Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking not only in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions but also in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These counterattacks are generating tactical, operational and strategic effects that may disrupt Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign plan. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 9 that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces (GoF), which includes the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and operates in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, has “virtually halted” advances near Orikhiv and in the area just south of Zaporizhzhia City, west of Orikhiv.[1] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Richne-Prymorske direction (both south of Zaporizhzhia City) forced Russian small groups to retreat from northern and central Prymorske. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Novoyakolivka and northern Lukyanivkse (both southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and noted that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces south of Pavlivka (just south of Novoyakolivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to advance near Orikhiv itself, attacking southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Robotyne and Danylivka, and west and northwest of Orikhiv toward Mali Shcherbaky in the direction of Novopavlivka without success. Mashovets noted that the counterattacks are forcing elements of the 58th CAA and attached airborne (VDV) elements to repel Ukrainian counterattacks instead of furthering their advances.
ISW observed in February 2026 that Ukrainian forces began limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast that have continued into early March, which may have mutually reinforced Ukrainian efforts to counterattack against the Russian 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[2] Mashovets reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces began to counterattack near Lukyanivske after Russian forces had advanced 1.5 kilometers near Lukyanivkse and Prymorske.[3] Ukrainian forces began to counterattack in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and retake lost territory in late January — just before Ukrainian forces increased offensive activity in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to pressure Russian forces in the area south of Zaporizhzhia City, and reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces increased ground and drone activity in the area in mid- to late- February.[5] Mashovets reported on March 9 that the Russian command has maintained the same number of troops and composition of forces in the area, even after the Ukrainian counterattacks.[6] Ukrainian forces‘ dual tactical efforts to halt and push back Russian gains are synergizing with each other and forcing Russian troops in Zaporizhia Oblast to contend with counterattacks in both the 58th CAA’s and the 5th CAA’s areas of responsibility (AoR) simultaneously.
The Russian command likely hoped that Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction would complement Russian advances near Orikhiv, which would in turn enable Russian forces to advance toward Orikhiv from the east and west and later enable advances toward Zaporizhzhia City itself.[7] ISW assessed in early December 2025 that the 5th CAA’s tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole could enable Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions.[8] The Russian military command indicated on December 29 that it intended to join the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions in order to advance on Zaporizhzhia City.[9] The commander of a Ukrainian regiment involved in the counterattacks in the Hulyaipole direction stated on March 8 that the Russian military command’s plans to seize Hulyaipole are “part of a broader plan” to advance westward in Zaporizhia Oblast.[10] Russian forces began making relatively fast gains in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late October and early November 2025.[11] The Russian military command likely hoped to exploit those advances to enable a Russian assault of Orikhiv from the east and west, which would allow Russian forces to outflank Ukraine’s well-fortified defensive lines in Zaporizhia Oblast that run east to west rather than trying to advance using frontal assaults from the south. Ukraine’s counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late January greatly complicated Russian plans to advance rapidly to Orikhiv and then Zaporizhzhia City from the east.[12]
Russian forces are thus facing a far more difficult battlefield situation in southern Ukraine in early March than they did at the start of 2026.[13]Ukrainian forces have tied up Russian forces in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions and Russian forces have had to rapidly adapt to communication and command and control (C2) problems resulting from the February 1 Starlink block.[14] Ukraine’s counterattacks have prevented Russian forces from fortifying the positions that they advanced to in the fall of 2025. Ukrainian forces’ success resulted in part from the fact that Russian forces did not follow up advances made through Russian infiltration tactics by consolidating their newly-held positions.[15] Infiltration tactics rely on the Russian infantry to infiltrate into Ukrainian rear areas, accumulate, and consolidate in the new frontline positions, but Russian forces appear to have tried to continue their advances without adequately consolidating, thereby enabling Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian forces’ ability to take advantage of these Russian mistakes has likely deprived Russian forces of the starting offensive positions from which they intend to launch a summer offensive with the unrealistic goal of reaching Zaporizhzhia city.
The counterattacks in southern Ukraine are also having strategic effects in other parts of the theater.Mashovets assessed on March 9 that the Dnepr GoF may have to pull elements from Kherson Oblast to help Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast contend with the Ukrainian counterattacks.[16] Mashovets noted that it will likely be difficult to pull forces away from the Kherson direction as the Russian command has previously redeployed Dnepr GoF VDV and assault elements to other areas of the theater, including to the Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka directions in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command recently redeployed elements to the neighboring Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions and would likely struggle to further reinforce Russian elements in the western Zaporizhia direction without denuding Kherson.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 9 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) from Sumy Oblast to Kherson Oblast, which the milblogger claimed then caused a ”critical situation” in the regiment’s previous area of responsibility near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), forcing the Russian military command to redeploy most of the regiment back to Sumy Oblast.[18] ISW cannot independently verify the report at this time. The Russian command risks vulnerabilities in other areas of the theater should it redeploy forces to the southern part of the theater, moreover, since Russian forces in all directions are struggling to advance and, in Kupyansk in particular, even to hold their ground.
