Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia’s refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for roughly one hour.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Ukraine proposed a 90-day ceasefire, the release of all prisoners of war (POWs), the return of Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have abducted, and another round of Ukrainian-Russian talks between June 20 and 30 to prepare for a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] The Russian delegation appears to have rejected Ukraine’s proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations agreed to conduct an “all for all” exchange of seriously ill and wounded POWs and POWs aged 18 to 25, which the Russian delegation later claimed would involve at least 1,000 total POWs.[3] The delegations also agreed to exchange the bodies of dead servicemembers in a “6,000 for 6,000” format. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, stated that Russia proposed a two-to-three-day ceasefire on unspecified areas of the front to allow both sides to retrieve bodies from the battlefield.[4] Medinsky stated that Ukraine and Russia will create permanent medical commissions to conduct regular exchanges of seriously wounded POWs without having to wait for ”political decisions.”[5] Umerov noted that Russia first gave its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement to Ukraine during the meeting and that Ukraine will study the document for a week before deciding on further action.[6] Umerov stated on May 28 that Ukraine, in contrast, had already presented its memorandum to Russia — well ahead of the June 2 talks.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russia is trying to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[8]
Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides’ memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine’s memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov’s statements about Ukraine’s proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[9] Ukraine’s memorandum calls for:
- A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
- Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
- The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
- And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.
Kremlin newswire TASS published photos of Russia’s memorandum following the Ukrainian-Russian talks on June 2.[10] Russia’s memorandum is divided into three sections: the first section defines Russia’s demands for the “final settlement” of the war; the second section proposes two different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire; and the third section outlines Russia’s ideal timeline for negotiations. The first section of Russia’s memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:
- International recognition of Russia’s occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
- Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine’s existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
- And protection of the “full rights, freedoms, and interests” of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the “glorification and propaganda of Nazism.”
The second section of Russia’s memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue one of two paths toward a ceasefire. The first path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts’ borders. The second path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:
- Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
- End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
- And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.
The third section of Russia’s memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead servicemembers and a two-to-three-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.
Russia’s memorandum reflects the Kremlin’s long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. Russia’s memorandum is imbued with its long-standing demand that any peace settlement address Russia’s perceived “root causes” of the war – namely the eastern expansion of NATO since the early 1990s and Ukraine’s supposed discrimination against Russian-speakers and Russian culture.[11] The Kremlin has called for the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and ISW has previously noted that these terms amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[12] Kremlin officials have consistently demanded regime change in Ukraine and falsely claimed that all pro-Western Ukrainian governments since Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity have been “illegitimate.”[13] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly argued that Russia should not conclude or respect any agreements with the current “illegitimate” Ukrainian government, and ISW has previously noted that any peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia’s explicit recognition of the current Ukrainian government.[14] The current Ukrainian government is legitimate, however, and continues to abide by the Ukrainian Constitution, such that Russia’s demand that Ukraine elect a new government before concluding a long-term peace agreement is simply another demand for regime change.
Putin demanded during a speech on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to “completely withdraw” from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] ISW noted that Russia occupied roughly 75 percent of the four oblasts as of June 14, 2024, and Russia now occupies 79.8 percent of the four oblasts as of June 2, 2025. Ukraine currently controls the remaining twenty percent of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which totals approximately 21,616 square kilometers of territory. The remaining twenty percent of the four oblasts is also home to five major cities (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities and Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Slovyansk) with a combined pre-war population of over 1.3 million people – not accounting for the thousands of people who live in the smaller towns and populated settlements throughout these oblasts.[16] Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since early 2022, and the Russian military is almost certainly incapable of conducting a successful offensive operation to seize one of these cities after three years of war and degradation. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine’s full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[17]
The Russian delegation dismissed Russia’s systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that the Ukrainian delegation gave Russia the names of “hundreds” of kidnapped Ukrainian children that Russia must return to Ukraine.[18] Medinsky claimed that the Ukrainian list contained 331 names yet downplayed this list as not “thousands” or “millions” of children but “dozens.”[19] Medinsky claimed that Russia returns Ukrainian children when Russian authorities can locate the children’s parents or other legal representatives and that Russia does not kidnap Ukrainian children but “saves” them.[20] Medinsky’s statement downplays the true extent of Russia’s pre-war preparations, legal mechanisms, and various schemes to hide and justify the forced deportation, forced assimilation, and militarization of Ukrainian children.[21] Ukraine has verified Russia’s deportation of at least 19,456 Ukrainian children, and only 1,345 deported Ukrainian children have been returned to Ukraine as of June 2.[22] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab placed the number of deported children closer to 35,000 as of March 19, 2025.[23] Kremlin Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova (against whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for her role in abducting Ukrainian children) claimed that Russia had “accepted” a stark 700,000 Ukrainian children between February 2022 and July 2023.[24] The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide explicitly forbids the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group for the purpose of destroying, in whole or in part, a national or ethnic group, and considers these violations as constituent acts of genocide.[25]