Institute for the Study of War: Ukraine liberated more territory than it lost in lete February

The United States and Israel are striking Iran’s drone and missile facilities to reduce the pressure on missile and drone interceptors – a capability the United States is denying Ukraine by refusing to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles. The US-Israeli combined strike campaign is targeting missile and drone production and storage facilities throughout Iran.[1] The United States, however, has long denied Ukraine the weapons necessary to do the same to Russian facilities. Ukrainian forces are able to conduct long-range drone strikes against a significant portion of Russia’s rear, but these drones’ payloads are limited and not suitable to destroy hardened objects or large facilities. Ukraine has therefore repeatedly requested US-produced Tomahawk missiles, a request that the United States ultimately denied in Fall 2025.[2] The US provision of a small number of Tomahawks to Ukraine would likely enable Ukrainian forces to significantly damage or even destroy key missile and drone production and storage facilities deep in the Russian rear, particularly highly concentrated production areas such as the Shahed drone factory at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,100 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[3] Ukraine would likely also be able to significantly damage Russian missile production sites in the rear with Tomahawks, such as the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) that manufactures a variety of ballistic missiles.[4] Ukrainian forces struck Alabuga with long-range drones in 2025 and struck the Votkinsk plant with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles in February 2026.[5] These previous Ukrainian strikes did not destroy or disable the Alabuga or Votkinsk plants, however. US provisions of Tomahawks in Fall 2025 could have helped Ukraine to strike drone and missile production and storage sites in the Russian rear as Ukraine continued to develop and produce its own Flamingo missiles. Such Tomahawk strikes may have been able to significantly degrade Russia’s Winter 2025-2026 long-range missile and drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian forces liberated more territory than they lost in the last two weeks of February 2026 for the first time since the Summer 2023 counteroffensive. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces liberated roughly 257 square kilometers since January 1. Ukrainian forces achieved a net gain of almost 33 square kilometers between February 14 and 20 and a net gain of roughly 57 square kilometers between February 21 and 27. The last time Ukrainian forces made net gains was during the Summer 2023 counteroffensive, when Ukrainian forces gained 377 net square kilometers in June 2023, 257 net square kilometers in July 2023, and 1.47 net square kilometers in September 2023. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on March 3 that Ukrainian forces have regained 460 square kilometers since the start of 2026.[10] ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances, as ISW depicts the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances until enough open-source evidence emerges to allow ISW to confidently assess that Russian forces no longer hold those positions. The frontline in Ukraine has also become porous with a lack of contiguous lines, adding additional complexity to assessing the true control of terrain (COT). Ukrainian successes in February 2026 are noteworthy, the variation between Zelensky’s and ISW’s numbers notwithstanding. The successful, localized Ukrainian counterattacks of recent weeks are unlikely to grow into a large-scale counteroffensive, and Russian forces will very likely stabilize their positions and begin advancing again. Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes, however, have disrupted Russian efforts to set conditions for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive and will force Russian troops to establish stable defenses before starting the fight to regain lost ground.

Russia has failed to achieve the objectives of its Winter 2025-2026 long-range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s winter campaign aimed to degrade Ukraine’s energy security, industrial capacity, and will to continue fighting against Russian aggression.[20] Russia has failed to accomplish each of these objectives, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noting on March 3 that Russia failed to divide Ukrainians, turn the Ukrainian population against the Ukrainian military, or cause the Ukrainian people to call for a stop in fighting.[21] Russia was able to significantly damage the Ukrainian energy grid and create months of hardship for the population across the country. Russian forces, however, did not succeed in their goal of splitting Ukraine’s energy grid in half and creating energy islands cut off from electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[22] Russian strikes also failed to prevent Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) from growing, with Advisor to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Gvozdiar stating on February 19 that the DIB had increased production fiftyfold since 2022 and reached an estimated $50 billion worth of production.[23] Ukrainian government sources reportedly assessed in January 2026 that Russian strikes aimed to make Kyiv City uninhabitable, but the city of nearly three million continues to function and to repair its energy infrastructure.[24] Zelensky stated on March 2 that Russian forces are preparing a new wave of strikes, including against Ukraine’s water supply.[25] Russia’s shift to a new target set is an implicit acknowledgement that its Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign failed to achieve its objectives. Russia will likely be able to apply the lessons it learned during its winter strikes against energy infrastructure to future strikes against water infrastructure, particularly as both Soviet-era systems contain limited but critical vulnerabilities that Russian drones can successfully damage or destroy despite their smaller payloads.

Key Takeaways

1. The United States and Israel are striking Iran’s drone and missile facilities to reduce the pressure on missile and drone interceptors – a capability the United States is denying Ukraine by refusing to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles.
2. Russian officials continue to condemn the US-Israeli strike campaign against Iran, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to support the United States.
3. Ukrainian forces liberated more territory than they lost in mid to late February 2026 for the first time since the Summer 2023 counteroffensive.
4. The Russian military command continues to operate in an alternate reality, setting wildly unrealistic deadlines that do not match Russia’s actual battlefield capabilities.
5. Russia has failed to achieve the objectives of its Winter 2025-2026 long-range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure.
6. Insider reports continue to indicate that the Kremlin is expecting the war to continue until at least the September 2026 State Duma elections.
7. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.