is undermining European unity around support to Ukraine.[12] Russia — not Ukraine — has previously demonstrated an unwillingness to conduct POW exchanges, as Russia reportedly rebuffed Ukrainian overtures for exchanges for months before the start of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[13]
People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev met with Xi in Beijing on December 12.[14] Xi and Medvedev discussed the situations in Syria and Ukraine and highlighted the bilateral Russia-PRC relationship and their cooperation in multilateral institutions. Xi reiterated the PRC’s standard stance on the war in Ukraine, calling for “de-escalation” and advertising the PRC’s “Friends of Peace” Initiative with Brazil.[15] Medvedev later told Russian media on December 12 that he and Xi discussed potential settlements in Ukraine and claimed that Russia is “ready to resume negotiations with Ukraine” but only if “Ukraine understands the realities that have developed … on the ground.”[16] Medvedev explicitly invoked Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14, 2024 speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), wherein Putin stated that Ukrainian forces must “completely withdraw” from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia would agree to enter into negotiations.[17] Kremlin officials have long used the expression “realities on the ground” to refer to Russian gains on the battlefield, albeit largely incremental and gradual, and to force Ukraine and its partners to make concessions on Ukraine’s sovereignty by recognizing the territories that Russia has illegally occupied and annexed as part of Russia including those that Ukrainian forces still hold.[18] Russia’s version of “negotiations” that take into account the “realities on the ground” call forUkraine to surrender nearly 20 percent of its territory and millions of its people living under Russian occupation. Xi and the PRC have continually provided Kremlin officials with a platform to advocate for this desired end-state to the war, as ISW has previously reported.[19]
India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner. Reuters reported on December 12 that Russian state oil company Rosneft and Indian refining company Reliance Industrieshave signed a historic 10-year deal through which Russia will supply 500,000 barrels of oil daily to India, valued at approximately $13 billion annually.[20] India has benefitted from cheap Russian energy supplies since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions, ultimately becoming the largest importer of Russian oil.[21] ISW has recently noted India’s efforts to reduce its reliance on Russian military cooperation, strengthen ties with the West, and distance itself from explicitly pro-Russian rhetoric on the war in Ukraine, but India nevertheless continues to balance these moves by maintaining strategic economic relations with Russia that are in India’s interest.[22]
Russian authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism, furthering the Kremlin’s effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its second and third readings on December 12 that expands the legal grounds for putting individuals on the legal list of terrorists and extremists to include disseminating “fake” information or discrediting the Russian military in violation of Russia’s censorship laws.[23] This bill is the latest Kremlin measure to legally equate opposition to its war in Ukraine and criticism of Russia’s methods of waging the war with behavior that is illegal and undesirable in Russian society.[24] These measures to create a de-facto state ideology through the Russian legal system notably bypass the Russian Constitution, as Article 13 forbids the Russian state from establishing an official state ideology and commits Russia to recognizing ideological diversity.[25] The Russian State Duma passed a bill on December 10 that would remove the Taliban from the register of extremist and terrorist organizations.[26]
Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control over the Russian information space. Putin awarded the “Golden Star” Medal — a medal awarded for an “act of heroism in service to the Russian government and people” and that accompanies the Hero of Russia title — to Russian milblogger and Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny on December 12 and thanked other Russian military correspondents and journalists for covering the war in Ukraine and for their “faith in Russia.”[27] Putin awarded the Hero of Russia title to Poddubny in September 2024 for injuries that Poddubny sustained while reporting from Kursk Oblast in August 2024, and ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has been increasingly trying to use Poddubny to disseminate official narratives in the Russian ultranationalist information space since late 2022.[28] Putin has also recently awarded prominent Russian milblogger and founder of the Rybar Telegram channel Mikhail Zvinchuk, who was initially critical of Russia’s military performance during its full-scale invasion, with the less prestigious Russian Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class part of continued Kremlin efforts to incentivize Russian milbloggers to be loyal to the Kremlin.[29]
Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December 12. GUR sources told Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne that GUR actors may have been involved in the murder of Shatsky in Kotelniki, Moscow Oblast.[30] GUR sources alleged that Shatsky was working to modernize Russian Kh-59 cruise missiles into Kh-69 missiles and implementing artificial intelligence (AI) technology into Russian drones and other Russian military aerospace systems. ISW cannot confirm these reports.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia’s bases in Syria in the long-term.
- Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations — further demonstrating the Kremlin’s current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria.
- Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s claim that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange with Russia.
- People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty.
- India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner.
- Russian authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism, furthering the Kremlin’s effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control over the Russian information space.
- Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December 12.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Svatove.
- The Russian military command’s efforts to ensure operational security amongst Russian forces continue to draw ire from select milbloggers, who derided these efforts as disruptive overreach.