A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. Romanian Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu reported on September 13 that Romanian forces scrambled two F-16 fighter jets from the 86th Air Base near Fetești after a Romanian radar detected a Russian drone in Romanian airspace at 1823 local time.[1] Moșteanu stated that Romania faces “provocations from Russia” nearly every week. Romanian Foreign Minister Oana-Silvia Țoiu stated that the F-16s tracked the drone until it left Romanian airspace without causing any damage or casualties 50 minutes after the moment of entry.[2] Toiu noted that two allied German Eurofighter jets were ready to aid Romanian forces, condemned the attack as “unacceptable and reckless,” and stated that Romania will take the necessary measures to protect Romanian sovereignty and security. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian drone flight paths are “always calculated” and that the drone did not accidentally enter the Romanian airspace due to a mistake or actions of lower-level commanders.[3] This is Russia’s second incursion into NATO airspace over the course of four days. The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided data to ABC News on September 14 indicating that Russian drones have penetrated Romanian airspace 11 times since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inclusive of the September 13 incursion.”[4] The Romanian MoD noted that Russian drones have conducted about 50 drone strikes near the Ukrainian-Romanian border since February 2022, including 30 strikes in which drone debris fell on Romanian territory.
Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory. Polish President Karol Nawrocki signed a decree on September 14 authorizing NATO to deploy another foreign contingent to Poland as reinforcements, specifically in support of the Operation Eastern Sentry.[5] NATO announced the start of Operation Eastern Sentry on September 12, and NATO officials noted that the intent of the operation is to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, following the Russian drone incursion and violation of NATO airspace.[6] Polish and NATO allied aircraft scrambled, and Poland’s ground-based air defense systems were activated to the highest possible readiness again in response to Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian border regions overnight on September 13 to 14.[7] NATO and member state officials have continued denouncing the Russian drone incursion into Poland and reiterated that the drone incursion was likely intentional, as ISW continues to assess.[8] Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have continued deflecting blame for the drone incursion and downplaying NATO states’ reactions to the drone incursion.[9] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely attempting to gauge NATO’s capabilities and reactions to the drone incursion in hopes of applying lessons learned to possible future conflicts against the NATO alliance.[10]
Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several naval exercises as part of Zapad-2025, including training to use Bal coastal missile systems and Uran cruise missiles to strike simulated enemies and ships in the Barents Sea, and launch a Ka-27 naval helicopter from the Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyer Severomorsk.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Baltic Fleet practiced emergency rescue assistance to surface ships.[12] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several joint aviation exercises, including training to conduct long-range Il-76 military transport aircraft flights behind enemy lines, use Ka-52M and Mi-28NM combat helicopters to provide fire support for air assault landings, and fly MiG-31 interceptor aircraft with Kinzhal ballistic missiles to strike enemy targets.[13] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Su-34 fighter-bomber crews practiced conducting air strikes.[14] The Belarusian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced conducting reconnaissance; counter-sabotage operations; relocating a command post; recapturing a defense infrastructure facility from a hostile formation; defending against forces crossing a river; operating drones, including quadcopter and first-person view (FPV) drones; operating the Kvadrat and Sprint satellite communications systems; and coordinating with military command.[15] Footage published on September 14 purportedly shows a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile system deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast as part of the Zapad-2025 exercises.[16] Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno geolocated the footage to the E28 Kaliningrad-Elblag highway about 35 kilometers from the Polish border.[17] Russia permanently deployed Iskander-M systems to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[18]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the Zapad-2025 exercises are training exercises to prepare for war against NATO.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russia is one of the only countries with experience in modern warfare and that Russia should share its lessons learned in Ukraine with other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies, or “at least” to Belarus. Russia previously used the September 2021 exercises to prepare and secure logistics that were crucial for Russia’s initial offensives into northern Ukraine at the start of the invasion.[20]
Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that elements of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad Oblast on the night of September 13 to 14.[21] The Ukrainian USF stated that the refinery is the second largest in Russia after the Omsk Oil Refinery, with an annual capacity of over 20 million tons of oil.[22] The Ukrainian USF stated that the refinery produces about 80 varieties of petroleum products and supplies the Russian Armed Forces. Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows a fire at the refinery’s primary oil distillation unit.[23] A source within Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 13 that GUR drone units conducted the September 13 strike against the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, and that preliminary data indicates that explosions at the refinery caused significant damage to a vacuum column essential for primary oil processing.[24] GUR sources told Suspilne on September 14 that GUR units conducted an overnight drone strike against the Metafrax Chemical Plant in Gubakha, Perm Krai — a producer of chemicals that Russian defense industrial facilities use to manufacture explosives — and that preliminary data indicates that the strike damaged urea production equipment.[25] Geolocated footage published on September 13 shows a fire at the Metafrac Chemical Plant.[26] Perm Krai Head Dmitry Makhonin claimed on September 14 that a Ukrainian drone struck an industrial facility in Gubakha.[27]
Ukrainian intelligence sources told Suspilne on September 14 that GUR and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) units planted an explosive device on a section of the Kursk City-Oryol City railway between Maloarkhangelsk and Glazunovka, Oryol Oblast.[28] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrey Klychkov claimed on September 14 that Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) servicemen attempted to defuse the device on September 13 when it detonated, killing three servicemen.[29] The intelligence sources stated that the explosion destroyed the railway roadbed and fuel tanks.[30] Russian Railways claimed on September 14 that the explosion delayed 17 trains.[31] The intelligence sources stated that GUR and SSO units also detonated a section of the St. Petersburg-Pskov railway between Stroganovo and Mshinskaya in Leningrad Oblast overnight, derailing a train and destroying 15 fuel tanks.[32] The sources added that both railway sections are crucial logistical routes for Russian forces fighting in the Kharkiv and Sumy directions. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed on September 14 that a train with 15 cars derailed in Luzhsky Raion, Leningrad Oblast.[33]
The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 14 that unspecified naval units struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet communications center at the 184th Scientific and Research Experimental Base in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, on the night of September 10 to 11.[34] Geolocated satellite imagery taken on September 14 shows damage to two buildings at the communications center.[35]
The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine, passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Several Russian government sources told Russian opposition outlet The Bell on September 11 that the Russian government is considering increasingthe Value-Added Tax (VAT), a federal tax imposed on most Russian goods and services domestically, from 20 to 22 percent in the near future due to large federal budget deficits.[36] The Russian government could generate an additional one trillion rubles annually (roughly $11.9 billion), or 0.5 percent of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by increasing the VAT to 22 percent. This tax increase would functionally remove money from the Russian population as businesses pass most tax increases onto consumers by raising the costs of goods and services. The Russian Ministry of Finance reported on September 9 that the Russian federal budget deficit for January to August 2025 amounted to 4.2 trillion rubles (roughly $50 billion), well exceeding its planned 3.8 trillion-ruble (roughly $45 billion) deficit for all of 2025.[37] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $160 billion), much of which is likely contributing to the Russian federal budget deficit.[38] This 6.3 percent of GDP notably does not include Russia’s investments in its defense industrial base (DIB) production. The Kremlin, on the contrary, offered Russian small drone producers a zero VAT rate in late July 2025.[39]