Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 21 that drone operators of the Ukrainian military, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai and the Russian Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast (14km south of Toropets).[1] Footage published on September 20 and 21 shows explosions and secondary detonations at both arsenals, and fires continued at both locations during the day on September 21.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tikhoretsk Arsenal contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea, at the time of the strike.[3] An SBU source told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske that the Russian 23rd Arsenal contained Iskander and Tochka-U ballistic missiles and that Ukrainian forces also struck the Shaykovka Airfield in Kaluga Oblast, and Hromadske included footage of an explosion though it is unclear whether the footage shows the Shaykovka Airfield.[4] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces intercepted 101 Ukrainian drones overnight, including 18 drones over Krasnodar Krai and three drones over Tver Oblast.[5] Krasnodar Krai regional authorities blamed the Tikhoretsk Arsenal explosion on falling Ukrainian drone debris, declared a local state of emergency, altered railway schedules and routes, and evacuated about 1,200 civilians from the area.[6] The United Kingdom (UK) MoD reported that the Russian Main Artillery Directorate’s 103rd Arsenal near Toropets, which Ukrainian forces struck on September 17 to 18, had recently undergone modernization because Russian forces had been improperly storing munitions at their arsenals, causing explosions at several depots.[7]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Podlet K1 mobile long-range radar system that was protecting the Tikhoretsk Arsenal, and this system is at least the fifth Podlet K1 system that Ukrainian forces have reportedly damaged or destroyed since February 2022.[8] The Podlet K1 system can detect up to 200 aerial targets simultaneously at a range of up to 300 kilometers and the Russian military introduced the system into service in 2015.[9] Russian forces use the Podlet K1 system to detect air targets at low and very low altitudes for Russian air defenses, including S-300 and S-400 systems.[10] Ukrainian forces have reportedly damaged or destroyed at least four other Russian Podlet K1 systems since the onset of the full-scale invasion, including in Lazurne, Kherson Oblast as of July 20, 2022; near Zelenotropynske, Kherson Oblast as of July 24, 2022; in Belgorod Oblast as of November 1, 2023; and in an unspecified location as of April 27, 2024.[11] Ukrainian forces also found a destroyed Russian Podlet K1 system in Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast on November 14, 2022, following Ukraine’s liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast as of November 11, 2022, though the cause of this Podlet K1’s destruction was unclear.[12]
The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia’s decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia’s volunteer recruitment. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 20 forming an interdepartmental commission under the Russian Security Council to more fully staff the Russian Armed forces with contract servicemembers (kontraktniki).[13] The commission will coordinate the activities of federal, regional, and municipal government bodies and organizations in selecting candidates for contract military service, including improving the selection process; assessing ongoing efforts to attract candidates to volunteer formations; and considering proposals to improve material incentives and social support for kontraktniki and their families. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev will chair the commission and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov will be the deputy chairperson of the commission. Russian authorities have previously signaled their intention to centralize volunteer recruitment efforts by opening a “Military Service Consulting Center” in Moscow City, posturing Moscow as the center of Russia’s federal recruitment efforts, investing in higher-quality recruitment ads, and leveraging national figures in this federal-level recruitment campaign.[14] Russian officials claimed in August and September 2024 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast prompted more people to express interest in becoming volunteers (whom the Kremlin also began to call kontraktniki), but Putin’s decision to centralize Russia’s volunteer recruitment efforts indicates that Putin assesses that Russia is not recruiting a sufficient number of volunteers to meet Russia’s manpower needs.[15] Putin notably signed the decree on the eve of the second anniversary of the Fall 2022 partial mobilization, and this decree further signals his aversion to involuntary mobilization at this time.[16]
Russian federal subjects (regions) have historically formed the basis of Russia’s volunteer recruitment campaigns, and at least 36 Russian regions have reportedly increased one-time payments to volunteers/kontraktniki in 2024, indicating difficulties in Russia’s ability to recruit additional personnel.[17] Three sources close to the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Bloomberg in August 2024 that the Russian military has struggled to recruit enough people to replace increasing Russian manpower losses throughout the war, and one individual told Bloomberg that Russian regions, on average, fell short of their recruitment quotas by about one-third.[18] Medvedev claimed in July 2024 that the MoD’s average daily recruitment rate for kontraktniki was 1,000 people, and an unnamed Western official estimated in August 2024 that Russian forces were suffering on average roughly 1,000 casualties per day, presumably throughout the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, during an interview with UK outlet Independent.[19] ISW cannot independently confirm these numbers, however. The Kremlin will likely be able to continue the current tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine with its current recruitment rate but will likely have to substantially increase its recruitment rates or decrease its daily personnel losses in order to further intensify offensive operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin has likely assessed that it can better control and improve Russia’s volunteer recruitment rates by centralizing and consolidating control over recruitment efforts and can no longer rely on underperforming regional recruitment campaigns to meet Russia’s manpower needs.
