US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel. An anonymous White House official told the Wall Street Journal on March 3 that the United States is “pausing and reviewing” military aid to Ukraine until Trump “determines that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a good-faith effort towards peace negotiations with Russia.”[1] The White House official did not provide clarification about what conditions the White House is expecting Zelensky to meet in order to resume aid.
The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.[2] Pauses in this aid will harm Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities, although it will likely take from weeks to months for the suspension of US aid to affect the frontline.[3] Western officials estimated in late February 2025 that Ukraine will be able to sustain its current pace of operations until about mid-2025 (roughly June 2025) as long as the United States continues to provide the aid contracted under the Biden administration on the previously anticipated timelines.[4] A Ukrainian official told CNN on March 4 following the suspension that Ukraine may run out of US-provided artillery shells by May or June 2025 but warned that Patriot air defense missiles could run out “in a matter of weeks.”[5] Ukraine relies heavily on US Patriot systems for its air defense umbrella to protect against Russian missile strikes against Ukraine’s rear areas. The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine’s critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine’s other supporters lack an analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes, particularly those including ballistic missiles.[6] As Ukraine runs short on Patriot missiles, Kyiv will have to make difficult decisions about which population centers to prioritize in terms of air defense protection. If it runs out of Patriots entirely then Ukrainian cities will lie open to Russian ballistic missiles.
The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time. Two anonymous US officials told ABC News on March 3 that about 90 percent of the weapons that the United States committed to Ukraine through past Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages has already arrived in Ukraine, including munitions and anti-armor systems.[7] ABC News reported that the remaining 10 percent of PDA equipment is still slated to arrive in Ukraine by August 2025 and that private weapons contracts between Ukraine and US companies – many of which Ukraine has already paid for — will likely facilitate at least a small flow of arms deliveries to Ukraine “for at least the next several years.”[8] The United States reportedly supplies about 30 percent of Ukraine’s arsenal with Ukraine’s European partners supplying another 30 percent and Ukraine itself supplying domestically supplies about 40 percent from domestic production according to the editor-in-chief of Ukrainian defense-focused outlet Defense Express, Oleh Katkov.[9] Ukraine will continue to fight with the materiel it currently has, with the materiel European partners have given and will continue to provide, and with the materiel Ukraine itself produces. The Trump administration’s aid pause will detrimentally impact Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and pursue offensive operations at its current rate, but it will not collapse the front entirely in the coming months.
Russian forces will likely exploit expected Ukrainian materiel shortages if the suspension of US military assistance persists, as Russian forces did during the previous suspension of US military assistance in early 2024. Russian forces significantly increased their tempo of operations in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in early 2024 in order to take advantage of Ukrainian supply shortages.[10] Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces had a roughly 20 to one artillery shell advantage and “overwhelming air superiority” over Ukrainian forces in this direction during the peak of the Ukrainian supply shortage in May and June 2024 and that these were the main factors enabling Russian forces’ creeping and costly advances northwest and west of Avdiivka at the time.[11] Russian forces also began offensive operations in May 2024 along the Belgorod-Kharkiv Oblast international border as part of efforts to seize Kharkiv City, likely as part of attempts to take advantage of delays in US aid disbursement and to advance before US military assistance reached Ukrainian forces on the frontline once US aid resumed.[12] Russian forces are currently conducting active offensive operations in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts, have recently intensified efforts in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and continue attempts to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[13] Russian forces will likely attempt to take advantage of the pause in US aid in order to make further gains in eastern and southern Ukraine in order to justify their territorial claims to the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe’s short- and long-term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on March 4 the five-part ReArm Europe Plan that aims to help EU member states “quickly and significantly increase expenditures in defense capabilities.”[14] Von der Leyen stated that the EU is ready to significantly increase its defense spending in order to both “respond to the short-term urgency to act and to support Ukraine” and “to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for…European security.” The first part of the ReArm Europe Plan calls for the EU to activate the “national escape clause” of the Stability and Growth Pact in order to allow EU member states to increase their defense spending without triggering the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The Stability and Growth Pact limits the budget deficits of EU members, and the activation of the “national escape clause” would allow EU states to maintain larger budget deficits than usual in order to increase their defense spending.[15] Von der Leyen stated that should EU member states increase their defense spending by 1.5 percent of their GDPs on average, this would make close to 650 billion euros (about $687 billion) available over four years. The second part of the plan would provide 150 billion euros (about $159 billion) of loans to EU member states for defense investments, including in air and missile defense, artillery systems, missiles, drones, and anti-drone systems. Von der Leyen stated that EU member states will have to “pool demand and buy together” and that EU states can “massively step up their support to Ukraine” with this equipment. The third part of the plan calls for the use of “the power of the EU budget” to direct additional funds to defense related investments. Von der Leyen stated that the last two parts of the proposed plan aim to mobilize private capital by accelerating the Savings and Investment Union and through the European Investment Bank. Von der Leyen concluded that the ReArm Europe plan could “mobilize” close to 800 billion euros (about $849 billion).
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel.
- The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.
- The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time.
- The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe’s short- and long-term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine.
- Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine’s ability to become self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and medium-term.
- The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine’s commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.
- The high casualties in Russia’s war in Ukraine are the direct result of Putin’s determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses.
- The Kremlin continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July 2025, likely to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of Russian mobilized troops for over two years.