The Russian defense industry is implementing long term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight published internal documents from Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), on October 11 that reveal that UVZ aims to increase T-90 production by 80 percent by 2028, compared to 2024 levels, and launch production of the new T-90M2 (Project 188MS) variant, also referred to as Ryvok-1 (Dash-1).[1] The documents, which ISW reviewed but cannot independently verify, indicate that UVZ aims to surge tank production beginning in 2027. The documents indicate that UVZ estimates a projected 2026 output of 10 T-90M2 tanks and intends to produce a peak of 428 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks in 2028. The documents indicate that UVZ intends to produce a total of 1,118 new and modernized T-90M and T-90M2 tanks between 2027 and 2029. Ukrainian officials previously assessed that UVZ can only produce roughly 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions, and UVZ is likely producing between three and six T-90 tanks per month.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that UVZ produced 540 to 630 T-90M tanks since February 24, 2022 (an estimated average of 13 to 15 tanks per month).[3]
The Russian defense industry may have to increase its production capacity for tank production by integrating more automation and high-precision machine tools to achieve the planned T-90 production increase, as Russia continues to face labor shortages and mounting casualties in Ukraine.[4] UVZ notably launched a program to train computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators in March 2025, likely to expand UVZ’s production capacity.[5] Russia has consistently relied on its allies to obtain high precision machine tools through sanctions evasion; the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 1 that UVZ continues to produce tank engines with European-manufactured CNC machines that Russia obtains through sanctions evasion schemes.[6]
While the T-90 production targets as described in the leaked documents are aspirational figures that Russian industry may not meet, the plans nevertheless indicate that Russia seeks to rearm and is setting conditions to pose a significant long term military threat to NATO far beyond the end of the current war in Ukraine. Frontelligence assessed that UVZ’s goals to modernize the Russian armored fleet with over 2,000 T-90M, T-90M2, and T-72B3M tanks between 2026 and 2036, in addition to the tanks and armored vehicles that Russia produced in 2024 and 2025, is sufficient to fully replenish Russia’s tank fleet for another large scale war.[7] Open-source tracking indicates that Russian tank losses have decreased through 2025, and a senior Finnish military official stated on April 27 that Russia is sending “almost none” of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for “later use.”[8] The planned production increase indicates that Russia plans for military contingencies beyond the current war in Ukraine on the backdrop of its current “Phase Zero” operations against Europe and that Moscow seeks to project power against NATO.[9]
Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery reported on October 8 that Russia’s total tank reserve has dropped from 3,106 to 2,478 in the last three to four months (since June or July 2025) and that Russia’s T-72A reserve specifically has dropped from 900 to 461.[10] The source noted that the Russian military appears to be drawing T-72A tanks from previously untouched storage bases in order to refurbish the tanks and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) appears to be cannibalizing remaining T-64 tanks. The source suggested that Russia is likely in a refurbishment phase and will likely be able to utilize these refurbished tanks in Ukraine. The source estimated that Russia has roughly 141 T-54/55, 885 T-62, 611 T-64, 492 T-72A, 287 T-72B, 44 T-80B, 82 T-80U, and zero T-90 tanks left in its reserve.[11]
ISW continues to observe a notably reduced use of Russian tanks on the battlefield compared to Russia’s intensified use of armored vehicles in late 2023 and 2024, suggesting that Russia may be stockpiling tanks and is likely aiming to build out and modernize its tank reserves for both short-term use in Ukraine and for the medium- to long-term in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO.[12] The Russian military may remain reticent to increase their use of armored vehicles on the battlefield again given that Ukrainian drones have been quite successful in damaging and destroying Russian armored vehicles and that the Russian DIB appears to be pivoting to a lengthier refurbishment phase.
Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that the tank remains and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions. Russian forces recently conducted a company-sized and reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Dobropillya areas in Donetsk Oblast after largely refraining from conducting larger mechanized assaults.[13] Russian forces appear to be conducting these assaults during rainy weather conditions, as rain and high winds impede Ukrainian drone operations.[14] Russian forces will likely continue to seize on bad weather as an opportunity to advance when Ukrainian forces cannot effectively fly drones. This dynamic underscores that Ukraine’s drone defenses depend on certain weather conditions and that drones alone are insufficient to defend against ground and armored forces. Russia’s reported efforts to refurbish T-72A tanks indicate that Russia will likely have sufficient armored stocks to re-equip frontline units in priority areas and continue opportunistic mechanized assaults in the short term, although Russia may also stockpile newly refurbished or produced tanks for future use in Ukraine or against a NATO member state.
Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet. Russia’s ongoing sabotage and drone reconnaissance activities against military bases and critical infrastructure in Europe indicate that Russia has already entered “Phase Zero,” the informational and psychological condition setting phase, of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.15] Russia’s long range strike capabilities and enhanced drone production capabilities represent an immediate threat to NATO.[16] Russia’s force generation efforts and reported efforts to generate a strategic manpower reserve–which Russia could choose to employ in Ukraine or in a future land war against NATO–suggest that Russia can sustain and reconstitute its manpower despite continuously heavy losses from its ongoing war in Ukraine.[17] Russia will likely have significant combat power made available within months following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, which Russia likely can rapidly deploy to NATO’s eastern flank. Russia is developing concepts of operation and warfighting tactics that allow Russia to pursue large scale combat operations without using masses of tanks or armor, while effectively denying an adversary from using tanks or armor at scale. Russia is also learning how to achieve the effects of battlefield air interdiction in an adversary’s rear without establishing air superiority or air supremacy.[18] ISW has observed no indication that the Russian military command would need to wait until the Russian military reconstitutes to its full end strength before intensifying its attacks against NATO member states, and in fact, Russia may attack before that moment if NATO fails to establish deterrence. Russia is currently gaining significant experience in modern warfare within an ever changing theater characterized by an extremely short innovation cycle while tolerating a highly attritional, infantry-led war in Ukraine–the likes of which Europe has not engaged in since the 1940s. NATO and its allies must prepare to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats that Russia will likely pose immediately following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, but also into the future.
European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities. Czech General Staff Spokesperson Zdeňka Košvancová reported on October 10 that the Czech military has detected an increasing number of incidents involving unidentified drones operating near Czech infrastructure, particularly military facilities, in recent weeks.[19] German outlet Der Spiegel reported on October 9 that the German military detected an unidentified drone that entered the security perimeter of a NATO air base in Geilenkirchen on the evening of October 8.[20] Der Spiegel, citing an internal memo, reported that the drone overflew the air base’s runway at low altitude. Der Spiegel noted that the NATO air base houses airborne early warning and control (AWACS) surveillance aircraft that fulfill a critical role in monitoring NATO’s eastern flank. Der Spiegel reported that German authorities have not yet attributed the incident to any specific actor. ISW assesses, however, that Russia has been increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered Phase Zero of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[21] The ongoing unattributed drone incursions across Europe are part of a recently intensified pattern and therefore are likely part of Russia’s broader condition setting effort.
Key Takeaways
- The Russian defense industry is implementing long term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term.
- Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that tanks remain and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions.
- Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet.
- European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities.
- Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
- Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka and in the Dobropillya tactical area.