The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is. ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces have already had to deploy forces from their operational reserve simply to support ongoing combat operations — likely including in Kupyansk where Ukraine has conducted a series of successful counterattacks.[19] ISW also assessed on March 7 that the Russian command likely laterally redeployed elite VDV and naval infantry units from Donetsk Oblast to the southern frontline, likely in order to respond to recent Ukrainian gains in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.[20] Russia’s constrained personnel reserves may inhibit Russia’s plans in other areas of the theater, as the Russian command’s decision to redeploy forces from Donetsk Oblast to Zaporizhia Oblast may hinder its anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[21] The fact that a series of Ukrainian tactical counterattacks are forcing Russia to make operational and strategic level decisions indicates that Russian forces are stretched very thinly even in the run-up to a planned major offensive. The Kremlin will likely need either to abandon or to substantially adjust previous plans for its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive — either in Donetsk Oblast or in Zaporizhia Oblast or both. Russian forces are thus struggling to sustain offensive operations when faced with tactical setbacks — a phenomenon that similarly occurred in November 2025 when Ukrainian attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area strained elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) operating in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions.[22] The Russian military simply does not have the capacity to overrun Ukrainian defenses that Russian President Vladmir Putin constantly claims.[23]
Ukrainian interceptor drones and personnel with experience downing Shahed drones are helping protect US military infrastructure in the Middle East. The New York Times reported on March 9 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine recently sent interceptor drones and a team of drone experts to protect US military bases in Jordan.[24] Zelensky stated that another team of Ukrainian experts will go to the Middle East to help unspecified states evaluate their protective measures against Iranian drones. Zelensky reported that Ukraine has received calls from leaders of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia seeking Ukrainian help to defend against Iranian strikes. Zelensky separately added on March 9 that Ukraine has received 11 requests so far from Middle Eastern and European states and the United States for Ukrainian support.[25] The ongoing Iranian strikes against Middle Eastern states present an opportunity for Ukraine’s Middle Eastern partners to invest in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) to enable Ukraine to scale up its interceptor drone and other defense capacity for both Ukraine and its partners.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to support the Iranian regime while predictably taking advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to engage in energy blackmail. Putin sent a congratulatory note to new Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamanei on March 9.[26] Putin reaffirmed Russia’s “unwavering” support for and solidarity with Iran and expressed confidence in Khamenei’s ability to “unite the Iranian people in the face of severe trials.” Putin held a meeting on March 9 with members of the Russian government and directors of Russian oil and gas companies to discuss rising energy prices due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.[27] Putin stated that the current high prices are only temporary, so Russia should take advantage of the situation now. Putin called on the Kremlin to use additional export revenues to reduce Russia’s debt, including to domestic banks. Putin claimed that Russian energy companies have always been stable and stated that Russia will continue to supply oil and gas to its “reliable partners” in the Asia-Pacific region and in Eastern European countries such as Slovakia and Hungary. Putin called for Russia to divert exports from other European Union (EU) states in order to gain a foothold in other markets. Putin stated that Russia would resume exports to EU states should they “reorient” and pursue cooperation with Russia.
Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea over the past month. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a radar station of a Russian S-300 air defense system near occupied Spokynye (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 8 to 9.[28] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 9 that Ukrainian SSO drone strikes destroyed a Russian Oborona-14 radar, Nebo-U radar, and two radars in a radio-transparent dome in occupied Yevpatoria (roughly 170 kilometers from the frontline).[29] Geolocated footage confirms the SSO strikes against Yevpatoria.[30] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot in occupied Kherson Oblast on March 7.[31] Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a building in Novooleksiivka (roughly 175 kilometers from the frontline just north of the Crimean border).[32] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea in the past weeks, with Ukrainian officials reporting strikes at least 14 times since February 11.[33] Ukrainian forces have largely targeted Russian air defense systems, radar systems, drone infrastructure, and ammunition facilities. Ukrainian strikes have likely degraded Russian air defense in the area, allowing subsequent strikes to reach their intended targets.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 9 that the United States asked to postpone the US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations originally planned for this week due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.[34]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking not only in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions but also in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These counterattacks are generating tactical, operational and strategic effects that may disrupt Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign plan.
- The Russian command likely hoped that Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction would complement Russian advances near Orikhiv, which would in turn enable Russian forces to advance toward Orikhiv from the east and west and later enable advances toward Zaporizhzhia City itself.
- Russian forces are thus facing a far more difficult battlefield situation in southern Ukraine in early March than they did at the start of 2026.
- The counterattacks in southern Ukraine are also having strategic effects in other parts of the theater.
- The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is.
- Ukrainian interceptor drones and personnel with experience downing Shahed drones are helping protect US military infrastructure in the Middle East.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to support the Iranian regime while predictably taking advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to engage in energy blackmail.
- Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea over the past month.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Hulyaipole, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Russia. Russian forces launched two missiles and 197 drones against Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.