August 26, 2025

Institute for the Study of War: U.S. will provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance if a European force sets up in Ukraine

Institute for the Study of War

The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for Ukraine in recent weeks. The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 26 that official Ukrainian and European sources stated that senior US officials told European officials recently that the United States would be prepared to contribute “strategic enablers,” such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command and control (C2); and air defense assets, to support a future European-led deployment on the ground in postwar Ukraine as part of security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] European officials reportedly stated that European states can only deploy troops to Ukraine with US support that enables, oversees, and protects the European ground troops. FT reported that officials stated that US postwar support would include US aircraft, logistics, and ground-based radar that would support and enable a European-enforced no-fly zone and air shield for Ukraine. The official sources commented that such US support is contingent on European states’ commitment to deploy “tens of thousands” of troops to Ukraine. Three of the officials reportedly stated that Ukrainian troops would defend behind a demilitarized zone that neutral peacekeeping troops would patrol. NATO states would reportedly arm and train these Ukrainian forces. A European-led “deterrence force” would reportedly operate deeper in Ukraine as a “third line of defense,” and US assets would operate further in the rear.

High-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected Western security guarantees for Ukraine and specifically the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of such guarantees, however. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov recently stated in an interview with NBC that Western states, including the United States, should not be allowed to be responsible for Ukraine’s post-war security.[2] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly said on August 18 that Russia “categorical[ly] reject[s]” “any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries.”[3] The Kremlin would likely reject a US and European security guarantee proposal like the one US and European officials are reportedly discussing.

The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil. Reuters reported on August 26 that the US Department of Homeland Security confirmed that the US will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States starting August 27, increasing total tariffs to 50 percent.[4] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil, and India currently imports roughly 37 percent of its oil from Russia — up from approximately two percent before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[5] Bloomberg reported on August 26 that India’s oil refiners are planning to cut back their purchases of Russian crude oil in response to the increased US tariffs, but have signaled no plans to completely end purchases from Russia.[6] Familiar sources told Bloomberg that both India’s state-run and private processors will likely decrease purchases to between 1.4 to 1.6 million barrels per day, down from a monthly average of 1.8 million barrels per day throughout 2025 thus far. Reductions in Indian refiners’ purchases of Russian oil over a sustained period of time will likely place significant restraints on Russia’s ability to fund its war machine. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues that are essential for the Kremlin’s financing of its war against Ukraine.[7]

Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. Reuters reported on August 25 that recent Ukrainian strikes on 10 oil refineries in Russia disrupted at least 17 percent of Russia’s refining capabilities, or roughly 1.1 million barrels per day, and caused A-95 (premium) gasoline shortages in some areas of occupied Ukraine, southern Russia, and Russia’s Far East.[8] Reuters reported on August 26 that Russia increased its crude export plan by 200,000 barrels per day in August, as Ukrainian drone strikes disrupted refinery operations and left crude oil available for Russia to export.[9] This revision in crude export plans could increase Russian oil revenue in the short term but is likely adversely affecting the domestic economy. The Wall Street Journal reported on August 25 that several regions of Russia and occupied Crimea have implemented rationing at gas stations as a result of damage from Ukrainian drone strikes to Russian oil refineries.[10] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin similarly reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to Russian residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[11] Russia struggled to keep up with domestic demand for gasoline even before recent Ukrainian strikes and has placed intermittent bans on the export of gasoline since 2022, most recently banning exports at the end of July through August.[12] Recent Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated gasoline shortages and caused a spike in gasoline prices across Russia and occupied Ukraine, which will likely result in increased consumer costs and increased business expenses across industries. This increase would drive inflation expectations and also push overall inflation upwards by increasing both direct and indirect costs throughout the economy. Russia’s Central Bank lowered interest rates on July 25, 2025, likely as a premature response to a temporary decrease in the seasonally adjusted annual rate of inflation in June 2025.[13] Increased gasoline prices and a lowered interest rate, coupled with long-term increased payments to sustain military recruitment and augment the defense industrial base’s (DIB) labor force, however, will likely cause inflation to spike, weaken consumer purchasing power, devalue the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[14]

Key Takeaways:

  • The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for Ukraine in recent weeks.
  • The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil.
  • Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia.
  • The Russian government proposed that Russian President Vladimir Putin withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
  • Russian residents in border areas are increasingly apathetic toward the war and accepting that Russia will not agree to an end to the war in the near future. 
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sumy and Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Sumy.
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Wilson Center

Forced displacement represents one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of our time. Individuals and families, torn from the fabric of their communities, find themselves navigating a world of uncertainty, often without basic necessities or a clear path to safety. There are currently some 110 million forced displaced, and this number is growing by 10 million each year!

At the heart of this crisis are the political triggers. Armed conflicts, ethnic or religious persecutions, and systemic human rights abuses force millions to flee their homes in terror. Many are displaced within their own national boundaries, while others seek asylum abroad. If these factors change as a result of political shifts at home or the pressures from abroad, they can return to their homes. Forced displacement is thus different from environmentally driven displacement, as victims of climate change may never be able to return to their homes.

The ramifications of any sort of displacement are profound, not just for those directly affected, but also for host communities and countries. Overburdened infrastructures, socio-economic strains, and cultural tensions can arise, necessitating comprehensive strategies to foster harmony and integration. Yet the root causes of forced displacement can be remedied with a concerted focus by local players and international diplomacy.

Organizations like Refugees International play a crucial role in this arena, advocating for the rights and needs of the displaced, conducting on-the-ground assessments, and influencing policymakers to take informed actions. Their relentless work underscores the gravity of the situation and the urgency ofinternational cooperation. But they, too, are overwhelmed by the rapid expansion of the crisis.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), with its core principles centered on the protection of civilians during conflicts, plays a pivotal role in this discourse. Yet, despite clear legal frameworks, compliance remains
inconsistent. This initiative emphasizes the importance of upholding and reinforcing these international standards.

It’s not just about recognizing the problem; it’s about active engagement. We urge governments, organizations, and individuals to prioritize the rights and needs of the forced displaced. Through collective efforts, informed policies, and sustained advocacy, we can shift the narrative from passive acknowledgment to proactive intervention.