US and Ukrainian delegations met in Florida on December 28 to discuss the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and other documents related to a potential peace settlement. US Donald Trump stated that he and Zelensky spoke to European, NATO, and EU leaders after the US-Ukrainian meeting.[1] Trump stated that a few issues remain unresolved, including territorial issues related to Donbas and a possible ceasefire to allow Ukraine to hold a referendum on a future peace agreement. Trump stated that the meeting discussed the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) at length and that Ukraine and Russia are working together to open the plant. Zelensky stated that the parties have almost agreed on the 20-point peace plan and on a document between the United States, Ukraine, and Europe on security guarantees for Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the parties have “100 percent” finalized another document between Ukraine and the United States on security guarantees. Zelensky noted that discussions continue about a plan to ensure Ukraine’s post-war economic prosperity. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian and European delegations will meet in the coming weeks to continue discussions, and Trump stated that Ukrainian, American, and Russian working groups will meet in January 2026. Trump called Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 28 before his meeting with Zelensky, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov reported that Trump and Putin also discussed the working groups, one of which will focus on security issues, while another will focus on economic issues.[2]
Recent Kremlin statements are at odds with several of the positions that Trump presented as the basis for ending the war. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected European-led security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Kremlin officials have also called for any future peace agreement to address Russia’s demands that NATO cease expansion and roll back its borders.[4] Ushakov reported that Putin used his call with Trump to make “very detailed arguments” about the importance of adhering to the agreements the United States and Russia allegedly made at the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[5] Kremlin officials have claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[6] Putin also referenced his 2024 MFA speech during a meeting with Russian military commanders on December 27.[7] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin statements demonstrate that Russia’s goals in Ukraine exceed territorial demands such as the seizure of Donetsk Oblast and that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia, nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations.[8]
Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders continue to aggrandize tactical details to create the false impression that Ukrainian defenses across the frontline are on the verge of collapse. Putin met on December 27 with the leadership of the Russian General Staff and grouping of forces (GoFs) commanders – the latest in a string of performative, publicized meetings between Putin and his commanders in recent weeks.[9] The Kremlin likely timed the meeting to fall on the eve of the December 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Florida in order to influence the US-Ukrainian meeting. Putin, Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and the GoF commanders made a series of likely exaggerated claims about Russian successes across the battlefield. Russian Central GoF Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces seized Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya), and Eastern GoF Commander Colonel General Andrei Ivanaev claimed that Russian forces seized Hulyaipole. Gerasimov briefly mentioned Kupyansk during his report to Putin, claiming that the Russian Western GoF is eliminating the Ukrainian forces blocked on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk. Gerasimov likely limited his remarks about the Western GoF given the widespread backlash the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has received in recent days from Russian milbloggers concerning the exaggerations and lies the MoD has platformed about the alleged seizure of Kupyansk and Ukrainian successes to liberate a significant portion of the town.[10]
Putin and the commanders continue to falsely portray future Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast as a quick and easy endeavor. The Fortress Belt consists of four heavily fortified major population centers – Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk – that make up the backbone of Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk Oblast.[12] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control more than half of the buildings within Kostyantynivka and are “rapidly” advancing toward Slovyansk following the recent seizure of Siversk.[13] Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces seized Sofiivka, which Solodchuk called an “important” settlement and “key” for further Russian offensive operations northward toward the Fortress Belt cities. ISW has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in five percent of Kostyantynivka. Putin and the commanders are presenting claimed subtactical- or tactical-level Russian successes, such as the seizure of the small settlement of Sofiivka, as having operational- or even strategic-level significance. Ukraine’s Fortress Belt is much larger and more populous than any of the settlements or towns Russian forces have seized in recent years, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities of this size since 2022. ISW assessed in late November 2025 that Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027, assuming Russian forces will be able to maintain their rate of advance at that time.[14]
ISW has observed recent open-source evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Rodynske and that Russian forces have operated within less than half of Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on December 28 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Rodynske, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to operate in the settlement.[15] Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Myrnohrad.[16] Additional geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Russian forces raising flags at multiple locations in northern Myrnohrad and central Rodynske during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[17] ISW has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) within only 49 percent of Myrnohrad. The Ukrainian General Staff on December 27 refuted the Russian claims of the seizure of Myrnohrad and noted that Russian forces have yet to seize Pokrovsk – even as Russian forces have notably been fighting within Pokrovsk itself for almost 150 days.[18] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces also reported on December 28 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within northern Pokrovsk.[19]
ISW has only observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in roughly 55 percent of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern, central, southern, and southeastern Hulyaipole.[20] Additional geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags at multiple locations in western and southwestern Hulyaipole during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces refuted on December 27 the Russian claims of the seizure of Hulyaipole and stated that Ukrainian forces continue defensive operations within the town, though the situation is “difficult.”[22] The Southern Defense Forces acknowledged that Russian forces control part of the town but reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold a significant part of Hulyaipole.[23] The Southern Defense Forces reported that Russian forces possess significant numerical superiority in personnel and equipment in Hulyaipole – in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment that Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas.[24]
Putin and Russian military commanders continue to discuss the need to form “buffer zones” in areas of Ukraine outside of the four oblasts Russia illegally annexed in 2022. Putin stated that Russian forces’ efforts to establish a buffer zone in the border areas of the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are proceeding at a “good pace.”[32] Solodchuk noted that Russian offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast aim to implement Putin’s instructions to create a buffer zone to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed at the December 17 Russian MoD board meeting that the alleged seizure of Kupyansk was part of Russian efforts to expand the buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast to reduce the threat of shelling against northern areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast.[33] Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts are not any of the regions that Russia illegally annexed, and recent peace negotiations have not discussed ceding this territory to Russia but have rather called for Russia to withdraw from these territories.[34]
Key Takeaways
- US and Ukrainian delegations met in Florida on December 28 to discuss the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and other documents related to a potential peace settlement.
- Recent Kremlin statements are at odds with several of the positions that Trump presented as the basis for ending the war.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders continue to aggrandize tactical details to create the false impression that Ukrainian defenses across the frontline are on the verge of collapse.
- Putin and the commanders continue to falsely portray future Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast as a quick and easy endeavor.
- ISW has observed recent open-source evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Rodynske and that Russian forces have operated within less than half of Myrnohrad.
- ISW has only observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in roughly 55 percent of Hulyaipole.
- Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts.
- Putin’s meeting with military commanders platformed on-the-ground tactical commanders in an effort to lend credence to the Russian military command’s aggrandized claims.
- Putin and Russian military commanders continue to discuss the need to form “buffer zones” in areas of Ukraine outside of the four oblasts Russia illegally annexed in 2022.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.