Institute for the Study of War: Russia sends more troops to Pokrovsk

The Russian military command is reportedly augmenting its troop presence in the Pokrovsk direction, likely to consolidate the gains Russian forces initially secured through infiltration missions and advance further through the town. Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Balahan (east of Pokrovsk and east of Myrnohrad).[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in northeastern Pokrovsk and east of Pokrovsk.[2] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and seized part of the Pokrovska Mine complex north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[3] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) at dawn on November 5 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three vehicles. Russian forces have rarely employed mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction recently, apart from mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[4] Ukrainian officials continued to note how Russian forces are disguising themselves as civilians, a war crime under the Geneva Convention, in line with recent reports of Russian perfidy in the area.[5]

Ukrainian officials reported a recent increase in Russian assault and accumulation efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. The 7th Corps reported on November 6 that Russian forces significantly increased the number of assaults in the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR).[6] The corps reported that Russian forces attacked on average 13 times per day in September 2025, but conducted 30 assaults on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff 0800 November 11 report, which covers activity between 0800 November 10 and 0800 November 11, reported that there were 276 combat engagements along the entire frontline — 100 of which were in the Pokrovsk direction.[7] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces in Pokrovsk are exploiting poor weather conditions to gather in large groups and enter the town in motorcycles or buggies.[8] The commander noted that Russian forces are starting to bring in provisions and are trying to infiltrate further into northern Pokrovsk and into Ukrainian rear positions where mortar crews and drone pilots are located.[9] The commander stated that Russian forces have infiltrated practically all over Pokrovsk such that Russian and Ukrainian positions are interspersed house-to-house. A Ukrainian servicemember reported that Russian forces have already conducted three rotations in the Pokrovsk direction after suffering heavy losses in the past four months.[10] The servicemember confirmed that the Russian military command committed unspecified Spetsnaz and naval infantry elements to the Pokrovsk direction. Russian efforts to infiltrate and then consolidate gains in Pokrovsk notably differs from Russia’s efforts in the Dobropillya salient, where Russian forces made initial infiltrations but failed to deploy reinforcements to consolidate the gains before Ukrainian efforts to push Russian troops back.

Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to erode frontline forces and eventually facilitate frontline gains. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia announced on November 6 that it will temporarily close the railway line from Husarivka, Kharkiv Oblast (west of Slovyansk, about 45 kilometers from the frontline) to Slovyansk (about 29 kilometers from the frontline) and Kramatorsk (about 22 kilometers from the frontline).[11] Ukrzaliznytsia stated that it will also close the railway between Bantysheve (west of Slovyansk, about 40 kilometers from the frontline) and Kramatorsk and between Slovyansk and Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman, about 20 kilometers from the frontline). Ukrzaliznytsia cited “security factors” for the closures — likely referring to the recent intensification of Russian strikes against railways.

Russia has been intensifying its strike campaign against railway infrastructure. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast news channel D1 reported on November 6 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a railway station in Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (about 104 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of November 5 to 6, heavily damaging the station building.[12] The Kamyanske drone strike comes against the backdrop of Russian attempts to interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, including recent strikes against bridges in the Velykomykhailivka direction.[13] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction recently noted that the Russian strikes against bridges in the direction are degrading Ukrainian logistics to set conditions for Russian attacks.[14] Russian forces have also been targeting trains in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts with modified Shahed-type drones as of early October 2025 and struck a passenger train at the railway station in Shostka, Sumy Oblast on October 4 and high-speed rail infrastructure in Kozyatyn, Vinnytsia Oblast on August 28.[15] Russia’s BAI campaign that involves strikes against targets in the near rear of the frontline, such as roads, railways and bridges that support GLOCs, aims to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces.[16] ISW recently assessed, for example, that Russia’s BAI efforts over the past five months set conditions for recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] Russia’s recent BAI efforts against rail infrastructure aim to disrupt Ukraine’s use of its intermediate rear area for logistics, particularly along the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway (about 20 to 35 kilometers from the frontline) and T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway (about 14 to 30 kilometers from the frontline) — both critical arteries that supply Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[18] The Russian military command may intend to shift its focus to attacking the fortress belt after the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) in the future and is using its BAI campaign to set conditions for such attacks now. It remains unclear if Russia’s success in using its BAI campaign to facilitate advances in the Pokrovsk direction will be exportable to other areas of the front, however.[19] Denying Russia’s BAI campaign will likely be critical for an effective Ukrainian defense of the fortress belt. Ukrainian forces should also invest in systematically degrading attacking Russian forces’ operational GLOCs through a Ukrainian BAI campaign as well.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation and reject efforts by Russian ultranationalists to frame Russia as an exclusively Orthodox Christian and ethnically Russian nation. Putin emphasized in a November 5 speech to the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations that Russia’s war in Ukraine is consolidating interethnic unity and that the “addition” of Crimea and the four occupied oblasts of Ukraine has expanded Russia.[27] Putin called for Russia to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russian society. Putin explicitly defined Russia as a multiethnic state and claimed that he would declare 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia. Putin called for Russia to replace the ideologically driven concept of the “Soviet people” with patriotism, which Putin defined as a love for Russia with the clear understanding that this is inclusive of all people and ethnic groups of Russia. Putin continued to accuse foreign intelligence services and foreign-sponsored “provocateurs” of attempting to undermine Russian interethnic unity, repeating calls on Russians to unite against external threats.[28] Putin also claimed on November 4 in a speech celebrating National Unity Day that Russia is committed to unity based on shared spiritual values and that Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), is working to promote cooperation among all forces in Russia and Russian communities abroad.[29] Putin’s statements show his continued commitment to portraying Russia as an inclusive multiethnic and multireligious state to engender civic — rather than ethnic — nationalism.  ISW continues to assess that Putin must balance between demands from the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin’s main constituencies — for restrictions against migrants on the one hand, with the need for migration to address Russia’s labor shortages and long-term demographic issues.[30]

Key Takeaways

1. The Russian military command is reportedly augmenting its troop presence in the Pokrovsk direction, likely to consolidate the gains Russian forces initially secured through infiltration missions and advance further through the town.
2. Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to erode frontline forces and eventually facilitate frontline gains.
3. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte noted on November 5 how the term “hybrid warfare” inaccurately describes Russia’s intensified attacks and malign actions against  NATO — in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment.
4. Authorities reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Hannover airport in Germany on the evening of November 5.
5. Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation and reject efforts by Russian ultranationalists to frame Russia as an exclusively Orthodox Christian and ethnically Russian nation.
6. The Kremlin continues to spread narratives about alleged Western provocations to create the appearance of external and internal enemies who aim to undermine the Russian state.
7. Russia continues to develop its modernization and refurbishment programs of older, lower quality tanks, likely for the battlefield in Ukraine where Russia’s tank use is limited.
8. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Siversk and Pokrovsk.