Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 27, 2024, 6:30pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on May 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly called on member states to lift their prohibitions against Ukraine using Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian territory. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted a declaration on May 27 calling for NATO states to support Ukraine’s “international right” to defend itself by lifting “some restrictions” on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons to strike Russian territory.[1] The declaration also calls for member states to accelerate their deliveries of critical weapons to Ukraine, and more than 200 representatives of NATO member states supported the declaration. Some NATO states, including the UK, have already lifted such restrictions on weapons they provide to Ukraine, but not enough Western states have done so to allow Ukraine to challenge Russia’s sanctuary from which it can freely conduct airstrikes or stage ground operations against Ukraine.[2] Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson told Swedish outlet Hallandsposten on May 26 in response to a question about Ukraine using Swedish-provided weapons against Russian territory that Sweden supports Ukraine’s right under international law to defend itself through combat operations against Russian territory so long as these operations comply with international laws on combat.[3]
Spain signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement with Ukraine on May 27.[4] The agreement stipulates that Spain will provide Ukraine with one billion euros (about $1.08 billion) worth of military aid in 2024 and another five billion euros (about $5.4 billion) worth of aid before 2027.[5] El Pais reported on May 27 that the new military aid package will include 19 restored Leopard tanks (likely referring to 19 previously-announced Leopards), Patriot air defense missiles, a “large batch” of 155mm artillery ammunition, and other Spanish-produced weapons.[6] El Pais reported that Spain intends to send 10 refurbished Leopard tanks to Ukraine before June 30.[7]
Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian long-range early warning radar systems and oil and gas infrastructure within Russia on May 26 and 27. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on May 27 citing its sources in Ukrainian special services that the Ukranian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) flew drones a record 1,800 kilometers to strike a Voronezh-M long-range early warning radar system in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast on May 26.[8] Satellite imagery dated May 26 and 27 shows new burn marks near the radar system, but the extent of damage to the system is unclear.[9] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrey Klychkov claimed on May 27 that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged an administrative building at a Rosneft fuel station in Livny, Oryol Oblast, and images of the aftermath show extensive damage to the building.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces also intercepted a drone over Bryansk Oblast, another drone over Belgorod Oblast, six drones over Oryol Oblast, and four drones over Krasnodar Krai overnight.[11] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that falling drones caused fires in Krinitsa and Dzhankhot, Krasnodar Krai.[12]
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly told German Chancellor Olaf Scholz before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Ukraine is not an independent state and that Russia can unilaterally and forcibly change Ukraine’s borders. Ukrainian media reported that Scholz stated at the Freedom for Democracy Festival in Berlin on May 26 that Putin stated that “Ukraine and Belarus are parts of Russia” and that Scholz’s discussion with Putin demonstrated that Putin thinks that one can change borders “with the help of force.”[13] Putin has consistently demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 essay, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”; that his war aims include the total defeat of Ukraine; and that he has expansive territorial ambitions in Ukraine.[14]
The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 26 that Western intelligence officials stated that the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) are behind a series of low-level sabotage operations throughout Europe that aim to disrupt Western arms supplies to Ukraine and create the appearance of a European movement opposing support for Ukraine.[15] The NYT stated that the GRU often recruits locals to conduct arsons and noted that the concerted Russian effort has targeted a paint factory in Poland, homes in Latvia, an IKEA store in Lithuania, and a warehouse in the United Kingdom connected with arms supplies to Ukraine. Western officials have recently reported on widespread Russian sabotage efforts throughout Europe, and NATO reported on May 2 that Russia is intensifying its hybrid activities in Europe.[16] Russian investigative outlet The Insider reported on April 29 that GRU agents established a long-term presence in the Czech Republic and Greece and have been conducting operations, including attacks on ammunition depots and assassination attempts, since 2014.[17]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on May 27 that he signed documents that will allow French military instructors to visit training centers in Ukraine.[18] Syrskyi stated that he and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov had a video call with French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu, and Syrskyi welcomed France’s initiative to send French military instructors to Ukraine. Syrskyi also expressed optimism that France’s determination would encourage other Ukrainian partners to join this “ambitious project.” The French Defense Ministry told French outlet Agence France-Presse (AFP) on May 27 that France has been discussing sending French military instructors to Ukraine since French President Emmanuel Maron met with European leaders on February 26 to discuss European support for Ukraine but did not explicitly confirm that France would send French military instructors to Ukraine.[19]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) offered to help Armenia mitigate the effects of flooding in northern Armenia, although Armenia has not publicly requested help from Russia. The Russian MoD claimed on May 27 that it commanded the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia to allocate personnel and equipment to help Armenia mitigate the effects of floods and mudflows.