The Russian military leadership and government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages. Russian actress Yana Poplovskaya, numerous Russian milbloggers (including supporters of arrested former Russian officer Igor Girkin), and Russian neo-nationalist outlet Tsargrad reported as early as September 13 that Russian authorities arrested an assault detachment commander of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic’s [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) Vladimir Novikov, also known under the alias “Beliy.”[20]Poplovskaya published an appeal asking Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to return Novikov to the frontlines, noting that Novikov had played a key role in the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and Krasnohorivka, has three state courage orders, and has received many of letters from his subordinates demanding his release.[21] Some of Novikov’s subordinates and several milbloggers also noted that they joined the detachment solely because he inspired them.[22] Poplovskaya and a Russian milblogger, who claims to have worked alongside Novikov, claimed that Novikov was arrested after he attempted to stop Chechens from trafficking drugs to his servicemen.[23] Poplovskaya stated that Chechens made a false complaint about Novikov in retaliation, and a milblogger affiliated with Novikov implied that the Russian military command may not have approved of Novikov’s efforts to teach Russian military personnel and Storm-Z convicts to neutralize Ukrainian drone threats because the military command seeks to advance their own career aspirations.[24] The milblogger added that he and Novikov independently developed a counter-drone system called ”seizure of the small sky” with the aim of training Russian counter-drone specialists and that this initiative was against the staff’s protocol.[25] Russian officials did not publicly acknowledge Novikov’s arrest, and Belousov has yet to respond to any appeals.
Tsargrad notably linked Novikov’s arrest to the recent deaths of prominent Russian milbloggers and drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment of the 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) Dmitry Lysakovsky (better known under the alias Goodwill) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (also known as Ernest) possibly overnight on September 12.[26]Tsargrad andseveral Russianmilbloggers familiar with the drone operators claimed that Lysakovsky and Gritsai were suddenly committed to a direct assault operation on September 11 alongside at least 12 other long-range aerial reconnaissance specialists, resulting in 14 people dying in the Pokrovsk direction. Tsargrad implied that the deaths and Novikov’s arrest could be related because both Lysakovsky and Gritsai also expressed concerns over drug usage in combat, and Russian state media amplified claims from Kremlin co-opted milbloggers that drone operators died in the aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike in an unspecified rear area.[27] The two cases, however, may be linked by the Russian military’s command increasing desperation to generate more infantrymen to maintain the initiative in Pokrovsk and Donetsk City directions. Russian sources noted that the assault took place shortly after the Russian military command disbanded Lysakovsky‘s and Gritsai’s drone detachment.[28] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that the Russian military command increasingly began to use servicemembers in the 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade, especially niche specialized detachments, in assaults and that the leadership of 51st CAA follows the motto of “we do not need smart people, we are smart ourselves. We need assaults [and] meat.”[29] The former Storm-Z instructor noted that the 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade disbanded drone detachments of its 268th Infantry Battalion and committed engineers of the 1st Reserve Battalion to battle as infantrymen.[30]
The particularly close timing between two incidents, the recent formal integration of the 1st DNR AC into the Russian military as the 51st CAA, and complaints about the Russian military command’s disregard for specialists in Donetsk Oblast may be symptoms of Russia’s manpower shortages and poor command culture.Novikov’s efforts to train Storm-Z elements to operate counter-drone systems may have contradicted the Russian military command’s intended use of these elements as purely “disposable” assault infantrymen. ISW had previously observed the Russian higher military command dismiss and imprison some popular and effective military commanders who raised concerns about the tempo of Russian operations and persistent issues with Russia’s campaign in Ukraine.[31] The Russian military-political leadership also destroyed the Wagner Group in an effort to reestablish control over and formalize Wagner, despite the fact that the Wagner Group contributed to some Russian innovations and accomplished some tactical military victories.[32]
