January 5, 2025

Institute for the Study of War: Ukraine steps up ground operations in Kursk

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion’s worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka “some time ago, however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat “Aida” Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military’s ability to react to Ukraine’s ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia’s ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.
  • Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.
  • Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military’s ability to react to Ukraine’s ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.
  • Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.
  • The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA’s area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.
  • Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
  • Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia’s two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.
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Wilson Center

Forced displacement represents one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of our time. Individuals and families, torn from the fabric of their communities, find themselves navigating a world of uncertainty, often without basic necessities or a clear path to safety. There are currently some 110 million forced displaced, and this number is growing by 10 million each year!

At the heart of this crisis are the political triggers. Armed conflicts, ethnic or religious persecutions, and systemic human rights abuses force millions to flee their homes in terror. Many are displaced within their own national boundaries, while others seek asylum abroad. If these factors change as a result of political shifts at home or the pressures from abroad, they can return to their homes. Forced displacement is thus different from environmentally driven displacement, as victims of climate change may never be able to return to their homes.

The ramifications of any sort of displacement are profound, not just for those directly affected, but also for host communities and countries. Overburdened infrastructures, socio-economic strains, and cultural tensions can arise, necessitating comprehensive strategies to foster harmony and integration. Yet the root causes of forced displacement can be remedied with a concerted focus by local players and international diplomacy.

Organizations like Refugees International play a crucial role in this arena, advocating for the rights and needs of the displaced, conducting on-the-ground assessments, and influencing policymakers to take informed actions. Their relentless work underscores the gravity of the situation and the urgency ofinternational cooperation. But they, too, are overwhelmed by the rapid expansion of the crisis.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), with its core principles centered on the protection of civilians during conflicts, plays a pivotal role in this discourse. Yet, despite clear legal frameworks, compliance remains
inconsistent. This initiative emphasizes the importance of upholding and reinforcing these international standards.

It’s not just about recognizing the problem; it’s about active engagement. We urge governments, organizations, and individuals to prioritize the rights and needs of the forced displaced. Through collective efforts, informed policies, and sustained advocacy, we can shift the narrative from passive acknowledgment to proactive intervention.