[20] The Russian MoD stated that it will send Russian military personnel to the disaster areas at Armenia’s request. The Russian MoD’s phrasing obscures whether Armenia has actually requested help from Russia, however. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 26 that the Russian-Armenian Center for Humanitarian Response (RACHR) (an organization under the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations) gave portable motor pumps to the Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to assist with rescue operations in flooded areas and that the RACHR is in “constant contact” with the Armenian MVD’s Center for Crisis Management.[21] ISW has not observed reports from Armenian officials or Armenian media that Armenia specifically requested assistance from Russia. Armenian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ani Badalyan stated on May 27 that Armenia would coordinate measures for mitigating the impacts of the floods with international partners after assessing the overall damage.[22] Russian officials are likely publicizing Russian offers to help Armenia mitigate the effects of a natural disaster to portray Russia as a reliable ally amid Armenia’s ongoing attempts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia.[23]
Russian officials are considering delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia and will likely do so in the near term. Russian Special Representative to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov stated on May 27 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Justice reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russia can remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations.[24] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the Taliban is the “real power” in Afghanistan and that the initiative to remove the Taliban from the prohibited organization list “reflects objective reality.”[25] Russian officials have yet to delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization, but Kabulov’s and Lavrov’s comments suggest that Russia will do so in the near term. Kabulov added that Taliban representatives will attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June 2024.[26] Putin met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tashkent on May 27 and signed a statement on bilateral commitments, which included intentions to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan.[27] The Kremlin has maintained contacts with the Taliban since the Taliban deposed the Afghan government in 2021, although more outright Russian recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan will likely portend increased Russian-Taliban cooperation. Russia likely hopes to leverage its relationship with the Taliban to degrade the operations of Afghan-based Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which organized and conducted the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow, among other things.[28] The Taliban continue efforts to repress anti-Taliban groups throughout Afghanistan, including ISKP, and Russia may hope to help the Taliban intensify its anti-ISKP activities.[29] Kazakhstan delisted the Taliban as a terrorist organization in December 2023, and Uzbekistan has expanded agreements with the Taliban in recent years.[30] Russia may view direct engagement with the Taliban as an increasingly normalized trend among Central Asian states.
Russia may sign an agreement with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) exchanging weapons for a Russian logistics hub at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. SAF Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasser Al-Atta stated on May 25 that a SAF delegation will travel to Russia in the near future to conclude an agreement exchanging “vital weapons and munitions” for a Russian logistics hub at Port Sudan.[31] Al-Atta described the planned Russian hub as “not exactly a military base.”[32] A prominent, Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger also claimed on May 27 that the SAF was able to recapture several areas of Khartoum due to supplies of Iranian drones.[33] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative for the Russian President in Africa and the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov met with SAF head Abdel Fattah al Burhan and several other Sudanese officials during a two-day visit to Sudan on April 28 and 29.[34] ISW previously assessed that Russia may be switching sides in the Sudanese civil war to support the SAF in pursuit of acquiring a Red Sea naval base and that Russian backing of the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Russian and Iranian policy and strategy in the region.[35]
Key Takeaways:
- The NATO Parliamentary Assembly called on member states to lift their prohibitions against Ukraine using Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian territory.
- Spain signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement with Ukraine on May 27.
- Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian long-range early warning radar systems and oil and gas infrastructure within Russia on May 26 and 27.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly told German Chancellor Olaf Scholz before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Ukraine is not an independent state and that Russia can unilaterally and forcibly change Ukraine’s borders.
- The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 26 that Western intelligence officials stated that the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) are behind a series of low-level sabotage operations throughout Europe that aim to disrupt Western arms supplies to Ukraine and create the appearance of a European movement opposing support for Ukraine.
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on May 27 that he signed documents that will allow French military instructors to visit training centers in Ukraine.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) offered to help Armenia mitigate the effects of flooding in northern Armenia, although Armenia has not publicly requested help from Russia.
- Russian officials are considering delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia and will likely do so in the near term.
- Russia may sign an agreement with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) exchanging weapons for a Russian logistics hub at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
- Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Lyptsi and Russian forces advanced near Svatove and northwest of Avdiivka.
- Russian forces continue formalization efforts for irregular units.