Iran reportedly did not send mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely due a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers. Reuters, citing three unnamed US and EU officials alongside several other experts, reported on September 21 that Iran did not provide mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 missiles it recently supplied to Russia.[33]Reuters reported that it is unclear why exactly Iran withheld the launchers although its sources suggested that Russia might instead use modified Russian-made vehicles to launch the missiles. Both Russia and Iran have repeatedly denied the Iranian supply of Fateh-360 missiles to Russia.[34] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on September 20 that US statements regarding Iranian and North Korean missile supplies to Russia are “fables” and that Russia has a sufficient stockpile of weapons.[35] Iran likely did not supply Russia with the mobile launchers given that shipping the launchers would require additional transportation and because, as noted by Reuters, Russia has alternative capabilities for launching the missiles. This arrangement enables both countries to avoid the logistical burden of transporting the launchers while allowing for more discreet transfer of the Fateh-360 missiles, enabling them to better obscure the supply chain and deny Iranian involvement in the Russian war effort. The fact that Iran did not send launchers does not in itself indicate anything about Iran’s commitment to supporting the Russian war effort.
Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet era tactic and mindset that defines a clear ideological division in the world. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin approved the list of 47 countries deemed to have “destructive attitudes” that clash with “Russian spiritual and moral” values on September 20 following a recent presidential decree facilitating immigration to Russia for individuals who reject “destructive neoliberal values” in their home countries.[36] The list includes Western and other allied countries that have largely supported Ukraine, but notably does not include Slovakia, Hungary, Turkey, Moldova, and Georgia.[37] This move underscores a pattern in which Russian officials accuse the West and the US of creating ideological divides supposedly aimed at isolating Russia, while engaging in this Cold War-style behavior, promoting global ideological camps and separation themselves.[38] Russia has recently enhanced efforts at establishing Eurasian security forums and mechanisms such as the Russian-proposed ”Eurasian security architecture” that aim to exclude the West and enhance divides based on these alleged ideological lines.[39] ISW has also observed that the Kremlin recently intensified efforts to codify a state ideology based on vague Russian “traditional values” while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which notably forbids such endeavors.[40]
Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble. Prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Mikhail Zvinchuk gave an interview to Belarusian state newswire Belta on September 20 describing the war in Ukraine as a “strange under-war” that predominantly operates on a political plane.[41] Zvinchuk claimed that the West’s primary objective of the war in Ukraine is not to achieve a strategic military defeat of Russia, but rather to secure profits and political advantages domestically. He noted that if the West genuinely aimed to defeat Russia, it would have provided Ukraine with more weapons and means of combat along with greater NATO involvement. Zvinchuk argued that the West’s actions have not significantly challenged Russia and suggested that the West’s slow and limited support has given Russia enough time to strengthen its defenses and build up its forces. Zvinchuk also falsely claimed that Ukraine is simply a testing ground for Western artificial intelligence (AI) and command and control (C2) systems, echoing previous Russian statements suggesting that Ukraine is simply a military testing site for the West.[42]Western hesitation in approving Ukraine’s ability to use long-range Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia and previous delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine may have further confirmed the Kremlin’s assessment that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine.[43] Western-policymakers maintain the power to properly equip Ukraine and challenge the Kremlin’s assessment of Western commitment to Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21.
- The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia’s decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia’s volunteer recruitment.
- The Russian military leadership and government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages.
- Iran reportedly did not send mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely due a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers.
- Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet era tactic and mindset that defines a clear ideological division in the world.
- Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Tortesk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
- The Kremlin has not fully suppressed localized protests organized by wives of Russian mobilized servicemen since declaring partial mobilization on September 21, 2022.