Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. ISW has observed an increase in Russian mechanized assaults in various sectors of the front since March 17. Russian forces conducted a roughly reduced company-sized mechanized and motorized assault toward Novopavlivka on March 17; reduced platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk direction and near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) on March 18; and a platoon-sized mechanized assault in Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and a reinforced company-sized assault near Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) on March 19.[1] Some of these mechanized assaults may have been Russian reconnaissance-in-force missions that aim to probe, identify, or test Ukrainian positions ahead of future ground assaults in the spring-summer campaign.
ISW has observed other indications of Russian preparation for the spring-summer offensive. Russian forces began shelling settlements immediately near Kramatorsk in late February 2026.[2] Russian forces have also been conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the southern tip of the Fortress Belt since at least late February 2026 to prepare for the upcoming campaign, striking main Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area.[3] Russian forces have repeatedly struck dams near Kostyantynivka and in the Pokrovsk direction since late February 2026, likely in an attempt to interrupt Ukrainian logistics and flood Ukrainian positions.[4] ISW has seen reports that Russia may launch its spring-summer offensive against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, and mechanized assaults and strikes in the Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk directions may be part of efforts to prepare for attacks on the Fortress Belt from the north and south in the future.[5] These various preparations suggest that the ground phase of the spring-summer offensive campaign is nearing, if it is not already underway. The anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive is unlikely to bring to bear substantial amounts of armor in multiple, simultaneous, mechanized attacks on Ukrainian positions; however, considering the drone-dense frontline and Russian armor shortages. Russian forces are more likely to commit more limited amounts of armor to localized, pulsing offensives at multiple parts of the frontline.
The Kremlin is trying to use its intelligence sharing with Iran as a bargaining chip to benefit its war against Ukraine. Politico, citing two sources familiar with the matter, stated on March 20 that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev proposed during his March 11 meeting in Miami with former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff that Russia would stop sharing intelligence with Iran if the United States also stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine.[14] The sources reported that the US delegation rejected Dmitriev’s proposal. Politico stated that another source reported that Russia has made various proposals about Iran to the United States, including a proposal that Iran move its enriched uranium to Russia, but that the United States has rejected all of the proposals. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on March 17, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Russia has been providing Iran with satellite imagery and drone technology and advice to support Iran’s strike campaign against Israeli and US forces in the Middle East.[15]
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko highlighted Belarus’ cooperation with Russia and Iran while discussing possible economic deals with the United States. Lukashenko gave an interview on March 20 to the Belarusian state news agency Belta about his March 19 meeting with US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale.[20] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus and the United States are preparing a “big deal” including a number of US-proposed “major deals.”[21] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus may sell a mine to the United States for at least $3 billion.[22] Lukashenko claimed that the US delegation asked about Belarus’ relationships with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which Lukashenko described as not just Belarus’ allies but states close to Belarus.[23] Lukashenko applauded the United States for having never set a goal to separate Belarus and Russia. Lukashenko claimed that the United States asked about alleged Iranian requests for Belarusian missiles.[24] Lukashenko noted that Minsk has talked about “many things” with Iran related to the defense industrial base (DIB) but claimed they have never discussed missiles. Lukashenko noted that when one actor supplies weapons to another actor who is currently at war, the supplier becomes a supporter of or even an accomplice to that side in the war, but claimed that Belarus “does not need this” with Iran.
ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that any US support for the Belarusian economy will likely directly benefit the Russian economy and war effort.[25] The Russian and Belarusian DIBs are closely intertwined, and the Kremlin uses Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner to supply the Russian DIB with necessary components.[26] Belarus has also allowed Russia to deploy Russian Oreshnik ballistic missiles on Belarusian territory and is reportedly hosting repeaters to allow Russian forces to adjust their Shahed-type drone strikes.[27] Iran and Belarus have also increased their economic and military cooperation, with public high-level meetings surging in Spring 2024.[28] Iran, like Russia, is trying to use Belarus to circumvent international sanctions, and Iran has likely sought technical information exchanges related to air defenses and electronic warfare with Belarus.[29] Belarus appears to be attempting to forge inroads with the Trump Administration and portray itself as independent from the Kremlin, despite ample evidence to the contrary.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
- Ukraine remains committed to holding safe, free, and fair elections, but the Kremlin is refusing to commit to the ceasefire necessary to hold such elections.
- The Kremlin is trying to use its intelligence sharing with Iran as a bargaining chip to benefit its war against Ukraine.
- French and British authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea on March 20.
- Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko highlighted Belarus’ cooperation with Russia and Iran while discussing possible economic deals with the United States.
- The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate from 15.5 percent to 15 percent on March 20 – the seventh time the Russian Central Bank has cut its rates since June 2025.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russian forces launched 156 drones against Ukraine, including against Kharkiv City and Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Chernihiv oblasts.