Russian forces used weather conditions to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s drone-based battlefield defenses in the Novopavlivka direction, highlighting Ukraine’s need for traditional weapons systems. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian armored vehicles in northeastern Novopavlivka.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached Novopavlivka’s northwestern outskirts during the mechanized assault.[2] Ukrainian volunteer Serhii Sternenko reported on November 15 that Russian forces took advantage of poor weather conditions to enter Novopavlivka several times with equipment and land infantry.[3] Sternenko stated that Russian forces set up a pontoon bridge between Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and Dachne (east of Yalta) and moved about 10 pieces of equipment across the Vovcha River.[4] Sternenko stated that Ukrainian forces detected the Russian forces too late but struck two tanks and five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Russian milbloggers also reported on Russian forces’ use of heavy fog during the assault and claimed that Russian forces were able to cross the pontoon bridge twice.[5] One milblogger noted that Russian forces were able to use the second wave of the attack to send in reinforcements to support the troops that dismounted after the first wave.[6] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) with conducting the mechanized assault.[7]
Russian forces have recently been exploiting foggy weather to attack throughout the front, particularly in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[8] The Novopavlivka sector of the front has been relatively quieter in recent weeks, as Russian forces have been concentrating on offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. Elements of the 41st CAA, whose area of responsibility (AoR) covers the Novopavlivka direction, have notably been supporting elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) on the southern flank of Pokrovsk.[9] The November 14 company-sized mechanized assault into Novopavlivka after a lull in the area demonstrates how Russian forces are trying to find opportunities to exploit a key weakness in Ukrainian defenses — the inability of Ukrainian drones to effectively function in poor weather conditions like fog and rain. Ukraine has thus far in the war based its defense on drones largely out of necessity. Ukraine’s “wall of drones” defensive barrier uses a large number of tactical strike drones and loitering munitions to destroy Russian manpower and equipment on the front line.[10] Ukrainian forces adopted this defensive approach in part to offset manpower and equipment shortages while protecting over 1,200 kilometers of front line from Russian advances. Sparsely held Ukrainian defensive positions have facilitated recent Russian infiltration efforts, and shortages of artillery and other traditional systems have limited Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate when bad weather disrupted some drone operations.[11] Western provisions of traditional systems like artillery are key to Ukraine’s ability to build out a layered defense system that is not dependent on any one type of weapon, such that the defenses are vulnerable and exploitable. Russia’s exploitation of this vulnerability further highlights the way that traditional weapons systems are not obsolete in modern warfare.
Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to replicate Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign on a limited scale. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike against the M-30 road that runs between Pokrovsk and Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear).[12] The corps reported that the airstrike impeded Russian forces from using the route to infiltrate Pokrovsk with light equipment. Geolocated footage of the strike published by the 7th Corps shows that Ukrainian forces struck the M-30 between Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka (just southeast of Pokrovsk).[13] Russian forces notably recently advanced into Pokrovsk on motorcycles, buggies, and transport trucks along the M-30 under heavy fog.[14] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian transport communications facility and a Russian manpower concentration near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk in the Russian near rear) with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[15] A Ukrainian source reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces also conducted a strike with a GBU-62 bomb against a road bridge in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast that Russian forces used for logistics.[16]
Russian forces have spent months conducting a strike campaign that achieved partial BAI efforts to shape the battlefield and set conditions for Russia’s recent advances in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[17] The limited Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and force concentrations are a step toward denying Russia the relative sanctuary that Russian forces have enjoyed in near rear areas.[18] A dramatically expanded Ukrainian BAI effort could disrupt the operations of the current Russian offensive approach. Russia’s BAI campaign notably began months before the recent intensification of offensive operations on the ground, however, and Ukraine should similarly work to incorporate BAI efforts into its longer-term campaign design.
Russian forces continue their BAI campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to facilitate battlefield gains. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba told The Guardian in an article published on November 15 that Russian forces have increased their strikes against Ukraine’s rail system threefold since July 2025.[25] Kuleba noted that Russian forces have struck railway infrastructure 800 times since January 2025, damaging more than 3,000 objects and totaling one billion dollars’ worth of damage. Kuleba added that Russia’s strike campaign has three objectives: to destroy Ukrainian logistics in the south to prevent the movement of goods such as Ukrainian grain to seaports; to disrupt rail traffic to cut off frontline oblasts; and to ”destroy everything” in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Head of Ukraine’s railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia, Oleksandr Pertsovskyi, added that Russian forces use Shahed-type drones to target individual locomotives. The station head of a rail station in Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces targeted Lozova as it is a major junction that connects to Dnipro City, Slovyansk, Poltava City, and Kharkiv City. ISW previously reported that Russian forces have been using modified Shahed-type drones equipped with a thermal imaging camera and a video stream to pursue moving targets, such as trains, in real time in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.[26] Russia recently intensified its BAI efforts against rail infrastructure to disrupt Ukraine’s use of its intermediate rear area for logistics, particularly along the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway (about 20 to 35 kilometers from the frontline) and T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway (about 14 to 30 kilometers from the front line) — both critical arteries that supply Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[27]
Russia’s long-range drone and missile strike tactics are precisely targeting gas infrastructure in Ukraine during the heating season. Ukrainian state-owned gas enterprise Naftogaz Chief Executive Serhii Koretskyi told the New York Times (NYT) in an article published on November 15 that Russia began to strike Ukrainian gas infrastructure in 2025 after Ukraine halted the transport of Russian gas to Europe on January 1, 2025.[28] Koretskyi reported that Naftogaz spent the summer of 2025 repairing gas infrastructure that Russian forces struck at the end of Winter 2024-2025 when Russia knocked out about 40 percent of Ukraine’s gas production capacity. The NYT noted that Russian forces renewed these strikes in October 2025, and a European official source stated that Russian forces struck Naftogaz’s facilities seven times in October 2025, knocking out 60 percent of Ukraine’s gas production capacity. Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia knows the location of Ukraine’s gas infrastructure as it dates back to Soviet times. Koretskyi noted that Russian missile and drone strikes cannot reach Ukraine’s underground gas storage facilities, but that Russia is striking the compressor pumps that pump the gas from underground and the pipelines that distribute gas throughout the country. Russian forces’ targeting of specific types of Ukrainian gas infrastructure demonstrates the sophistication of their strike campaigns with the explicit goal of complicating living conditions for Ukrainian civilians in the wintertime.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces used weather conditions to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s drone-based battlefield defenses in the Novopavlivka direction, highlighting Ukraine’s need for traditional weapons systems.
- Ukrainian forces appear to be trying to replicate Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign on a limited scale.
- Russia’s large-scale production of glide bombs and Shahed-type drones will continue to facilitate Russia’s BAI campaign on the front.
- North Korea continues to provide military support to Russia and may be preparing to provide Russia with drones in the future.
- Russian forces continue their BAI campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to facilitate battlefield gains.
- Russia’s long-range drone and missile strike tactics are precisely targeting gas infrastructure in Ukraine during the heating season.
- Russia appears to be setting conditions to deploy involuntarily called up reservists to occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to commit them to combat operations.
- Russian forces continue to boast about executing Ukrainian servicemembers.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.