Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime in the near term. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported on December 2 that satellite imagery from November 30 and December 1 showed that the Russian Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, the Yelnya Altay-class oiler, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler were at the Russian base in Tartus.[1] Anderson then reported that satellite imagery from December 3 showed that Russia removed the three frigates, the submarine, and two unnamed auxiliary vessels (likely the Yelnya and Vyazma) from the base — amounting to all of the vessels that Russia had stationed at Tartus.[2] Russia cannot redeploy these vessels to its Black Sea ports because Turkey is enforcing the Montreux Convention, which prevents Russian warships from passing through the Turkish Straits.[3] Russia will likely therefore redeploy the vessels to its bases in northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 3 that the Russian military command has likely deployed a force grouping of an unspecified size from its Africa Corps — the organization that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) created to supplant the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa following Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 — to Syria.[4] ISW cannot independently confirm reports of Africa Corps elements deploying to Syria, but these reports, if true, would indicate that the Russian military command is avoiding redeploying regular Russian military forces from its priority theater in Ukraine to Syria. The Russian evacuation of Tartus and the reported deployment of Africa Corps forces to Syria suggest that Russia is worried that Syrian opposition forces may advance southward to Hama (roughly 80 kilometers northeast of Tartus) and threaten the Tartus base but that the Russian military command will not deploy significant reinforcements to Syria in the near term to prevent such advances. The Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) Africa File will cover Syria’s impact on Russian activity in Africa and the Mediterranean in its upcoming update.
The United States announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for Ukraine on December 2.[5] The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced its 71st tranche of military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), including Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and AT-4 and Javelin anti-armor systems.[6] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on December 2 that US President Joe Biden has asked the DoD to deliver the aid rapidly and that the United States “will deliver hundreds of thousands of additional artillery rounds, thousands of additional rockets, and other critical capabilities” to Ukraine between early December 2024 and mid-January 2025.[7]
Russian officials continue to perpetuate information operations about prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges in order to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate and to undermine Ukrainians’ trust in their government. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on November 27 that Russia has a list of 630 Ukrainian POWs that Russia is “immediately” ready to swap in a one-to-one exchange.[8] Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova published the list of the alleged 630 Ukrainian POWs on December 2 and claimed that Ukraine refused the swap after Russia suggested it.[9] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs Secretary Brigadier General Dmytro Usov stated on December 3 that Russian authorities have not submitted requests for such POW exchanges through official channels and that the published list includes civilians and POWs whom Ukraine has already returned home.[10] Usov noted that Russian authorities are only interested in exchanging POWs that Ukrainian forces captured in Kursk Oblast. Usov stated that the Russian officials who are publicly claiming that Ukraine is undermining POW exchanges are attempting to discredit the Ukrainian government. A Russian insider source similarly noted on November 29 and December 3 that Zakharova’s and Moskalkova’s statements about Russia’s alleged willingness to conduct a large POW exchange are an attempt to present the false narrative that Ukrainian leadership is unwilling to negotiate to Ukraine’s Western partners and allies, while falsely portraying Russia as the party interested in negotiations.[11] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin information operations centered around POWs are likely intended to distract from the Kremlin’s own efforts to disrupt the POW exchange process and from consistent reports of Russian human rights abuses, including executions, perpetrated against Ukrainian POWs.[12] Russia — not Ukraine — has previously demonstrated an unwillingness to conduct POW exchanges, as Russia reportedly rebuffed Ukrainian overtures for exchanges for months before the start of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[13]
India is reportedly attempting to decouple its defense industry from Russia as it increases cooperation with Western defense companies and builds up its own defense industrial base (DIB). Bloomberg reported on December 3 that senior Indian officials stated that India has sharply reduced its defense equipment orders from Russia and instead started purchasing defense equipment from Western suppliers.[14] The officials reportedly stated that India canceled plans to jointly develop and manufacture helicopters and advanced fighter jets with Russia “some time ago” and that India is unlikely to move forward with plans to lease a Russian nuclear-powered submarine to train Indian crews as India is building its own submarines. One unnamed senior Indian official reportedly stated that Russian-made weapons are often cheaper than Western weapons but need frequent repairs, which increases their long-term costs. ISW has previously reported on other sources of increased tensions within the Russia-India relationship, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s August 23 visit to Ukraine and the reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine.[15]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime in the near term.
- The US announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for Ukraine on December 2.
- Russian officials continue to perpetuate information operations about prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges in order to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate and to undermine Ukrainians’ trust in their government.
- India is reportedly attempting to decouple its defense industry from Russia as it increases cooperation with Western defense companies and builds up its own defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained lost positions near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Russian forces reportedly continued to suffer significant personnel and armored vehicle losses throughout November 2024 as they attempted to maintain intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine