The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia’s ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024.[1] The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000 casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated 45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth consecutive month that Russian casualties increased. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day and seized a total of 839 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in November 2024. ISW previously reported that Russian forces suffered increased casualties in September and October 2024 as well and that Russian casualties totaled an estimated 80,110 troops in exchange for roughly 1,517 square kilometers of gains in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in those two months.[2]Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized.)
Russia’s constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine’s ability to inflict losses at this rate. US officials reportedly estimated in late October 2024 that Russia’s current recruitment rate was between 25,000 and 30,000 new soldiers per month.[3] Ukrainian military observer Petro Chernyk stated on December 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have to increase its monthly recruitment rates from 40,000-42,000 recruits to 50,000 recruits in order to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast while maintaining their current casualty rate.[4]Chernyk’s statement suggests that Russia may have increased its recruitment rate in recent weeks, although this recruitment rate appears to be thousands of troops short of Russia’s ever-increasing monthly casualty totals. The Kremlin’s commitment to maintaining the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and continuing to advance in eastern Ukraine has created dueling demands on Russia’s labor pool. Additional efforts to increase Russian force generation rates risk further destabilizing the Russian economy as Russia continues to grapple with domestic labor shortages and rising inflation.[5] Russians can either serve in uniform in Ukraine, or work in Russia’s domestic economy, but they cannot do both simultaneously. The Kremlin is unlikely to sufficiently meet its needs for labor in both the military and Russia’s domestic economy in the near future, and additional months of intensified offensive operations in Ukraine in 2025 and beyond will only further compound Russian resourcing dilemmas. US President Joe Biden’s commitment to providing the remainder of available US aid to Ukraine and the continued, regular provision of Western military assistance to Ukraine remains crucial to Ukraine’s ability to continue defending against Russian offensive operations and inflicting unsustainable losses on the Russian military in 2025.[6]
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the Kremlin’s information operation to portray Russia’s November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with US-provided ATACMS missiles. US officials confirmed that Gerasimov called US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Charles Q. Brown Jr. on November 27.[7] The New York Times (NYT) reported, citing unspecified officials, that Gerasimov told Brown that Russia had planned the Oreshnik missile launch well ahead of the US decision to allow Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with US-provided ATACMS.[8] Western media noted that Gerasimov also warned Brown about Russian military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, but that Gerasimov did not “explicitly mention” that Russian forces would launch hypersonic missiles during the exercises. US military spokespeople confirmed to Western media that the call occurred but did not provide details on the conversation. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have notably attempted to use the Oreshnik ballistic missile and its test launch on November 21 as part of an information operation that Russia is escalating the war in Ukraine in response to the US lifting its restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western-provided weapons against military targets in Russia.[9] Gerasimov’s statement to Brown, if accurate, directly undermined this ongoing information operation by admitting that the Oreshnik launch was not connected to Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons as Putin explicitly claimed in an emergency address immediately following the strike.[10]
Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on December 4. North Korean and Russian state media reported that the strategic partnership agreement ensuring “international strategic stability” and a “fair world order” between North Korea and Russia entered into force on December 4.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un signed the strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang on June 19 and Putin and Jong-un ratified the strategic partnership agreement on November 9 and 11, respectively.[12] ISW has extensively reported on the strengthening of Russian-North Korean bilateral relations since late 2022 that began with Russia discreetly purchasing missiles and ammunition from Pyongyang, to then facilitating performative diplomatic engagements, and most recently resulting in North Korea’s deployment of over 10,000 North Korean soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[13] Russia and North Korea are likely to leverage the commencement of their strategic comprehensive partnership agreement to formalize and expand their avenues of cooperation in the coming months.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided over Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia. Kadyrov accused Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev on December 5 of not fulfilling the objectives that Putin tasked them with in response to a case involving a Chechen minor accused of hooliganism in Moscow City.[14] Kadyrov criticized Kolokoltsev and Bastrykin for failing to protect Russian ethnic minorities and accused them of not listening to the Russian public.[15] Kadyrov further claimed that Kolokoltsev ordered Russian law enforcement services to beat foreigners and drive them out of Russia, despite Russia’s need for migrants and allies.[16] Kadyrov previously clashed with Bastrykin in June 2024 over disagreements in addressing religious extremism in Russia, and Bastrykin and Kolokoltsev have been outspoken ultranationalist voices advocating for crackdowns against Russian migrants and ethnic minorities.[17]Public disagreements between senior Russian officials regarding the role and treatment of migrants and ethnic and religious minorities in Russian society suggest that there may be an increasing opposition among certain Kremlin officials to Putin’s long-term efforts to portray Russia as an inclusive and harmonious multicultural Russian state and foster civic nationalism instead of ethno-religious nationalism.[18]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia’s ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy.
- Russia’s constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine’s ability to inflict losses at this rate.
- Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the Kremlin’s information operation to portray Russia’s November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with US-provided ATACMS missiles.
- Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on December 4.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided over Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, and Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
- Russian forces are reportedly increasingly recruiting women for combat and logistics functions.