Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles, several civilian vehicles, and an unspecified number of motorcycles on April 12.[9] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with over 20 armored vehicles, including over 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and several tanks.[10] The Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces attempted to advance in a wave of motorcycles ahead of the attacking armored vehicles to swiftly reach Ukrainian positions. Another Ukrainian brigade operating nearby stated that the Russian assault occurred near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and 12 IFVs.[11] The Ukrainian National Guard published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with three tanks, 18 IFVs, an unspecified number of MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 41 motorcycles in an unspecified area of the Zaporizhia direction.[12] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and destroyed two IFVs and one AFV.
Russian forces have been augmenting mechanized assaults with civilian vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) since late Fall 2024 after limiting their use of armored vehicles across the entire frontline, likely due to concerns about unsustainable armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024.[13] Russian forces largely relied on small infantry groups to advance in Ukraine and used armored vehicles to transport infantry to the frontline and as fire support for infantry assaults in late Fall 2024 through Winter 2024-2025.[14] Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups along the frontline but may be recommitting armor to frontline assault operations as part of a general intensification along the entire frontline. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov noted on April 14 that Russian forces are using more civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction due to their high degree of maneuverability for evading Ukrainian drones compared to slower armored vehicles.[15] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian drone operations are rendering Russian armored vehicle usage ineffective in the Pokrovsk direction, which is consistent with a long-term trend of Ukrainian drones discouraging Russian armored vehicle usage in this direction.[16] ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia’s current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term, and Russian forces are likely using these alternative civilian vehicles in assault operations to bolster mechanized assaults amid concerns about dwindling supplies of Soviet-era armored vehicles.[17] The recent intensification in Russian armor usage suggests that the Russian military command may be growing less concerned about dwindling armored vehicle stores or at least may be willing to accept additional armored vehicle losses if Russian forces can secure additional gains before a possible future ceasefire.
A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on April 11 that the Second Western District Military Court rejected an appeal against a February 28 ruling that changed Popov’s house arrest to two months of pre-trial detention.[18] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad claimed on April 11 that Popov’s lawyer stated that Russian authorities had not yet considered Popov’s petition to suspend court proceedings and send Popov to fight in Ukraine.[19] Popov’s lawyer stated on April 9 that Popov signed a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and would return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending criminal trial.[20] A Russian security official stated to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 9 that Popov would assume command of an unspecified “Storm Z” penal detachment operating in Ukraine. Popov publicly appealed to Putin in March 2025 to reinstate him in active military service, and Popov’s support base, particularly within the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities, widely supported the appeal. The court’s seeming reversal of the decision to send Popov to the war in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to struggle to respond to situations in which the Kremlin’s desired outcome is at odds with that of the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities. The Kremlin may be conflicted about how to punish Popov for weaponizing the information space in July 2023 when he attempted toreverse his removal from command. The Kremlin likely fears that allowing Popov to return to the battlefield at his request would set a precedent in which popular commanders and officials could threaten to blackmail the Kremlin into accepting their demands.
Read more about Popov’s arrest in ISW’s latest special edition.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.
- Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.
- A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk.