The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[1] Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to “maintain this momentum.”[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia’s recruitment plans for 2025 will “mostly” allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[4] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are “increasing the number” of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later.[5] Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.[6] Syrskyi’s and Putin’s figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.
The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military’s efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 13 that the Russian military command has developed a series of standards in equipping frontline units with motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies.[12] Mashovets stated that Russia is working to equip every battalion with up to 30 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; every platoon with up to nine motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; and every “Storm V” penal recruit assault company with up to 15 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to three buggies. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is struggling to source enough motorcycles to equip every unit to the standard level and that equipment rates between frontline units vary considerably as a result. Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) had up to 1,125 motorcycles, up to 975 ATVs, and 210-215 buggies as of end of April and beginning of May 2025 and noted that other Russian CAAs have varying equipment allocations depending on the number of assault companies and platoons within the CAA. Ukrainian and Russian sources previously suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working to formalize Russian motorcycle usage, and the appearance of a defined doctrinal organization and allocation for motorcycle units within the Russian military is consistent with this effort.[13]
Russian forces currently appear to be utilizing motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles, although Russian units may begin conducting assaults exclusively with motorcycles in the future. Mashovets stated that Russian units currently prefer to use motorcycles in tandem with infantry and armored vehicles.[14] The Russian military appears to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles, although Russian forces may also continue to conduct these combined assaults if Russian commanders assess that motorcycle assaults are less successful. The Russian military may also continue to rely on combined assaults if the Russian MoD cannot improve its abilities to supply Russian units with motorcycles; however, as Mashovets noted that Russian servicemembers are continuing to rely on volunteer organizations to supply some units with motorcycles.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian motorcycle usage is a response to Ukrainian drone innovations and an attempt to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces sustained in 2024 and possibly conserve some tanks and armored vehicles for future use.[16] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker, unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[17] The Russian military will likely retain its lessons learned in Ukraine beyond the war in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.
- The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.
- Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
- The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicle units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military’s efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.