Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the final day of the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 16. Putin, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin visited the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and inspected the troops participating in Zapad-2025.[1] Belousov reported that personnel from Russia’s Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD/MMD), Aerospace Forces (VKS), Airborne (VDV) Forces, and Northern and Baltic fleets and Belarusian elements as part of the Union State’s combined Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) participated in Zapad-2025. Putin stated that 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercises, including military personnel from six additional countries. Putin later met with personnel from Bangladesh, India, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Iran. India announced on September 9 that it sent 65 military personnel to the Mulino Training Ground to participate in Zapad-2025 to enhance military cooperation and exchange information about combat tactics with Russia and Belarus.[2] This is India’s second time participating in the joint exercises, after 200 Indian personnel participated in counterterrorism operations during the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2021 joint exercises in September 2021.[3] Putin notably wore a military uniform to observe the exercises – the second time Putin has worn a military uniform at a public event since the beginning of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[4] Putin first wore a military uniform during the full-scale invasion while visiting Kursk Oblast in March 2025, and ISW assessed at that time that Putin was likely trying to portray himself as an engaged wartime leader and to share the credit for Russian forces retaking territory in Kursk Oblast.[5] Putin likely attended the September 16 exercises in a military uniform in order to posture Russian-Belarusian military strength against the backdrop of recent Kremlin kinetic and rhetorical escalation against NATO states neighboring Russia, such as Poland and Norway, and repeated Russian threats against the Baltic states and Finland.[6]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage of elements of the Russian Northern Fleet repelling a mock enemy air raid in the Barents Sea and practicing a landing operation with drone support on Sredniy Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast.[7] The Russian MoD also published footage of elements of the Baltic Fleet conducting a mock cruise missile strike against a naval target and supporting infantry units.[8] The Russian MoD published footage of elements of the LMD repelling a mock sabotage and reconnaissance mission and conducting mock drone reconnaissance and electronic intelligence missions in Kaliningrad Oblast.[9] The Russian MoD emphasized that Russian and Belarusian forces focused on integrating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) during the exercises.[10] Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated that Belarusian forces practiced the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons and deployment of an Oreshnik ballistic missile system during the exercises.[11] Muraveiko stated that Belarusian forces also practiced integrating drones, motorcycles, and robotic platforms – common systems that Russian forces utilize in Ukraine – during the exercises. ISW continues to assess that Russian and Belarusian forces are using the Zapad exercises to implement some tactical lessons from Russia’s experience in Ukraine.[12]
Ukraine’s ongoing long-range strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Russia’s oil and gasoline markets, likely affecting Russia’s long-term ability to finance its war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 16 that Ukraine’s Special Operation Forces (SOF), alongside unspecified Ukrainian forces, conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast, resulting in several explosions and a fire.[13] The Saratov refinery specializes in gasoline, diesel fuel, and oil fuel production and other oil products; it has a 4.8-million-ton production capacity; and supplies the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.
Reuters reported on September 16 that three industry sources stated that Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft warned producers that Transneft may need to reduce output following a series of Ukrainian drone strikes on critical export ports and refineries.[14] Two industry sources told Reuters that Transneft recently restricted unspecified oil firms’ ability to store oil in the Transneft pipeline system and warned producers that they may have to accept less oil if Transneft’s infrastructure sustains further damage. The three sources informed Reuters that the Ukrainian strikes could force Russia, which accounts for nine percent of global oil production, to ultimately cut output. Reuters noted that Russia lacks significant capacity to stockpile oil, and Russian industry sources reported that Russia has already lost some oil exporting capacity following August 2025 Ukrainian drone strikes against the Ust-Luga oil terminal in Leningrad Oblast. Reuters reported on September 15 that two industry sources stated that Ukrainian forces damaged a unit at the Russian Surgutneftegaz’s Kirishinefteorgsintez refinery plant, one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, in Leningrad Oblast in a drone strike on September 14, forcing authorities to halt operations due to a subsequent fire.[15] Reuters reported that the unit accounts for nearly 40 percent of the plant’s total processing capacity of roughly 20 million tons per year. Sources told Reuters that the Ukrainian strike caused a fire and damaged a furnace and other unspecified equipment at the unit, which may take up to a month to repair. The sources noted that the plant aims to boost operations at other units to compensate for the damage, which will allow the plant to maintain 75 percent of its processing volumes. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure, particularly against oil refineries, is generating compounding effects on Russia’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine and exacerbating chronic gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[16]
Ukraine continues to demonstrate its adeptness at innovating and fielding drones with increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technology while maintaining accessible costs, significantly augmenting Ukrainian drone effectiveness. Ukrainian outlet United24 Media reported on September 15 that Ukrainian drone producer Vyriy and Ukrainian defense technology company The Fourth Law (TFL) are launching mass production of Vyriy-10 first-person view (FPV) drones.[17] United24 Media reported that Vyriy equipped the Vyriy-10 drones with TFL’s TFL-1 terminal guidance module, an advanced AI guidance system that will enable drone operators to execute more precise strikes and navigate environments with pervasive electronic warfare (EW). TFL Head Yaroslav Azhnyuk stated that several Ukrainian units have leveraged the modified Vyriy-10 drones to increase drone strike effectiveness by two to four times. United24 Media noted that the drones cost approximately $448, making it only slightly more expensive than traditional Ukrainian-made FPV drones. The integration of Ukrainian drones with AI guidance systems represents a significant technological advancement that will enable Ukrainian drone operators to conduct more accurate strikes and bypass frontline Russian EW to strike targets in the Russian near rear.[18]
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to rhetorically distance himself from Russia’s recent incursion into Polish airspace in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that Belarus is de facto a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Lukashenko claimed on September 15, in response to Russia’s incursion into Polish airspace from September 9 to 10, that Belarus was not involved in any drone incursions into Polish and Lithuanian airspaces.[19] Lukashenko claimed that Belarusian forces downed drones heading toward Poland and spent “massive” resources destroying the drones. Lukashenko claimed that Belarus informed Polish authorities about the drones that Belarusian forces failed to take down. Lukashenko accused Poland of “playing dirty tricks” and claimed that Poland clearly has unspecified plans that Belarus must ”unravel“ and ”resist.“ Lukashenko’s statements are likely an attempt to deflect from the ways Belarus is cooperating with Russia and assisting Russia’s war effort, including through the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 military exercises, Belarusian efforts to assist Russia in its sanctions evasion schemes, and support for Russian force generation.[20]